Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 25STCV01962, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01962    Hearing Date: May 1, 2025    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

            This Anti-SLAPP motion is brought by Defendant and Cross-Complainant Javaherian & Ruszecki (Cross-Complainant), against Cross-Defendants Downtown LA Law Group, LLP, and its owner Farid Yaghoubtil (Cross-Defendants). Plaintiff in the original case is Stephany Buendia. Plaintiff recently settled a personal injury claim against the ride-sharing company LYFT for $825,000. Cross-Complainant was Plaintiff’s original counsel. However, in November of 2022, Plaintiff hired Cross-Defendants to represent her and terminated Cross-Complainant as her counsel.

            After Plaintiff settled her case, Cross-Complainant asserted that they had a lien on Plaintiff’s settlement award. Cross-Complainant argued that their original agreement with Plaintiff contained a contingency fee, and that Plaintiff owed them payment for the work they did on the case. On January 24, 2025, Plaintiff brought suit against Cross-Complainant seeking a declaratory order stating that Cross-Complainant had no right to recover any of the settlement funds. On February 26, 2025, Cross-Complainant filed the relevant Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants. They claim Cross-Defendants stole Cross-Complainant’s client. Specifically, Cross-Complainant alleged: 1) intentional interference with a contract, 2) negligent interference with a prospective economic relationship, and 3) appropriation of name and likeness.

On March 13, 2025, Cross-Defendants filed this Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) in response to the Cross-Complaint.

Evidentiary Objections

Cross-Defendants submits evidentiary objections to both the Declaration of Mark Ruszecki and the Declaration of Corey Bellinger. The Court rules on Cross-Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Declaration of Mark Ruszecki

Objection 1 - ¶ 6: Sustained

Objection 2 - ¶ 7: Sustained

Objection 3 - ¶ 8: Sustained

Objection 4 - ¶ 9: Sustained

Objection 5 - ¶ 10: Sustained

Declaration of Corey Bellinger

Objection 6 –¶¶ 1-14: Sustained

Discussion

Cross-Defendants move to strike two causes of action from the Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16. The causes of action are: 1) intentional interference with a contract, and 2) negligent interference with prospective economic relationship.

CCP § 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) is “a mechanism through which complaints that arise from the exercise of free speech rights can be evaluated at an early stage of the litigation process and resolved expeditiously.” (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [internal quotations omitted].) Courts use a two-step process for determining whether an action is a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or a SLAPP. First, the court determines whether the defendant has established that the challenged claim arises from protected speech. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If such a showing has been made, the court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.)

A.    Step One – Arising from Protected Activity

The first question this Court must answer is whether these two causes of action arise from protected activity. To satisfy this first step, Cross-Defendant must show two things: (i) that the cross-defendants’ act constituted a protected activity; and (ii) the cross-complainant’s cause of action arose from that protected activity. (Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 130.)

i)                  Did Defendant’s Act Constitute a Protected Activity?

Here, Cross-Defendant’s wrongful act was their solicitation of Plaintiff while she was still Cross-Complainant’s client. Specifically, Cross-Complainant alleges that, “[a]t some point, presently unknown by [Cross-Complainant], [Cross-Defendants] obtained private, privileged information they otherwise would not be privy to pertaining to [Plaintiff] and used it to approach, solicit, and be retained by her to represent her for her crash related injuries.” (Cross-Compl. ¶ 15 [emphasis added].) Cross-Complainant repeats this allegation under the “Second Cause of Action” heading. (Id. ¶ 42.)

Under California law, solicitation of a client clearly constitutes protected activity. In Taheri Law Group v. Evans, the court found that communications with a represented client about pending litigation were protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. ((2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482.) The law firm in Taheri filed an action against attorney Neil Evans for several causes of action, including intentional interference with business relations. (Id. at 485.) The complaint alleged that Evans induced one of the firm’s clients to fire them by promising the client outlandish legal outcomes. (Id. at 485–486.) Evans argued his actions were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, because the communications were related to pending litigation. The appellate court found the law firm's causes of action arose directly from communications between Evans and the client about pending litigation. (Id. at 489.) The court ruled this was a protected activity. (Ibid.)

