Judge: Teresa A. Beaudet, Case: BC695541, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC695541 Hearing Date: July 20, 2023 Dept: 50
YULIANA VALDOVINOS, Plaintiff, vs. ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC dba LA CURACAO, et
al. Defendants. |
Case No.: |
BC695541 |
Hearing Date: |
July 20, 2023 |
|
Hearing
Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS ADIR
INTERNATIONAL, LLC dba CURACAO AND ERIC VITAL RUBIO’S AMENDED MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT |
Background
On February 27, 2018, Plaintiff Yuliana
Valdovinos, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Adir
International, LLC dba Curacao (“Adir”), Alex Hernandez, and Eric Vital Rubio
(“Rubio”). The Complaint asserts a number of causes of action. The fifteenth
cause of action is for recovery of civil penalties pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).
Adir and Rubio (jointly, “Defendants”) now move for an order striking Plaintiff’s
fifteenth cause of action and the associated prayer for penalties. Plaintiff
opposes.
On April 3, 2023, the
Court issued an order continuing the hearing on the instant motion. The Court’s April 3, 2023 Order provides, inter
alia, that “Plaintiff may file a supplemental brief in opposition to
Defendants’ motion to strike setting forth a trial plan to show that her PAGA
cause of action would be manageable. Defendants may file a supplemental reply. Any supplemental
opposition and reply papers must be filed and served per Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b)
based on the new hearing date.”
On June 2, 2023, Plaintiff
filed a “Proposed PAGA Trial Plan.” No supplemental reply was filed by Defendants.
Discussion
A court may strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading” or any
part of a pleading “not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of
the court.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 436.)
As noted in the Court’s April 3,
2023 Order, Defendants move for an order striking Plaintiffs’ “Fifteenth
Cause of Action for Recovery of Civil Penalties under the Private Attorneys
General Act (‘PAGA’), and associated prayer for penalties.” (Notice of Mot. at p. 1:24-26.) Defendants argue that the fifteenth cause of action
should be stricken because it is unmanageable.
Defendants cite to Wesson
v. Staples the Off. Superstore, LLC (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 746, 765,
where the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that “courts have inherent authority to ensure
that PAGA claims can be fairly and efficiently tried and, if necessary, may
strike a claim that cannot be rendered manageable.” The
Wesson Court noted that
“[u]nder PAGA, an aggrieved employee may recover civil
penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of himself or herself and
other current or former employees…A PAGA action may thus cover a
vast number of employees, each of whom may have markedly different experiences
relevant to the alleged violations. Under those circumstances, determining
whether the employer committed Labor Code violations with respect to each
employee may raise practical difficulties and may prove to be unmanageable.” (Id. at pp. 765-766 [internal quotations and
citations omitted].)
Here, Defendants assert
that “[o]ver the course of the PAGA limitations period, Adir has
employed 3,475 employees. These employees work across ten retail stores in
Southern California, as well as three other locations in Tucson, Phoenix, and
Las Vegas.” (Mot. at p. 2:21-24; Chung Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 10, Ex. A (Pedroza Depo.)
at pp. 29:15-25, 30:1-9.) Defendants state that Adir currently employs
approximately 1,200 individuals. (Chung Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. A (Pedroza Depo.) at
p. 33:10-12.)
Defendants assert that “Adir’s non-exempt employees span dozens of
distinct and varied job titles and positions. General non-exempt job categories
encompassed in this matter include laborers and sales associates in a wide
variety of departments…Each position and department is unavoidably distinct and
individualized, and overseen by different supervisors.” (Mot. at p. 3:1-6;
Chung Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendants contend that “[e]ven narrowing the witness list
to 50% of the universe of potentially aggrieved employees, the parties will
have to call and subpoena at least 1,737 witnesses to testify at trial…” (Mot.
at p. 4:4-6; Chung Decl., ¶ 7) Defendants assert that “[c]onservatively
estimating that each witness examination will take 2 hours total for direct,
cross-examination, and re-direct, including the review of exhibits, the Court
will have to reserve at least 3,475 hours for trial. At 5 hours of actual trial
time per day, the trial for the instant action will require a minimum of 695
days.” (Mot. at p. 4:10-13; Chung Decl., ¶ 9.)
As set forth in the Court’s
April 3, 2023 Order, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants cannot show that there
are manageability concerns on a motion to strike, because “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the
face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is
required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437.) As set forth above, Defendants rely on their counsel’s declaration
and other evidence in support of the motion. Defendants do not appear to
address this point in the reply. However, the Court notes that in Wesson, the Court of Appeal “conclude[d] that courts have inherent authority
to ensure that a PAGA claim will be manageable at trial—including the
power to strike the claim, if necessary—and that this authority is not
inconsistent with PAGA’s procedures and objectives, or with applicable
precedent.” (Wesson v. Staples
the Office Superstore, LLC, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 762-763.)
