Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: 294S16415TCV, Date: 2025-01-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 294S16415TCV Hearing Date: January 9, 2025 Dept: 50
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DANIEL PEREZ, Plaintiff, vs. JOSEPH SAFRAN, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
BC630866
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Hearing Date: |
January 9, 2025 |
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Hearing Time: |
10:00 a.m. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF DANIEL
PEREZ’S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO ADVANCE HEARING ON MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO
DEEM THE REAL PROPERTY COMMONLY KNOWN AS 5930 BEEMAN AVENUE, VALLEY VILLAGE,
CA 91607 COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND FOR AN ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT LIEN
ATTACH TO THE PROPERTY AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION |
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Background
Plaintiff Daniel Perez (“Plaintiff”) filed
this action against Defendants Joseph Safran (“Safran”) and One Capital Group,
Inc. on August 17, 2016. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) breach
of written contract, (2) open book account, (3) money had and received,
(4) unjust enrichment, (5) conversion, (6) fraud in the
inducement, and (7) equitable relief.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter
alia, that “[o]n or about October 30, 2014, Safran and Plaintiff executed
an agreement relating to 1240-1350 N. Fairfax Ave., West Hollywood, California
90046 (the ‘Property’) whereby Plaintiff agreed to loan defendants $200,000.00
(the ‘Loan’) for a period of two years…for the sole purpose of purchasing the
Property, in exchange for repayment of the Loan plus returns on the Loan (the
‘Agreement’).” (Compl., ¶ 13.) “Prior to the execution of the Agreement, the
parties orally agreed that if the Property was not timely purchased by the
defendants, the defendants would immediately repay the Loan to Plaintiff in
full with interest.” (Compl., ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleged that “[o]n or about
October 31, 2014, and in accordance with the defendants’ instructions,
Plaintiff wired the defendants $190,000.00 of the $200,000.00 (the ‘Funds’) in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.” (Compl., ¶ 15.) “Immediately
thereafter, the defendants informed Plaintiff that they had sufficient funds to
close the purchase of the Property and that the remaining $10,000.00 of the
Loan no longer needed to be funded by Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 16.) “[S]ometime
after October 31, 204, the defendants deposited the Funds along with funds of
other parties into an escrow account with North American Title Company for the
purposes of purchasing the property.” (Compl., ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff alleged that “sometime after
escrow was opened, a dispute arose between the seller(s) of the Property and
the defendants regarding the purchase of the Property.” (Compl., ¶ 21.) “[S]ometime
in mid-2016, an arrangement was reached between the seller(s) of the Property
and the defendants, whereby the defendants would receive no less than the full
amount of funds deposited into escrow for the purchase of the Property and the
escrow would be cancelled.” (Compl., ¶ 23.) “Upon discovery that the escrow
would be cancelled and that the defendants would be released the funds
deposited into escrow, including his Funds, Plaintiff contacted the defendants
and inquired as to the return of his Loan.” (Compl., ¶ 25.) “[I]nstead of
providing information regarding the escrow and its cancellation, the defendants
became upset and uncooperative and refused to return the funds from escrow,
claiming that the arrangement with the seller was confidential.” (Compl., ¶
27.)
Plaintiff alleges that “an amount no less
than $1,200,000.00, (including Plaintiff’s Funds) was released to the
defendants on or about July 5th or 6th, 2016 and that
escrow was cancelled and that the funds were released.” (Compl., ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a result of the cancellation of escrow and the
failure to purchase the Property, the entire Loan plus interest became due and
payable to Plaintiff. Throughout July 2016, the defendants promised they would
return the Funds in exchange for veiled promises and requests. Despite repeated
demands, the defendants have not returned the Funds and refuse to return the
Funds.” (Compl., ¶ 29.)
On October 25, 2018, the Court entered a
Judgment in this action indicating that “judgment is entered in favor of
Plaintiff Daniel Perez (“Plaintiff”) and against defendants Joseph
Safran, an individual (“Safran”) and One Capital Group, Inc., a
California Corporation (“One Capital”) jointly and severally, in the sum
of $190,000.00.” (Emphasis in original.)