            Similarly, in Pech v. Doniger, lawyer Richard Pech brought suit for interference with a contract against his former clients and their new attorneys. (Pech v. Doniger (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 449.) Pech alleged that after he and his client had already signed a contingent agreement, the defendant attorneys advised his client not to file the complaint Pech prepared. (Id. at 451.)  Instead, they encouraged the client to negotiate a settlement behind Pech’s back. (Ibid.) The Pech court ruled in favor of the defendant attorneys, explaining that, “[c]ounseling others in anticipation of litigation or encouraging others to sue is considered protected prelitigation activity.” (Id. at 462 [citing Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 111].)

            Given the above case law, this Court finds that Cross-Defendants engaged in protected activity when they solicited Plaintiff.

ii)                Did the Causes of Action Arise from that Protected Activity.

Next, the Court must determine whether the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity. In determining whether a cause of action arises from protected conduct, the court focuses on “the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims.” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490-491.) “[T]he critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 (emphasis in original).) In making this determination, the Court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Ibid.)

A)    First Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with a Contract

Cross-Complainant’s first cause of action for intentional interference with a contract does arise out of protected activity. The elements for this cause of action are, 1) a valid contract between plaintiff and third party, 2) defendant's knowledge of that contract, 3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce disruption of the relationship, 4) actual disruption of the contract, and 5) resulting damage. (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148 (emphasis added).)

Under the “First Cause of Action” heading, Cross-Complainant alleges that, “[Cross-Defendants’] conduct prevented performance or made performance of JARU’s contract with [Plaintiff] difficult.” (Cross-Compl. ¶ 29.) Additionally, they incorporate the allegation that, “[a]t some point, presently unknown by [Cross-Complainant], [Cross-Defendants] obtained private, privileged information they otherwise would not be privy to pertaining to [Plaintiff] and used it to approach, solicit, and be retained by her to represent her for her crash related injuries.” (Id. at ¶ 15.)

Notably, solicitation of Plaintiff is the only specific behavior referenced in either of these allegations. This means the only way for Cross-Complainant to satisfy the “intentional disruption” element of their claim is to rely on this allegation of solicitation. Therefore, this cause of action must arise out of that solicitation.

B)    Second Cause of Action: Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relationship

Similarly, Cross-Complainant’s second cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic relationship also arises out of protected activity. The elements for this cause of action are: 1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; 2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; 3) the defendant's knowledge that the relationship would be disrupted if the defendant failed to act with reasonable care; 4) the defendant's failure to act with reasonable care; 5) actual disruption of the relationship; and 6) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. (North Amer. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786.)

Under the “Second Cause of Action” heading, Cross Complainant once again alleges that, “[Cross-Defendants] engaged in wrongful conduct through obtaining private, privileged information they otherwise would not be privy to pertaining to [Plaintiff] and used it to approach, solicit, and be retained by her to represent her for her crash related injuries.” (Cross-Compl. ¶ 42.) This reference to solicitation is the only specific allegation about Cross-Defendants’ conduct. This conclusion also follows logically. Cross-Complainant alleges that their economic relationship was interfered with when Cross-Defendants solicited Plaintiff and convinced them to change lawyers. Therefore, Cross-Defendants’ solicitation is the direct cause of the interference. Thus, this cause of action must be based on the solicitation – a protected activity.

C)    Summary

Since both causes of action arise from protected activities, Cross-Defendants have met their initial burden as to both claims.

iii)              Cross-Complainant Counterarguments

Cross-Complainant insists that this is a mischaracterization of their allegations. (Opp. p. 3:3-4.) They argue that their causes of action are not based on solicitation, but on a, “concerted and coordinated scheme used by Cross-Defendants to pursue and get cases unethically and illegally.” (Id. at p. 1:5-6.) Through multiple declarations, Cross-Complainant suggests that Cross-Defendants are “capping”, (i.e. acquiring clients through other individuals or businesses) which would be a violation of BPC § 6152. (Ruszecki Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.)

