Judge Teresa A. Beaudet, Case BC697115 2022-09-21 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Gerald Lange (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment action on March 7, 2018 against Defendant Monster Energy Company (“Monster”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to engage in the interactive process, (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (4) failure to prevent discrimination, and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Plaintiff alleges that he began working with Monster on or about October 17, 2006 as a “Monster Ambassador.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with testicular cancer in 2015. (Compl., ¶ 13.) On August 11, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a leave of absence application and supporting documents from his healthcare provider stating his diagnosis. (Compl., ¶ 14.) On August 15, 2017, Monster indicated that Plaintiff would be granted a discretionary leave of absence which would require him to return to work on September 11, 2017, the estimated date of return provided by Plaintiff’s healthcare provider. (Ibid.) Based on Plaintiff’s condition and reaction to radiation therapy, Plaintiff’s doctor extended his date of return to work to February 14, 2018, and Plaintiff indicated to Monster that he would not be able to return to work by September 11, 2017. (Compl., ¶ 15.)

On September 14, 2017, Plaintiff submitted another request for leave of absence. (Compl., ¶ 17.) On September 27, 2017, Monster indicated that Plaintiff’s discretionary leave of absence had been approved up to the maximum time of three months, making his date of return November 14, 2017, and that if Plaintiff was unable to return to work by this date, his employment would be terminated. (Ibid.) On November 3, 2017, Plaintiff informed Monster that he was still dealing with various medical issues, and Monster responded that if he was not released back to work by November 13, 2017, he would be terminated. (Compl., ¶ 19.) On November 12, 2017, Plaintiff told Monster that his doctor did not feel it was appropriate for him to return to work. (Ibid.) Monster provided Plaintiff with a separation of employment letter on November 14, 2017, which stated that due to his exhaustion of the maximum leave time of three months, Monster was terminating him. (Compl., ¶ 20.)

Monster now moves for an order bifurcating the trial of this matter into two primary phases: liability and damages. Plaintiff opposes.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) provides: “[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (b).)

Code of Civil Procedure sections 597 and 598 allow a court to order that the trial of any issue or part thereof proceed before the trial of any other issue to promote the ends of justice or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation. Additionally, Evidence Code section 320 provides that trial courts have discretion to regulate the order of proof. “[T]rial courts have broad discretion to determine the order of proof in the interests of judicial economy.” ((Grappo v. Coventry Fin. Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504.) The objective of bifurcation is “avoidance of the waste of time and money caused by the unnecessary trial of damage questions in cases where the liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.” ((Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 955.)

As an initial matter, the parties indicate that they have agreed to bifurcate punitive damages. Monster asserts that the trial should also be bifurcated into two primary phases, liability and damages.

Monster contends that the overriding issue in this case is whether the accommodation Monster provided to Plaintiff was reasonable in light of the circumstances. Monster asserts that this issue is discrete from Plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress and can be tried and decided with far fewer witnesses than the damages phase. (See Mot. at p. 7:8-8:7.) Plaintiff counters that this is a faulty assertion, because whether Monster could have reasonably accommodated Plaintiff with more than three months leave addresses only one of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff contends that even if Monster is correct that it did not have to provide an extended leave as an accommodation (which Plaintiff disputes), this still leaves Plaintiff’s claim for failure to engage in the interactive process.

Monster also asserts in the motion that the liability phase could have at most nine witnesses, whereas the damages phase could have as many as 36 additional witnesses. Monster contends that an order for a phased trial will thus serve to promote judicial economy and preserve resources because if Plaintiff does not prove liability, the jury would be saved the time of sitting through 36 witnesses. The Court notes that Monster now indicates in the reply that there will be 17 “damage phase witnesses.” (See Graph in Reply at p. 3:1-18.)[1] In the reply, Monster also provides an asserted estimate of the time savings that could result from bifurcating liability, assuming Monster prevails in the liability phase. As this estimate was provided for the first time in the reply, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to respond to it.

In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that judicial economy, efficiency, and the ends of justice will not be promoted should the matter be bifurcated into the three phases of (1) liability, (2) damages, and (3) punitive damages. Plaintiff asserts that bifurcation will require opening statements, argument, jury instructions, and deliberations to be repeated three times; and will require duplicative expert and lay witness testimony. Plaintiff asserts that 8 witnesses will testify as to both liability and damages, requiring them to be called again if the liability phase is bifurcated from the damages phase. (Opp’n at p. 4:21-5:2.) Plaintiff also notes that he waived his economic damages in this case, and asserts that this “eliminates an entire category of evidence to be elicited, making [Monster’s] motion more unreasonable.” (Opp’n at p. 2:2-3.)

Monster contends that Plaintiff’s treating medical providers will not need to testify in the liability phase. (Mot. at p. 9:10-11.) Plaintiff counters that his treating physicians would testify as to Plaintiff’s cancer and treatment, the doctor’s notes submitted to Monster, and Plaintiff’s health during the time at issue. Plaintiff asserts that these same doctors would also be called to testify about the emotional distress recorded in their medical records both during Plaintiff’s medical treatment and post termination, and that it would be “nearly impossible” to schedule a doctor to testify twice. (Opp’n at p. 3:5-10.) Monster asserts in the reply that only one of Plaintiff’s doctors will testify. (Reply at p. 4:4-6.)

Lastly, Monster argues that bifurcation is necessary to avoid undue prejudice to Monster, because there is the risk that the jury may be confused or overlook the testimony regarding liability and instead become enveloped in many days of testimony concerning Plaintiff’s emotional distress.

Based on a consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds that Monster has not established good cause to bifurcate the trial of this matter into liability and damages phases. As discussed, the parties have agreed to bifurcate punitive damages.

[1]Monster states in the reply that the parties have now prepared their Joint Witness List.

gerald lange, Plaintiff, vs. monster energy company, et al. Defendants.	Case No.:	BC697115
	Hearing Date:	September 21, 2022
	Hearing Time:	10:00 a.m.
	[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50