Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 25STCV01841, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01841    Hearing Date: June 9, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Robert Alexander Williams filed this action in pro per against defendants The Salvation Army (“TSA”), John Chamness, Keith Bottjen, Steve Smith, George Baker, and Sheryl Tollerud (“Defendants”) on January 23, 2025. He filed his operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on February 13, 2025. The FAC asserts claims for the following:

            The following is alleged in the FAC and accepted as true upon demurrer:

            TSA employed Plaintiff, who is African-American, as a “Corps Officer” from June 2011 to August 2020. (FAC, ¶¶ 5, 16.) The parties’ dispute arises from events beginning in 2019.

In August 2019, TSA transferred Plaintiff to a facility in Compton. (Id., ¶ 17.) After his transfer, Plaintiff reported various unsafe working conditions at the Compton facility to TSA, through Chamness. (Id., ¶ 18.) Chamness did not act on Plaintiff’s concerns, citing “financial constraints”. (Id., ¶ 19.) In or around December 2019, Plaintiff reported three instances of employee misconduct at the Compton site (the “Misconduct Complaints”); Chamness similarly failed to respond to or investigate those reports. (Id., ¶ 25.)

            Plaintiff’s spouse (“Spouse”), who was also employed by TSA, was injured on the job on November 1, 2019. (Id., ¶ 20.) The investigation led to a legal dispute between Spouse and TSA. (Id., ¶ 22.) Chamness denied Plaintiff family medical leave to care for Spouse during her recovery. (Id., ¶ 23.) Chamness and TSA then embarked on a campaign of harassment and retaliation against Plaintiff and Spouse following Spouse’s injury. (See id., ¶¶ 23-34.)

            The timeline of events beginning in December 2019 is as follows:

            On December 20, 2019, Chamness falsely claimed Plaintiff and Spouse had not informed Chamness of the status of Spouse’s recovery or her plans to return to work. (Id., ¶¶ 26-28.)

            On January 8, 2020, Chamness falsely accused Plaintiff and Spouse of job abandonment. “Subsequently,” Chamness launched a retaliatory investigation (“Investigation”) against Plaintiff, “fabricating claims that [the Investigation] was connected to the [Misconduct Complaints] ... .” (Id., ¶ 29.)

            On January 16, 2020, TSA threatened Plaintiff with disciplinary action unless he and Spouse “attend[ed] a meeting with an in-house psychologist employed by defendant.” (Id., ¶ 31.)

            Sometime around January 27, 2020, TSA, through Chamness, revoked Plaintiff’s childcare benefits and “rescinded [his] assignment of a company issued vehicle”. (Id., ¶¶ 32, 34.) These actions appear to have been related to the Investigation; the FAC implies that by January 27, 2020, Plaintiff had been suspended pending the Investigation’s outcome. (See id., ¶ 33.)[1]

            Chamness and his co-defendant Steve Smith, TSA’s Personnel Secretary, hired an attorney, Dan Woods, to conduct the Investigation. (Id., ¶¶ 30, 35, 45.) [2] In February 2020, TSA “compelled” Plaintiff to meet with Woods. (Id., ¶ 35.) Plaintiff met with Woods at least twice in February 2020. (Id., ¶¶ 35, 37 [“subsequent meeting on February 26th”].) During these meetings Woods belittled Plaintiff and Spouse. (See id., ¶¶ 36-40.) Woods also told he Plaintiff could not “do anything about it” and he had “no rights”. (Id., ¶ 36.)

            On March 18, 2020, Chamness summoned Plaintiff to a meeting (disregarding COVID-19 lockdowns) and demanded that he and Spouse resign or be terminated within 48 hours. (Id., ¶ 42.) The FAC alleges “Plaintiff and his family would be required to vacate their residence within 14 days” despite the ongoing eviction moratorium. (Id., ¶ 43.) (The FAC does not clearly explain the link between Plaintiff’s employment at TSA and his housing.)

            Plaintiff requested TSA’s policy governing termination procedures. (Id., ¶ 44.) Chamness denied there was “no way for Plaintiff to appeal a termination.” (Ibid.) Chamness later sent an email referencing a “Commission of Inquiry” as an appeal process. (Ibid.)

            On March 19, 2020, Plaintiff contacted Steve Smith “to understand the justification for the demand for his resignation and resignation of his wife.” Smith refused to meet with him. (Id., ¶ 45.) Smith also stated Plaintiff could not avail himself of termination appeal policies “because the termination process had not yet officially begun.” (Id., ¶ 48.) On March 21, 2020, Smith reiterated Chamness’ demand that Plaintiff resign within 48 hours. (Id., ¶ 50.) Plaintiff refused. (Id., ¶ 51.)

            On April 15, 2020, and on at least three other unspecified occasions, TSA falsely represented that they would compensate Plaintiff financially if he resigned. What TSA characterized as a “transition grant” contingent on Plaintiff’s resignation was, in fact, Plaintiff’s already-accrued retirement benefits. (Id., ¶¶ 59-60.)