But this “highly coordinated scheme” is nowhere to be found in the Cross-Complaint’s allegations. (See generally, Cross-Compl.) The only allegation that comes close is the previously cited allegation: “[a]t some point, presently unknown by [Cross-Complainant], DTLA and/or Farid obtained private, privileged information they otherwise would not be privy to pertaining to Stephany and used it to approach, solicit, and be retained by her to represent her for her crash related injuries.” (Cross-Compl. ¶ 15 [emphasis added].) Aside from a vague reference to some “presently unknown” method of acquiring information, the only actual behavior alleged in the Cross-Complaint is that Cross-Defendants used “privileged information . . . to approach, solicit, and be retained by [Plaintiff]”. Thus, at the end of the day, the alleged action is still the solicitation itself. This means that Cross-Complainant’s causes of action arise out of this solicitation, and, per Pech, solicitation is protected behavior.

iv)              Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the first prong of the two-step anti-SLAPP analysis is satisfied as to the first and second causes of action. The burden now shifts to Cross-Complainant.

B.     Prong Two – Probability of Prevailing

Once the burden shifts, “plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476 [internal quotations omitted].) In making the prong two determination, “the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (CCP § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)

Thus, Cross-Complainant must show that their causes of action for intentional interference with a contract, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations are both legally sufficient and have a probability of success on the merits.

i)                  Statute of Limitations Issues

            Here, Cross-Complainant fails to establish that their claims are legally sufficient. In their Anti-SLAPP motion, Cross-Defendants point out that both causes of action are barred by the statute of limitation. (Mot. to Strike p. 20:5-12.) The statute of limitations for both intentional interference with contract and negligent interference with prospective economic relationship is two years. (CCP § 339(1).) This two-year timer starts running “at the date of the wrongful act.” (Ibid.) In this case, the alleged wrongdoing must have occurred on or before November 7, 2022, as that is when Plaintiff terminated Cross-Complainant’s legal representation. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Cross-Complainant filed their Cross-Complaint on February 26, 2025, more than two years after November 7, 2022. (Cross-Compl. p. 1.) Thus, these claims are barred.

            Cross-Complainant argues their claims are not barred for two reasons. First, they argue that their original agreement with Plaintiff was for a contingency fee. (Opp. p. 9:25-28.) Therefore, their causes of action accrue at the moment of Plaintiff’s recovery, not at Cross-Defendants’ wrongful conduct. (Ibid.) Second, they argue that the discovery rule applies, and so the statute of limitations timer only begins when they actually discovered or should have discovered Cross-Defendant’s wrongful conduct. (Id. p. 10:3-8.) The Court takes each argument in turn.

A)    Accrual of the Causes of Action

First, Cross-Complainant’s causes of action do not accrue at the moment of recovery. The case of Trembath v. Digardi is instructive on this point. (Trembath v. Digardi (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 834, 836.) In Trembath, a plaintiff attorney sued another attorney for intentional interference with a contract. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleged that defendant induced plaintiff’s client to drop plaintiff as their lawyer and hire defendant instead. (Ibid.) Plaintiff filed their case when plaintiff’s former client finally recovered on her claim – more than two years after the initial inducement. (Ibid.) Defendant demurred to plaintiff’s suit, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. (Id. at 835.) The trial court sustained the demurrer, and plaintiff appealed. (Ibid.) On appeal, plaintiff argued that this general rule for accrual should not be applied to his case, because his original agreement with the client was for a contingent fee. (Id. at 836-837.) This meant the damages element of his cause of action against the other lawyer would not accrue until recovery occurred, thus putting plaintiff in an impossible bind where recovery was impossible. (Id. at 837.) The Trembath court was unconvinced by plaintiff’s argument, and upheld the demurrer. (Ibid.) The court held that, “the tort action against the third party is distinct from the contract right against the client, and that the attorney's cause of action upon the former right accrues, as would any other tort action for inducement of breach of contract, no later than the date of the breach which has been tortiously induced.” (Ibid [emphasis added].) What the court is saying here is that there were two people potentially liable to plaintiff – his former client and the lawyer who stole them away. Plaintiff was right that their contingent agreement created special circumstances, but only with respect to their former client. The tortious lawyer’s conduct, on the other hand, was distinct from the specifics of the initial contractual agreement, and therefore the general rule for accrual applied. Thus, under Trembath, the statute of limitations timer for the first cause of action in this case started when Cross-Defendants solicited Plaintiff. Not when Plaintiff settled the case.

