Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 24STCV25720, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV25720    Hearing Date: January 22, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiffs Kiara Jaime Flores and Gustavo Torres (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action on October 3, 2024 against Defendants Kyung K. Choi, Kyung Min Choi, Albert Santos, and Yvonne Santos. The Complaint alleges fourteen causes of action.

On December 20, 2024, Cross-Complainants Albert Santos and Yvonne Santos filed a Cross-Complaint against a number of Cross-Defendants, alleging seven causes of action.

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “[o]n or about April 30, 2021, Plaintiffs entered into a lease agreement with Defendants Kyung and Kyung Min for the residential property located at 423 E. 61st Street, Unit #1, Los Angeles, CA 90003 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Subject Property’).” (Compl., ¶ 14.) “Defendants Kyung and Kyung Min owned and managed the Subject Property until June 2024. At that time, Defendants Albert and Yvonne Santos acquired ownership of the property, and they have remained the owners and managers from June 2024 to the present.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs allege that “[f]rom the very beginning of Plaintiffs’ tenancy, the Subject Property was plagued by numerous uninhabitable conditions, which Defendants Kyung and Kyung Min, and later Defendants Albert and Yvonne Santos, consistently failed to address despite repeated complaints and notifications from Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he defective conditions of the Subject Property include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Cockroach, rodent, vermin, and pest infestation;

b. Extensive water damage; c. Improper or faulty kitchen sink; d. Improper ventilation;

e. Inadequate electrical wiring; f. Defective windows and window screens; g. Broken or missing floor tiles; h. Ongoing Plumbing Issues; i. Missing smoke detectors; j. Ineffective waterproofing and weather protection; and k. Overall dilapidation and disrepair.” (Compl., ¶ 23.)  

Albert Santos and Yvonne Santos (jointly, the “Santos Defendants”) now demur to the fourteenth cause of action of the Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice.

Discussion

A.    Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” ((C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. ((Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.  ((Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

B.    Fourteenth Cause of Action for “Violation of LAMC Chapter XV, Article 1, § 151.05.A”

In the fourteenth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants never served Plaintiffs with a copy of a valid registration or annual registration renewal statement as required by LAMC Chapter XV §151.05.A.” (Compl., ¶ 200.)

Plaintiffs allege that “[b]y failing to comply with LAMC Chapter XV §151.05.A, Defendants were not entitled to demand or receive rent from Plaintiffs at any time during Plaintiffs’ tenancy…Nevertheless, during the period of May 2021 to September 2024, Defendants unlawfully demanded and obtained $52,000.00 in rent from Plaintiffs…As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failure to comply with LAMC Chapter XV §151.05.A, Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of the $52,000.00 in illegally collected rent.” (Compl., ¶¶ 202-204.) Plaintiffs further allege that they are “entitled to an award of statutory treble damages and attorneys’ fees pursuant to LAMC Chapter XV §151.10.A, which provides attorneys’ fees to prevailing renters, but not prevailing landlords.” (Compl., ¶ 205.)

Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.05(A) provides that “[o]n or after July, 1979, no landlord shall demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first procuring and serving on the tenant or displaying in a conspicuous place a valid written registration statement from the Department or its designee. On or after April 30, 1983, no landlord shall demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first serving a copy of a valid registration or annual registration renewal statement on the tenant of that rental unit.” Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.02 defines “Department” as “The Los Angeles Housing Department.”

Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.10(A) provides that “[a]ny person who demands, accepts or retains any payment of rent in excess of the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or any regulations or orders promulgated hereunder, shall be liable in a civil action to the person from whom such payment is demanded, accepted or retained for damages of three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted or retained exceed the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent which could be lawfully demanded, accepted or retained together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as determined by the court.”

In the demurrer, the Santos Defendants assert that the fourteenth cause of action fails. The Santos Defendants cite to Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 762-763, where “Plaintiff and appellant Lakeesha Lyles, tenant of a rent-controlled apartment, brought an action against her landlords, defendants and respondents Denise Sangadeo-Patel individually and Denise Sangadeo-Patel in her capacity as trustee of the Denise Sangadeo-Patel Trust. Plaintiff alleged various causes of action seeking damages and restitution premised on defendants’ alleged failure to serve her with a copy of a valid rental unit registration statement or annual rental unit registration renewal statement from the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department (Department), as required by Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) section 151.05, subdivision A. That provision is part of a rent control law.” The Court of Appeal in Lyles noted that “[t]he trial court granted defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint. Plaintiff elected not to amend the first amended complaint, stipulated that the trial court could enter judgment, and appealed from that judgment. We interpret the ordinance on which plaintiff’s claims depend as not providing for the remedies sought by plaintiff. We affirm.” ((Id. at p. 763.)

