Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: BC632599, Date: 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC632599    Hearing Date: April 25, 2023    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

Background

Plaintiff Elijah Stiny, in pro per (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on September 1, 2016 against Defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges one cause of action for wrongful termination.

On November 15, 2016, Defendant Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation (“Defendant”), erroneously sued as Northrop Grumman Corporation filed an answer to the Complaint.

On September 8, 2017, the Court issued a minute order in this matter providing, inter alia, that “Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. Matter is stayed pending the completion of arbitration.”

On September 6, 2022, Defendant filed a notice indicating, inter alia, that “Defendant Northrop Grumman Systems’…Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication (‘MSJ’) was heard by the Hon. Stephen J. Sundvold (Ret.), the arbitrator for this matter (JAMS Case No. 1200055140).” (September 6, 2022 Notice at p. 1:4-6.) The notice attaches an August 22, 2022 Order on the motion, which provides, inter alia, that “[o]n June 3, 2022 and July 1, 2022, Respondent Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation’s (‘Respondent’) Motion for Summary Judgment (‘Motion’) was heard in the above-captioned matter. Arbitrator Hon. Stephen J. Sundvold (Ret.), having read and considered the papers submitted both in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and based upon the papers and pleadings on file in this matter as well as oral argument of the parties, and good cause appearing therefor, the Motion is GRANTED in its entirety and Claimant Elijah Stiny (‘Claimant’) demand for arbitration (the ‘Demand’) is DISMISSSED WITH PREJUDICE.” (Defendant’s September 6, 2022 Notice, Ex. B, p. 1:1-7.)

Plaintiff now moves “to vacate the arbitration ruling on or about August 22, 2022 and requests a new arbitration hearing.” (Mot. at p. 1:23-24.) Defendant opposes.

            Discussion

            Plaintiff states that his motion is based on 9 U.S.C. section 10, which provides, inter alia, that “(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” (9 U.S.C. § 10, subd. (a).)

            Plaintiff asserts that “[i]n the present case, Arbitrator Judge Sundvold did not postpone the arbitration hearing to allow for sufficient time to complete relevant and pertinent Discovery,” and that “[t]he arbitration hearing for a motion for summary judgment made by defendant Northrop Grumman never should have occurred so soon and should have been postponed until after Discovery completed.” (Mot. at p. 2:28-3:1; 3:4-6.)

            As an initial matter, Defendant asserts in the opposition that the Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate the final award as between Plaintiff and Defendant because Plaintiff failed to timely file his motion.

            Defendant notes that under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), “[n]otice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered.” (9 U.S.C. § 12.) Defendant also notes that under the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”), “[a] petition to vacate an award or to correct an award shall be served and filed not later than 100 days after the date of the service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1288.)

            Defendant indicates that “[o]n August 22, 2022, the third and final MSJ hearing, the

Arbitrator granted the MSJ in full, holding that Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice.” (Zamago Decl., ¶ 8.) Defendant’s counsel attaches a signed copy of the August 22, 2022 Order. (Zamago Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. B.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was accordingly required to file a motion to vacate the award by no later than November 22, 2022 under the FAA, and November 30, 2022 under the CAA. The instant motion was filed on January 26, 2023.

            As to the deadline provided by the CAA, the Court notes that Defendant does not appear to provide any evidence as to the date when a signed copy of the award was served on Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff did not file a reply in support of the instant motion and does not dispute that the motion is untimely under either the FAA or the CAA.

            Defendant also asserts that no grounds exist to vacate the arbitrator’s August 22, 2022 ruling. Defendant notes that “an award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not subject to judicial review except on the grounds set forth in sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for correction).” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a) provides as follows:

“(a) Subject to Section 1286.4, the court shall vacate the award if the court determines any of the following:

(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.

(2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators.

(3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.

(4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.

(5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.

(6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision. However, this subdivision does not apply to arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement between employers and employees or between their respective representatives.”

As set forth in Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff asserts that “[i]n the present case, Arbitrator Judge Sundvold did not postpone the arbitration hearing to allow for sufficient time to complete relevant and pertinent Discovery.” (Mot. at p. 2:28-1.) Thus, the provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a) apparently at issue in Plaintiff’s motion is that “[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(5); see Mot. at p. 2:22-24.)

However, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has presented evidence demonstrating that the arbitrator refused “to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor,” or that the arbitrator refused to “hear evidence material to the controversy.” (Code Civ. Proc.,         § 1286.2, subd. (a).) As an initial matter, Plaintiff provides a declaration in support of the motion, but such declaration is not signed. The Court notes that Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5¿defines a¿“declaration”¿as a writing that is signed, dated, and certified as true under penalty of perjury.

Moreover, even if the Court overlooks Plaintiff’s failure to sign the declaration, the Court does not find that good cause has been shown to vacate the August 22, 2022 ruling. As discussed, Plaintiff asserts (without providing competent evidence in support thereof) that “[t]he arbitration hearing was held before the Discovery window was closed, where in fact all parties acknowledged that the Discovery window was still open and did not even have a date for closure. The arbitration hearing for a motion for summary judgment made by defendant Northrop Grumman never should have occurred so soon and should have been postponed until after Discovery completed.” (Mot. at p. 3:2-6.)

In the opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff appears to be conflating the fact that a motion for summary judgment hearing and an arbitration hearing are two distinct hearings.

In addition, Defendant indicates that on September 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed his demand for arbitration, and Defendant filed its response to the demand on October 17, 2018. (Zamago Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) The matter was assigned to Stephen Sundvold Esq., of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (“JAMS”). (Zamago Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant notes that Rule 18 of Jams Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures provides that “[t]he Arbitrator may permit any Party to file a Motion for Summary Disposition of a particular claim or issue, either by agreement of all interested Parties or at the request of one Party, provided other interested Parties have reasonable notice to respond to the motion. The Request may be granted only if the Arbitrator determines that the requesting Party has shown that the proposed motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the issues in the case.” (Zamago Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. C.)

            Defendant asserts that the arbitrator provided Plaintiff more than sufficient time to work up his case. Defendant indicates that “Defendant filed a MSJ…on March 28, 2022. Five days before his Opposition due date, on May 1, 2022, Plaintiff sought to extend the due date to May 17, 2022, which was granted. On May 20, 2022, JAMS sent an email to the parties to confirm whether Plaintiff would be submitting an Opposition as he had failed to oppose Defendant’s MSJ on May 17, 2022. Plaintiff did not respond…At the June 3, 2022 telephonic hearing regarding the MSJ, Plaintiff confirmed he did not file an Opposition because he was feeling ill…Thus, Plaintiff asked for a second extension. The Arbitrator stated he was inclined to grant the MSJ in full. After allowing for some oral argument, the Arbitrator told Plaintiff he could brief and oppose his singular Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy (‘WDVPP’) claim with the new deadline of June 23, 2022…By the second rescheduled MSJ hearing, which proceeded on July 8, 2022, Plaintiff had failed to file any written Opposition. The Arbitrator allowed Plaintiff an additional extension to file an Opposition (before the August 22 hearing); Plaintiff again failed to do so. On August 22, 2022, the third and final MSJ hearing, the Arbitrator granted the MSJ…” (Zamago Decl., ¶ 8.)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED:  April 25, 2023                               

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court