Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV24199, Date: 2025-04-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV24199 Hearing Date: April 4, 2025 Dept: 50
SECURITY GUARDS OF AMERICA, INC, Plaintiff, vs. CA STUDENT LIVING USC, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; BENJAMIN A TROUTMAN, an individual; JOHN DIEDRICH, an individual,
and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: |
24STCV24199 |
Hearing Date: |
April 4, 2025 |
|
Hearing
Time: 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT |
Background
Plaintiff Security Guards of America, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed this
action on September 18, 2024 against Defendants CA Student Living USC, LLC,
Benjamin A. Troutman, John Diedrich, and Does 1-25. The complaint alleges causes of action for (1)
breach of written contract – Security Services Agreement; (2) Breach of Written
Contract – Assumption and Guaranty; and (3) Fraud.
Defendants CA Student Living USC, LLC (“Student Living”) Benjamin A.
Troutman (“Troutman”), and John Diedrich (“Diedrich”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) demur to Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff opposes.
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used
only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack
or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) “To survive a demurrer, the
complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need
not be alleged.” ((C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
B. Allegations of the
Complaint
Plaintiff and Student Living entered into a Security Services
Agreement, pursuant to the terms of which, Plaintiff would provide security
services for Defendants at 510 W 31st Street, Los Angeles, CA 90007. The
security services were to commence on June 26, 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) The agreement includes a Credit Card
Authorization and Consent Form, by which Troutman assumed the responsibility
for and/or guaranteed the payment for services provided by Plaintiff pursuant
to the Security Services Agreement. (Complaint,
¶ 10.) Plaintiff has fully performed its
obligations and issued invoices for payment of its services; however,
Defendants have failed to pay the invoices. The outstanding balance of the
unpaid invoices is $41,740.85. (Complaint,
¶11.) Plaintiff is entitled to legal
interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per year, plus reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs for bringing this action to recover the unpaid balance. (Complaint, ¶ 12.)
C. Second Cause of Action for Breach of Written Contract
To state a cause of
action for breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the
existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the
plaintiff.” ((Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
If a breach of contract claim
“is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out
verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must
be attached and incorporated by reference.” ((Harris
v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may
also “plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.”
((Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG
Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29
Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)
Defendants argue that
the breach of contract cause of action fails to state sufficient facts because
it fails to provide any basis to hold Troutman personally liable for breach of
contract to Plaintiff. Defendants argues that Troutman’s position as an
employee of Student Living is insufficient to hold him liable for the
companies’ alleged wrongful acts citing Sonora
Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 538 (2000) (“Ordinarily,
a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its
stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities
and obligations.” [citations omitted]).
However, a demurrer
assumes the facts as alleged in the complaint to be true. Here, the complaint specifically alleges that
Troutman personally assumed the responsibility for and/or guaranteed the
payment for services provided by Plaintiff.
(Complaint, ¶ 17; Exhibit A – Credit Card Authorization and Consent Form
signed by Troutman and not on behalf of Student Living.) Adequate consideration
is alleged in that security services were provided in exchange for Troutman’s
responsibility for and/or guarantee.
The demurrer as to this
cause of action is OVERRULED.
D. Third Cause of
Action for Fraud
“The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c)
intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”
(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135
Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be
alleged specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal
construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. ((Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud
against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons
allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom
they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. ((Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)
Plaintiff must allege fraud with particularity. “This means: (1) general pleading of the
legal conclusion of fraud is insufficient; and (2) every element of the cause
of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically, and
the policy of liberal construction of pleading will not usually be invoked to
sustain a pleading that is defective in any material respect.” ((Wilhelm v. Pray,
Price, Williams & Russell (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331.)
To state a claim for promissory fraud, Plaintiff must allege specific
factual circumstances beyond contract breach which reflect Defendants’
contemporaneous intent not to perform. (Hills Transportation Co. v. Southwest Forest Ind., Inc.
(1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Diedrich electronically executed the Security Services Agreement on
behalf of Student Living, as its authorized signatory, but did not in fact
intend to abide by the terms of the Security Services Agreement, and intended
to breach it. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff does not allege specific facts to
show that Defendants did not intend to pay Plaintiff at the time Defendants executed
the agreement with Plaintiff. Plaintiff also
does not allege the names of the persons allegedly making the false
representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, etc.
The demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer as to the second cause of action,
but SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the third cause of action with leave to amend.
The
Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within
20 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20
days, the Court orders (a) Student Living to file and serve its answer to the complaint
within 30 days of this Order, and (b) Diedrich to file and serve a proposed
judgment of dismissal.
Defendants are ordered to
give notice of this Order.¿¿
DATED: April 4, 2025 ________________________________
Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court