Plaintiff filed an ex parte application “to
advance the hearing on [Plaintiff’s] Motion for Order to Deem the Real Property
Commonly Known as 5930 Beeman Avenue, Valley Village, California 91607
Community Property and for an Order that Creditor’s Judgment Lien Attach to the
Property (the ‘Motion for Order’), which was filed on November 27, 2024, and is
currently set for hearing on May 1, 2025, to January 19, 2025, or
alternatively, to the first available date on the Court’s calendar in the next
sixty (60) days.” Plaintiff’s ex parte application also seeks a
“temporary
restraining order enjoining defendant and judgment debtor Joseph Safran…and
Karen Harrosh…and all persons acting in concert or participating with them from
further encumbering, assigning, or in any way transferring ownership of or
title to the real property commonly known as 5930 Beeman Avenue, Valley
Village, California 91607…until the Court has heard and ruled on the Motion for
Order.” Plaintiff’s ex parte application is unopposed.
On December 19, 2024, Department 47
of this Court issued a minute order providing, inter alia, as follows:
“The above
captioned Ex Parte Application is GRANTED IN PART and continued for further
hearing as indicated below.
The Court will
issue a Temporary Restraining Order issued between now and JANUARY 9, 2025,
pending a final order of this action by the Honorable Teresa A. Beaudet.
Hearing on Ex
Parte Application To Advance Hearing On Motion For An Order To Deem The Real
Property Commonly Known As et. al. And For An Order That Plaintiff’s Judgment
Lien Attach To The Property And Application For Temporary Restraining Order Or
Preliminary Injunction is continued to 01/09/2025 at 10:00 AM in Department 50
at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.”
Discussion
A.
Plaintiff’s Ex Parte
Application to Advance the Hearing on Plaintiff’s “Motion for Order”
As set forth above, Plaintiff
moves ex parte “to advance the hearing on [Plaintiff’s] Motion for Order
to Deem the Real Property Commonly Known as 5930 Beeman Avenue, Valley Village,
California 91607 Community Property and for an Order that Creditor’s Judgment
Lien Attach to the Property (the ‘Motion for Order’), which was filed on
November 27, 2024, and is currently set for hearing on May 1, 2025, to January
19, 2025, or alternatively, to the first available date on the Court’s calendar
in the next sixty (60) days.” (Ex
Parte Application at p. 2:5-11.)
Plaintiff cites to California Rules of Court, rule 1.10, which provides that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the court may extend
or shorten the time within which a party must perform any act under the rules.” Plaintiff also cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(3),
which provides that “[e]very court shall
have the power to do all of the following:…(3) To provide for the orderly conduct of
proceedings before it, or its officers.”
Plaintiff argues that “[g]ood
cause exists for the relief requested herein because Debtor and Harrosh have
demonstrated calculated efforts to divert income and assets in order to avoid
paying [Plaintiff] the amount due pursuant to the judgment.” (Ex Parte
Application at p. 6:13-15, emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff notes that on September
13, 2024, the Court entered an “Order on Motion to Garnish Wages of Spouse of
Judgment Debtor and for Assignment Order Against Spouse” in this action. The September 13, 2024 Order provides, inter
alia, that “Harrosh and Debtor failed to meet their burden of
establishing the validity of the 2001 SPA. Consequently, the 2001 SPA does not
act as a bar to the garnishment sought in the Motion.” The September 13, 2024 Order
further provides as follows:
“That the
following right to payment due, or to become due, including, but not limited to
rent, referral fees, fees for services, contingency fees, royalties,
commissions, payments in general, payments from sales, payments from leases,
payments from refinances, payment from loan originations, payments from
relocations, payments from a patent or copyright, advances, accounts
receivable, general intangibles (as defined by Commercial Code Section
9102(a)(42)), judgments, instruments (as defined by Code of Civil Procedure
Section 708.510(a) and the comment to Section 708.510), etc. (the Funds) from
all third parties, including, but not limited to, Sapir Realty Corporation, a
California corporation and doing business as Weichert, Realtors – All Stars,
and the tenant(s) occupying the real property commonly known as 5930 Beeman
Avenue, Valley Village, California 91607, be, and hereby are, assigned to
Creditor’s counsel c/o Daniel Medioni, Esq. of Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman
& Rabkin, LLP, 11400 West Olympic Boulevard, 9th Floor, Los Angeles,
California 90064, to be applied to the judgment herein until such judgment is
fully satisfied, including interest thereon. Judgment was entered on October
25, 2018, in the principal amount of $190,000.00. The balance on the judgment
is $262,597.70 as of September 23, 2022 (the date the last writ of execution
was issued) and is accruing interest at the rate of $52.05 per day from and
after September 24, 2022…
Harrosh and any
representative, agent, employee or attorney of Harrosh and any person(s) in
active concert and participating with Harrosh are hereby restrained from
encumbering, assigning, disposing of or spending the Funds and/or all rights to
payment thereunder…”
Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[o]n October 4, 2024, less than three
(3) weeks after the Order, Debtor and Harrosh encumbered [5930 Beeman Avenue,
Valley Village, California 91607 (the ‘Property’)] by taking a second deed of
trust in the amount of $285,127.00, secured by the Property (the ‘2nd DOT’)
recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s office as instrument number
20240682403.” (Medioni Decl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[o]n
November 27, 2024, Creditor filed his Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order
to Deem the Real Property Commonly Known as 5930 Beeman Avenue, Valley Village,
California 91607 Community Property and for an Order That Plaintiff’s Judgment
Lien Attach to the Property (the ‘Motion For Order’).” (Meidioni Decl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff’s
counsel asserts that “[t]he 2nd DOT has reduced the amount of equity in the
Property, which is Debtor and Harrosh’s only known asset.” (Meidioni Decl., ¶
12.)