Plaintiff also asserts that
Wesson is “inapplicable to the situation here, where there are no
misclassification claims, there is no class certification requirement…no
evidentiary record, no agreement on factual issues, and no agreement on trial
issues.” (Opp’n at p. 4:4-6.) In Wesson, “[e]ach
of Wesson’s claims was premised on
the theory that Staples had
misclassified its California GMs as exempt executives (who are not entitled to
overtime pay and off-duty meal and
rest periods), when in fact they should have been classified as nonexempt,
hourly employees. Wesson moved to certify a class
of Staples California GMs, but the
trial court denied the motion, concluding he had not demonstrated that his
claims were susceptible to common proof.” (Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.)
“[T]he parties estimated
they would need a total of six trial days per GM to litigate GMs’
classification as exempt executives on an individual basis. Based on that
estimate, the trial would have lasted eight years.” (Wesson
v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 758.) In addition, “[t]he trial court invited Wesson to submit a trial plan showing that
his PAGA action would be manageable at trial. In response, Wesson continued to insist that the court lacked authority to
require that his claim be manageable, and laid out his plan to prove his prima
facie case using common proof, but declined to address how the parties could
litigate Staples’s affirmative defense. Following
this response, the court concluded that the PAGA claim could not be
managed at trial and granted Staples’s
motion to strike it.” (Id.
at pp. 755-756.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial court “did not abuse its
discretion in striking his PAGA claim as unmanageable.” (Id. at p. 756.)
As set forth in the Court’s
April 3, 2023 Order, in Wesson, the trial court “invited Wesson to submit a trial plan showing that his
claim would be manageable, and permitted him to file a supplemental brief in
opposition to Staples’s motion.” (Wesson
v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 758.)
In her proposed PAGA trial plan,
Plaintiff cites to Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685, 711, where the Fourth District Court of
Appeal noted that “we respectfully disagree with Wesson and agree with the reasoning of the district courts that
have refused to dismiss PAGA claims based on manageability.” The Estrada
Court concluded that “a court cannot dismiss a PAGA claim based on
manageability.” (Id. at p. 711.) As set forth in the
Court’s April 3, 2023 Order on the instant motion, the California Supreme Court has granted the defendant’s
petition for review in Estrada on June 22, 2022. (Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills (2022) 511 P.3d 191.) “The issue to be briefed and
argued is limited to the following: Do trial courts have inherent authority to
ensure that claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) will be manageable at
trial, and to strike or narrow such claims if they cannot be managed?” (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court in Estrada v.
Royalty Carpet Mills (2022) 511 P.3d 191, noted that “[p]ending review, the opinion of the Court of
Appeal, which is currently published at 76 Cal.App.5th
685 [292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1], may be cited, not only for its persuasive
value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a
conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise
discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937], to choose between
sides of any such conflict.” The Court notes that the California Supreme Court
does not yet appear to have issued an opinion in the Estrada matter.
As to the claims asserted in this action, Plaintiff’s fifteenth
cause of action for recovery of civil penalties under PAGA alleges that Plaintiff
is “pursuing civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code sections alleged
herein.” (Compl., ¶ 211.)
Plaintiff’s eighth
cause of action is for failure to pay compensation due for hours worked. Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action is for
failure to pay compensation due pursuant to Labor
Code section 226.7 (meal period wages). Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action
is for failure to pay compensation due pursuant to Labor
Code section 226.7 (rest period wages). Plaintiff’s eleventh cause
of action is for wage statement and recordkeeping violations. Plaintiff’s
twelfth cause of action is for violation of Labor
Code section 2802.[1]
Plaintiff’s thirteenth cause of action is for failure to pay waiting time wages
pursuant to Labor Code section 203. Plaintiff’s
fourteenth cause of action is for violation of Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5.[2]
In support of
Plaintiff’s proposed PAGA trial plan, Plaintiff submits the declaration of her
counsel, who states that “Judge Michael Johnson was appointed as the discovery
referee in this case on September 12, 2019.” (White Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s
counsel states that “Plaintiff has data produced by Defendant…which includes a
PAGA List of Aggrieved Employees produced in 2020, and that “[t]he PAGA list
addresses Defendant’s question of manageability, which provides the following
data for approximately 2,399…Aggrieved Employees: 1) Employee Id; 2) Div; 3)
Location; 4) Dept. Number; 5) Department; 6) First Name; 7) Last Name; 8) Date
Hired; 9) Date Terminated; 10) Date Re-Hired; 11) Employee Status; 12) Job
Title; 13) Address 1; 14) City; 15) State; 16) Zip Code.” (White Decl., ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[a]dditionally, to supplement this written
discovery the Joint PMK deposition was scheduled to take place on May 1, 2023
and that matter is before Judge Johnson…” (White Decl., ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff’s counsel states that
“Plaintiff and aggrieved employees will call their expert database and
statistician to testify to the number of pay periods for each category of
violation, based on his analysis and assessment of data/records produced by
Defendant. The expert will rely on payroll and timekeeping data in order to
assess the number of employee pay periods during which each of the
aforementioned categories of violations occurred, broken out by initial and
subsequent violations.” (White Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff’s counsel further states
that “[f]rom the pay and time records, Plaintiff’s expert will identify the
individuals and the total number of pay periods in which Plaintiff contends the
employees were ‘aggrieved’. This will establish the total number of violations
at issue and the total number of aggrieved employees.” (White Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also asserts that “[a] small
sample of data could determine if the employees terminated in fact complained
of wage and hour practices at Curacao.” (Plaintiff’s Proposed PAGA Trial Plan
at p. 13:17-18.)
