Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 19-1105688, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Before the Court at present are three motions filed by Defendant Meredith Anne Castillo (“Meredith”) as follows:
(1) a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication, filed on 9/9/22 (“Motion 1” below); and (2) a Demurrer and Motion to Strike, both filed on 6/22/22 (“Motions 2 and 3” below), as to the Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) which had been filed on 5/19/22 by Plaintiff Alice Alvidrez (“Plaintiff”).
Motion 1, on the request for summary judgment as to Meredith, is GRANTED. The alternative request for summary adjudication is defective here, but in any event is MOOT based on that ruling.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has asserted that there are multiple defects in the Motion which preclude relief here. Plaintiff first argues that Issues 2 and 3 are not each sufficient to completely dispose of a cause of action (a “COA”), defense, damages claim or issue of duty. But Issues 1-3 reflect alternate bases for relief on COA 1, which is permitted.
Plaintiff next correctly argues that the Separate Statement fails to comport with CRC 3.1350(d) for the alternative request for summary adjudication. But while that precludes summary adjudication on the inadequately supported “Issues” presented the Separate Statement (“SS”) adequately supports, in the aggregate, the motion for summary judgment (the “MSJ”).
Plaintiff also argues that efforts to support the motion by pointing to “factually-devoid” discovery responses should be rejected, as Meredith did not specify the responses which support same. But the SS does identify the specific responses upon which Meredith relies. Nor has Plaintiff shown in her Opposition that further discovery is pending, or otherwise requested relief to obtain any further discovery.
Plaintiff also argues that the Motion did not fully respond to allegations in the SAC. But in an MSJ context, Meredith was not required to disprove everything asserted in the SAC: she could instead present evidence to show that Plaintiff lacks evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims. Having done so here, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff to present admissible evidence to support the claims made in the SAC. Plaintiff has failed to meet that burden here.
COA 1 asserts a claim for negligence. To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a legal duty of care. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209.) Whether a defendant has a legal duty to take action to protect the plaintiff from injuries caused by a third person is governed by a two-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect – if so, the court must then consult the factors described in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty. (Id. at 209.)
Here, Meredith has met her burden to show a lack of evidence sufficient to establish a cognizable duty of care which would extend from Meredith to Plaintiff’s son, as she has presented evidence to show that she had no prior knowledge of and played no part in the criminal acts committed by Lamberto Castillo (“Lamberto”). (See UF 1-9.)
The burden thus shifted to Plaintiff to show that triable issues exist as to whether Meredith had such a duty. Plaintiff failed to meet that burden here, as no admissible evidence has been presented to show that Meredith had a special relationship with Plaintiff’s son that created an affirmative duty to protect, or that Meredith had the ability to control Lamberto’s actions, or that Meredith performed an act of misfeasance that increased the risk of injury to Plaintiff’s son, or that some other set of circumstances here gave rise to an affirmative duty to protect. And although negligent entrustment might otherwise have been a basis for the claim, no evidence was presented to show that Meredith knew or should have known that Lamberto was unfit to possess the gun when it was given to him or at any time prior to the crime at issue, while he claims that he had not previously been charged with any crime and had been honorably discharged from the U.S. Air Force years prior. (ROA 220, Ex. B, at ¶¶ 9, 11.)
In addition, although Plaintiff asserts that Meredith bought the gun under her maiden name (UF 5) to avoid it being linked to him, no admissible evidence is presented to support that assertion. Nor has Plaintiff presented any evidence to support her assertion that Meredith knew of Lamberto’s homicidal intent before he acted, or that Meredith otherwise encouraged him to act as he did or assisted him in doing so. (UF 1-8; “PFO” 1-13.) The absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims here thus requires the Court to find that the Motion is well-taken as to COA 1.
Similarly, for COA 2, Meredith has met her burden to show a lack of evidence sufficient to support an intentional tort claim. (See UF 1-11.) The burden thus shifted to Plaintiff to show that triable issues exist as to whether Meredith engaged in conduct which would constitute an intentional tort. Plaintiff again failed to meet that burden here. Plaintiff argues that Meredith had entrusted Lamberto with the gun, knew of the conflict that had occurred, and that the facts therefore infer that she rushed him home to obtain the gun and continue the confrontation with deadly force. But that suggested inference is unsupported by any evidence. The absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims thus requires the Court to find that the Motion is also well-taken as to COA 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment as to defendant Meredith is therefore GRANTED.
Meredith’s Evidentiary Objections (filed on 11/29/22 as ROA 268) are SUSTAINED as to Obj. Nos. 1 and 2 [foundation, hearsay] but otherwise OVERRULED.
Motions 2 and 3 are MOOT in light of the ruling above.
Counsel for Meredith is to submit a proposed order in accordance with C.R.C. 3.1312 and give notice of this ruling.