            The same is true for the second cause of action. In Trembath, the plaintiff only brought suit for intentional interference with a contract. Therefore, the court’s ruling does not bind beyond that cause of action. Cross-Complainant argues that their cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic relations should accrue at the moment of the settlement, not the moment of the interference. (Opp. p. 9:25-28.) However, Cross-Complainant bears the burden in this analysis. Unfortunately, they cite no case law to suggest that this cause of action does not follow the general rule for accrual. (Ibid.)

As far as this Court can tell, there is no California case law on when the claim of negligent interference with prospective economic relations accrues in a case between lawyers involving a contingency fee. That said, the Court is convinced that the logic of Trembath extends to this cause of action. The statute of limitations for both actions comes from the same statute, CCP § 399. Additionally, both causes relate to a third-party interfering with a separate relationship. This means the third party’s actions are distinct from whatever initial agreement existed. The Trembath court put significant weight on this fact when explaining their own ruling as to interference with a contract. (Trembath, supra at 837.) Moreover, federal courts in California seem to agree with this interpretation. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, the 9th Circuit upheld a time-bar dismissal of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, explaining that, “[u]nder California law . . . an intentional interference claim must be filed within two years of the underlying harmful act.” (Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 788, 810.) This case is not binding precedent. It is not directly on point, and it is about intentional interference, rather than negligent interference. But the fact that the 9th Circuit holds that intentional interference with prospective economic advantage accrues at the moment of interference is persuasive evidence that this Court’s extension of Trembath is correct. Therefore, the Court holds that the statute of limitations for this second cause of action accrued at the moment of Cross-Defendant’s solicitation. That means this action is time-barred.

B)    Discovery Rule

Second, Cross-Complainant argues that their claims are not time-barred, because, per the discovery rule, an action does not accrue until a party knows or should have known about the wrongful act. (Opp. p. 10:3-8.) While this may be true, Cross-Complainant makes no attempt to explain when they knew or should have known about Cross-Defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct. (Ibid.) Their argument cites no allegations, no exhibits, and no specific dates. (Ibid.) They simply declare that “the discovery rule tolled the statute”. (Id at 10:7-8.) In this stage of the analysis, it is the Cross-Complainant’s burden to establish a probability that they will prevail in the case. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc, supra.) Cross-Complainant needed to provide an actual date of discovery, show that it was less than two years before they filed this action, and, most importantly, provide facts to support their assertions. By providing no explanation of how the discovery rule salvages their first two causes of action, Cross-Complainant fails to meet their burden.

C)    Summary

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that neither the first nor second causes of action have a probability of prevailing on the merits, as they are both barred by the statute of limitations.

ii)                Factual Deficiencies

Even if this Court held that these causes of action were not barred by the statute of limitations, there would still be significant factual deficiencies with these claims. Cross-Complainant’s burden is to provide “a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc, supra.) But almost all the evidence they provide via the declarations of Corey Bellinger and Mark Ruszecki is inadmissible as either hearsay or impermissible character evidence. Thus, even if Cross-Complainants had made it to this step of the analysis, they would have failed to establish prima-facie evidence of Cross-Defendants’ wrongful conduct.

iii)              Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Cross-Complainants fail to establish a probability of prevailing as to the first and second causes of action. Therefore, these causes of action shall be stricken from the Cross-Complaint.

C.     Motion to Strike Various Paragraphs

Finally, Cross-Defendants also move this Court to strike four paragraphs from the Cross-Complaint: paragraphs 13, 15, 16 and 17. However, only the oft-cited paragraph 15 directly references the protected activity in this case. (See, Cross-Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15-17.) Therefore, only Paragraph 15 will be struck.

D.    Attorney Fees

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.” 

In their motion, Cross-Defendants ask this Court to set a hearing for an award of fees pursuant to CCP § 425.16(c)(1). Defendants may file a noticed motion concerning the issue of attorney fees and costs.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants’ special motion to strike is granted as to paragraph 15, as well as the first and second causes of action of the Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendants’ special motion to strike is otherwise denied. Cross-Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this Order.   

DATED:  May 1, 2025                 ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court