In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[t]he representative
Plaintiff will testify. Her testimony will be that she was never able to take a
meal and/or rest period as required by law. The representative Plaintiff will
also establish she is an aggrieved employee for purposes of the meal and/or
rest period claim.” (White Decl., ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff’s counsel also states that “Plaintiff anticipates the
respective expert witnesses will conduct an analysis of the data obtained from
the depositions and present their statistical analysis at trial, negating the
need to call hundreds of witnesses. There is an efficient way to present the
issues at trial in both scenarios where the meal period waiver is determined to
be invalid before trial or if the Court finds disputed questions remain. The
Defendant already has been provided the opportunity to question witnesses and
therefore the parties can stipulate to present testimony through depositions
and/or expert witnesses. Further, the Parties’ respective expert witnesses can
create a proposal of which witnesses should present live testimony at trial if
it becomes necessary.” (White Decl., ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff’s counsel further asserts that “because Defendant’s data is
maintained in an electronic format, it is generally a swift and straightforward
process to produce large volumes of data. Typically, electronic data is stored
in a database and a series of computational commands can be written to tell the
database system which data to pull, e.g., for one employee or a specific group
of employees during a particular time period. There are only two potential
added “costs” associated with pulling data for a large number of employees:
longer computational runtime and disk storage, neither of which usually makes
the process burdensome or unmanageable.” (White Decl., ¶ 10.) In addition,
Plaintiff’s counsel states that “[i]f Plaintiff is successful in establishing
liability, Plaintiff will present through expert witness testimony, the maximum
PAGA penalties to be awarded under the law. As to liability, Plaintiff will
already have identified the aggrieved employees. Plaintiff’s expert will then present
testimony from his analysis of the Defendant’s payroll records which will
establish how many pay periods are at issue for each aggrieved employee and
will present a comprehensive penalty assessment model providing the aggregate
amount of penalties. The presentation of this damages and penalties evidence
can be easily presented by a single witness, Plaintiff’s expert.” (White Decl.,
¶ 12.)
As set forth above, Defendants did not file a supplemental reply.
Thus, Defendants do not address or dispute Plaintiff’s proposed PAGA trial plan,
or Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration filed in support of the proposed PAGA
trial plan.
Based on a consideration of the foregoing, the Court does not find
that the circumstances warrant striking Plaintiff’s fifteenth cause of action
for recovery of civil penalties pursuant to PAGA, or the associated prayer for
penalties.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to strike is
denied.
Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this Order.¿¿¿
DATED: July 20, 2023 ________________________________
Hon. Teresa A.
Beaudet
Judge, Los
Angeles
[1]Labor
Code section 2802, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n employer shall indemnify his or her employee
for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct
consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience
to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee,
at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful.”
[2]Labor
Code section 98.6,
subdivision (a) provides that “[a]
person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate,
retaliate, or take any adverse action against any employee or applicant for
employment because the employee or applicant engaged in any conduct delineated
in this chapter…or because the employee or applicant for employment has filed a
bona fide complaint or claim or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or relating to his or her rights that are under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner, made a written or oral complaint that
he or she is owed unpaid wages, or because the employee has initiated any
action or notice pursuant to Section 2699, or
has testified or is about to testify in a proceeding pursuant to that section,
or because of the exercise by the employee or applicant for employment on
behalf of himself, herself, or others of any rights afforded him or her.”
Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b)
provides that “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf
of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing
information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or
may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a
person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance,
or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state
or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or
federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is
part of the employee’s job duties.”