            On May 5, 2020, Sheryl Tollerud, contacted Plaintiff and informed him that his termination paperwork would imminently be processed, and he “would never have another chance to receive the money.” (Id., ¶¶ 61-62.) When Plaintiff stated he intended to appeal his termination, Tollerud responded that Plaintiff’s “pay an[d] all his benefits would be cut off.” (Id., ¶ 63.)

            Plaintiff then discovered that “in order to participate in the Commission of Inquiry to appeal his termination, [he] and his family would be required to relocate to a location of [TSA’s] choosing.” (Id., ¶ 67.) Plaintiff “was informed that he would be prohibited from disclosing this arrangement to anyone” and would forfeit his right to appeal his termination unless he consented to relocation. (Id., ¶ 68.)

            The FAC alleges that on May 15, “Defendant coerced Plaintiff and his family into relocating to a specific location” under false pretenses. (Id., ¶ 69.) The FAC further alleges that “on or around June 5, 2020,” Tollerud informed Plaintiff that “[i]f Plaintiff and his family did not relocate,” Plaintiff could not appeal his termination and he would lose his housing. (Id., ¶ 74.)

            Plaintiff appealed his termination to a Commission of Inquiry. (See id., ¶¶ 77, 80-81.) TSA refused to allow him access to his personnel file beforehand despite his request. (Id., ¶¶ 78-79.) “During the process of the Commission of Inquiry, Plaintiff discovered that Defendants and their agents had engaged in a long-standing pattern of racial discrimination against Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 81.)[3] TSA also presented the Commission with evidence “from Plaintiff’s Pre-Employment college file,” in violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy. (Id., ¶ 83.)

            Plaintiff has subsequently become aware of several Caucasian employees who appealed adverse decisions to TSA’s Commissions of Inquiry and did not suffer similar abuse. (Id., ¶ 84.)

            Plaintiff and Spouse had “a final meeting” with TSA staff in August 2020, during which they were forced to sign legal documents (of unspecified effect) under duress. (Id., ¶¶ 118-119.)

            Plaintiff sued on January 23, 2025.

            Legal Standard

            Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (CC.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

            Request for Judicial Notice

            Defendants request judicial notice of two contracts Plaintiff allegedly signed with TSA and a portion of the transcript of the proceedings before the Commission of Inquiry. These materials are subject to reasonable dispute. The request is denied.

            Meeting & Conference

            Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires a demurring party to meet and confer with its opponent telephonically or in person before filing. Defendants’ counsel filed a declaration that satisfies section 430.41 (Bailey Decl., ¶ 2.)

            Statutes of Limitations

            Plaintiff’s latter five causes of action are time-barred. The latest incident alleged in the complaint is the “final meeting” he and his Spouse had with TSA staff in August 2020. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit in January 2025.        

            Plaintiff’s FEHA claims – his second, third, and sixth – have a statute of limitations of one year. (Gov. Code, § 12965(c); see also Wade v. Ports America Management Corp. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 648, 665-666 [distinct from wrongful termination limitations period].) His wrongful termination claim has a statute of limitation of two years. (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1382-1383 [distinct from FEHA].) His intentional infliction of emotional distress claim also has a statute of limitations of two years. (Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College District (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852-853, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 and Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450.) He filed well outside the applicable limitations periods for all these claims.

            Plaintiff has not filed an opposition indicating how he might plead around the relevant statutes of limitations. And the FAC appears to rule out tolling. Plaintiff was well aware of the basis for his claims in, at the latest, August 2020, so he cannot avail himself of discovery or fraudulent concealment doctrines. To the extent he might argue he suffered continuing violations, they would not stretch past August 2020. His claims are irreparably time-barred, and he has not shown otherwise.

            The demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second through sixth claims is sustained without leave to amend.

            First Cause of Action for Labor Trafficking (Civ. Code, § 51.5)

The limitations period for a trafficking claim is seven years (Id., § 52.5(c)); thus, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is not time-barred on its face.

Civil Code section 52.5 creates a private civil cause of action for victims of trafficking crimes described in Penal Code section 236.1.

The definition in section 236.1 is as follows:

“A person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of human trafficking . . . .”

(Pen. Code, § 236.1(a).)

As relevant to Plaintiff’s claims:

“ ‘Deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another’ includes substantial and sustained restriction of another's liberty accomplished through... coercion ... .”

(Id., subd. (h)(3).)

“ ‘Forced labor or services’ means labor or services that are performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained through ... coercion ... .”

(Id., subd. (h)(4).)

And, crucially:

“ ‘Coercion’ includes a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process; debt bondage; or providing and facilitating the possession of a controlled substance to a person with the intent to impair the person's judgment.”

(Id., subd. (h)(1).)

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s first cause of action fails for uncertainty, and the Court agrees. It is unclear what portion of Plaintiff’s allegations he intends to characterize as coercive; it is unclear when he alleges his liberty was restricted. For example, it is unclear whether he actually continued working for TSA or relocated under duress. Also, because he levies his claim at four defendants but refers repeatedly to “Defendant”, singular, throughout his FAC, it is unclear which allegations apply to which defendants.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

The demurrer having been sustained, the motion to strike is moot.

Conclusion

            The demurrer is sustained in its entirety, with leave to amend only as to the first cause of action.

            The motion to strike is denied as moot.

The Salvation Army is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  June 9, 2025                                  

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court