            The Court of Appeal in Lyles found that “[t]he language in LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A. that a landlord may not ‘demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first serving a copy of a valid [rental unit] registration or annual [rental unit] registration renewal statement on the tenant of that rental unit’ does not concern a landlord’s entitlement to rent. It does not disentitle a landlord to rent for a period during which the landlord is not in compliance with LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A. Instead, it concerns the timing of a landlord’s ‘demand’ for or ‘acceptance’ of rent to which the landlord remains entitled.” ((Id. at p. 766.) The Lyles Court further noted as follows:

“Subdivision B. of LAMC section 151.11 permits a tenant to ‘withhold the payment of any rent otherwise lawfully due and owing’ if the tenant’s landlord has failed to comply with LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A. by not serving the tenant with copy of a valid rental unit registration or annual rental unit registration renewal statement. Once such a noncompliant landlord complies with LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A., however, the tenant becomes obligated to pay the current rent and any back rent withheld pursuant to LAMC section 151.11, subdivision B. Thus, the tenant is permitted to withhold rent to which the landlord is otherwise entitled until the landlord complies with LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A., at which time the tenant must pay the landlord all accrued rent. The penalty provision of LAMC section 151.10, subdivision A. applies only when a landlord ‘demands, accepts or retains any payment of rent in excess of the maximum rent … in violation of the provisions of this chapter.’ The maximum rent is that allowed by the rent control provisions of the LARSO. Defendants may have violated the ordinance by accepting the rent at a time when the documents had not been served. But that does not mean that defendants were not ultimately entitled to that rent.” ((Id. at pp. 766-767.) 

            The Lyles Court found that “[t]he idea that the failure of the landlord to serve a copy of a registration statement upon the tenant would lead to a forfeiture of all rent, thereby allowing the tenant to reside rent free in a unit and recover a treble damage penalty, would be an absurd and unreasonable consequence. The ordinance is part of a rent control provision. If a landlord violates the rent control law by charging excessive rent, then sanctions make sense. But the city council could not have meant to impose such severe sanctions for failure to serve annually a registration statement. Until the registration statement is sent, allowing the withholding of rent appears to be the incentive provided by the city council.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 768.)

            The Santos Defendants assert that “[a]s Lyles plainly states, the RSO does not provide for restitution of rent when a landlord fails to serve a tenant with an RSO Statement…Thus, Plaintiff’s fourteenth cause of action for violation of section 151.05.A and restitution of all rent paid fails, and the Santos Defendants’ demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend.” (Demurrer at pp. 8:20-9:2.)

            In the opposition, Plaintiffs assert that “Lyles does not create a blanket prohibition against restitution for violations of §151.05.A, particularly when combined with systemic statutory obligations, other than serving the registration statement under LAMC §151.05.A. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ noncompliance with registration requirements was part of a broader pattern of disregard for the LAMC and RSO, including habitability violations and the unlawful retention of rent.” (Opp’n at p. 5:8-12.) But the Santos Defendants’ demurrer solely concerns the fourteenth cause of action for violation of “LAMC Chapter XV, Article 1, § 151.05.A.” The Court does not see how defendants’ purported “broader pattern of disregard for the LAMC and RSO” demonstrates that Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for the violation of  Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.10(A). 

In the fourteenth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that “[b]y failing to comply with LAMC Chapter XV §151.05.A, Defendants were not entitled to demand or receive rent from Plaintiffs at any time during Plaintiffs’ tenancy.” (Compl., ¶ 202.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failure to comply with LAMC Chapter XV §151.05.A, Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of the $52,000.00 in illegally collected rent.” (Compl., ¶ 204.) But as discussed, the Lyles Court found that “[t]he language in LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A. that a landlord may not ‘demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first serving a copy of a valid [rental unit] registration or annual [rental unit] registration renewal statement on the tenant of that rental unit’ does not concern a landlord’s entitlement to rent. It does not disentitle a landlord to rent for a period during which the landlord is not in compliance with LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) The Lyles Court held that “defendants’ noncompliance with LAMC section 151.05, subdivision A. did not disentitle defendants to the rent they collected from plaintiff…” (Id. at p. 769.)

As discussed, Plaintiffs also allege that they are “entitled to an award of statutory treble damages and attorneys’ fees pursuant to LAMC Chapter XV §151.10.A, which provides attorneys’ fees to prevailing renters, but not prevailing landlords.” (Compl., ¶ 205.)  However, as set forth above, the Lyles Court found that “[t]he idea that the failure of the landlord to serve a copy of a registration statement upon the tenant would lead to a forfeiture of all rent, thereby allowing the tenant to reside rent free in a unit and recover a treble damage penalty, would be an absurd and unreasonable consequence. The ordinance is part of a rent control provision. If a landlord violates the rent control law by charging excessive rent, then sanctions make sense. But the city council could not have meant to impose such severe sanctions for failure to serve annually a registration statement. Until the registration statement is sent, allowing the withholding of rent appears to be the incentive provided by the city council.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 768.) Plaintiffs do not appear to address this portion of the Lyles opinion in their opposition.

            The Court does not see how the facts of Lyles are purportedly distinguishable from those alleged in the Complaint here. As discussed, the Lyles Court “interpret[ed] the ordinance on which plaintiff’s claims depend as not providing for the remedies sought by plaintiff.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) The Court finds that the Santos Defendants have shown that under Lyles, the Los Angeles Municipal Code section on which Plaintiffs’ fourteenth cause of action depends does not provide for the remedies Plaintiffs appear to seek.   

In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains the Santos Defendants’ demurrer to the fourteenth cause of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.  

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Santos Defendants’ demurrer to the fourteenth cause of action of the Complaint, with leave to amend.

The Court orders Plaintiffs to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days of this Order, the Santos Defendants are ordered to file and serve their answer within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿¿ 

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The Santos Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order. 

DATED:  January 22, 2025                           

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Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court