Plaintiff asserts that May 1, 2025 was the “first available [sic] on
the Court’s motion reservation system (CRS) for the Creditor’s Motion for Order
to be heard…” (Ex Parte Application at p. 4:27-28.) Plaintiff states that he is
“concerned that if [Safran] and Harrosh are given five (5) months before the
Motion for Order is heard, Debtors will further encumber or transfer the
Property as evidenced by the 2nd DOT.” (Ex Parte Application at p. 7:1-3.)
Based on the foregoing, and in light of the lack of any opposition,
the Court finds that
Plaintiff
has demonstrated good cause for
the Court to advance the hearing on Plaintiff’s “Motion for Order” filed on
November 27, 2024.
B. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order
A temporary restraining
order may issue when “[i]t appears from facts shown by affidavit or by the
verified complaint that great or irreparable injury will result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (c)(1).) “[T]rial courts should evaluate two interrelated factors when
deciding whether or not to issue [a restraining order]. The first is the
likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second
is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the [restraining
order] were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to
suffer if the [order] were issued.” (Church
of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1251.)
“The
trial court’s determination must be guided by a mix of the
potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing
on one, the less must be shown on the other to support [a restraining order]…Of
course, [t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by
the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits…A
trial court may not grant a [restraining order], regardless
of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the
plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.”(Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior
Court, supra, 99
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1251-1252 [internal quotations omitted].)
Furthermore,
“an injunctive order should
be limited in scope to the subject of the litigation.” (City of Redlands v.
County of San Bernardino (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 398, 415.)
Here, Plaintiff asserts that he has a
“reasonable probability of success on the merits.” (Ex Parte Application at p.
8:2.) Plaintiff cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 708.240, subdivision
(b)[1],
which provides that “[t]he judgment creditor
may apply to the court in which an action under this article is pending for
either or both of the following:…(b) A temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction or both, restraining the third person from transferring
to any person or otherwise disposing of the property in which the judgment
debtor is claimed to have an interest, pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with
Section 525) of Title 7, and the court may make, dissolve, and modify such
orders as provided therein.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 708.240, subd. (b).)
As set forth
above, the Court entered a Judgment in
this action on October 25, 2018 indicating that “judgment is entered in favor
of Plaintiff Daniel Perez (“Plaintiff”) and against defendants Joseph
Safran, an individual (“Safran”) and One Capital Group, Inc., a
California Corporation (“One Capital”) jointly and severally, in the sum
of $190,000.00.” (Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[Safran] has made absolutely zero payments towards
the Judgment.” (Medioni Decl., ¶ 15, emphasis omitted.)
Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[o]n
August 7, 2020, Harrosh purchased the real property commonly known as 5930
Beeman Avenue, Valley Village, California 91607 (the ‘Property’) for
$1,200,000.00.” (Medioni Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) As set
forth above, on September 13, 2024, the Court issued an Order in this
action providing, inter alia, as follows:
“That the
following right to payment due, or to become due, including, but not limited to
rent, referral fees, fees for services, contingency fees, royalties,
commissions, payments in general, payments from sales, payments from leases,
payments from refinances, payment from loan originations, payments from
relocations, payments from a patent or copyright, advances, accounts
receivable, general intangibles (as defined by Commercial Code Section
9102(a)(42)), judgments, instruments (as defined by Code of Civil Procedure
Section 708.510(a) and the comment to Section 708.510), etc. (the Funds) from
all third parties, including, but not limited to, Sapir Realty Corporation, a
California corporation and doing business as Weichert, Realtors – All Stars,
and the tenant(s) occupying the real property commonly known as 5930 Beeman
Avenue, Valley Village, California 91607, be, and hereby are, assigned to
Creditor’s counsel c/o Daniel Medioni, Esq. of Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman
& Rabkin, LLP, 11400 West Olympic Boulevard, 9th Floor, Los Angeles,
California 90064, to be applied to the judgment herein until such judgment is
fully satisfied, including interest thereon. Judgment was entered on October
25, 2018, in the principal amount of $190,000.00. The balance on the judgment
is $262,597.70 as of September 23, 2022 (the date the last writ of execution
was issued) and is accruing interest at the rate of $52.05 per day from and
after September 24, 2022…
Harrosh and any
representative, agent, employee or attorney of Harrosh and any person(s) in
active concert and participating with Harrosh are hereby restrained from
encumbering, assigning, disposing of or spending the Funds and/or all rights to
payment thereunder…”
Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[o]n October 4, 2024, less than three
(3) weeks after the Order, Debtor and Harrosh encumbered the Property by taking
a second deed of trust in the amount of $285,127.00, secured by the Property
(the ‘2nd DOT’) recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s office as
instrument number 20240682403.” (Medioni Decl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s counsel
asserts that “[t]he 2nd DOT has reduced the amount of equity in the Property,
which is Debtor and Harrosh’s only known asset.” (Meidioni Decl., ¶ 12.)
As discussed, on November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order
to Deem the Real Property Commonly Known as 5930 Beeman Avenue, Valley Village,
CA 91607 Community Property and for an Order that Plaintiff’s Judgment Lien
Attach to the Property. In the November 27, 2024 motion, Plaintiff asserts that
“[j]udgment debtor [Safran] has been married to Karen Harrosh…since 2001,” and
that “[5930 Beeman Avenue, Valley Village, California 91607] is a community
asset that is subject to enforcement of the Judgment.” (Plaintiff’s November
27, 2024 Motion at p. 1:3-4; 7:12.) Per Code of Civil Procedure section
708.240, subdivision (b), Plaintiff, as the judgment creditor, may apply for a temporary restraining order
restraining Harrosh “from transferring to
any person or otherwise disposing of the property in which [Safran] is claimed
to have an interest…”
Plaintiff asserts that he will suffer
irreparable injury if a temporary restraining order is not issued. Plaintiff’s
counsel asserts that “[Safran] and Harrosh encumbered the Property with
the 2nd DOT for the express purpose of thwarting [Plaintiff’s] ability to
enforce the Judgment against the Property,” and that “[Safran] has made
absolutely zero payments towards the Judgment.” (Medioni Decl., ¶¶ 13, 15,
emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff argues that “[Safran] and Harrosh will not suffer
any damage whatsoever by the imposition of the injunction. Debtor is required
by law to comply with the judgement ordered by the Court…” (Ex Parte
Application at p. 9:11-13.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits (as discussed, Judgment
has been entered in favor of Plaintiff). The Court finds that Plaintiff has
shown that he is likely to sustain interim harm if the temporary restraining
order is denied, as compared to any purported harm that Safran is likely to
suffer if the order were issued. In addition, as discussed, the ex parte
application is unopposed. Thus, Safran does not dispute that the requested
injunctive relief is warranted here.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s ex parte
application to advance the hearing on Plaintiff’s “Motion for Order” filed on
November 27, 2024. However, the
Court notes that Plaintiff requests that the hearing be advanced to January 19,
2025, which is a Sunday. The Court sets the hearing for January 21, 2025 at
2:00 p.m. in Dept. 50. Any opposition to the motion shall be filed and served per
code, with a courtesy copy delivered to Dept. 50. Any reply in support of the
motion shall be filed and served per code, with a courtesy copy delivered to
Dept. 50.
The Court grants
Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order.
The Court orders that defendant
and judgment debtor Joseph Safran (“Safran”) and Karen Harrosh (“Harrosh”), and
all persons acting in concert or participating with Safran and Harrosh, are hereby
enjoined from further encumbering, assigning, or in any way transferring
ownership of or title to the real property commonly known as 5930 Beeman
Avenue, Valley Village, California 91607 until the date the Court has issued an
Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order filed on November 27, 2024.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Order.
DATED:
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles Superior Court
[1]It appears
Plaintiff inadvertently referenced “Civil Code” at page 8:5 of the Ex Parte
Application.