Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 21-1203474, Date: 2023-05-25 Tentative Ruling

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 1/20/23 by Defendant RPM Plastic Molding, Inc. (here, “MP”) is GRANTED.

Summary judgment is proper where the evidence shows there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (McCabe v. American Honda Motor Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1119; C.C.P. § 437c(c).) To satisfy this burden, a defendant must establish that one or more of the elements of a cause of action (a “COA”) cannot be established or that a complete defense exists to the cause of action. (Id.; C.C.P. § 437c(o).) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to either the particular COA or the proffered defense thereto. (Id.) The plaintiff must set forth specific facts demonstrating a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id.; C.C.P. § 437c(o); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

Here, MP has presented evidence sufficient to meet its initial burden on each of the COA presented by Plaintiff Samuel Ornelas (“Plaintiff”) in this action. 

For COA 1, Plaintiff asserts a sexual harassment claim. To establish that COA, Plaintiff must show he was subjected to conduct or comments that were unwelcome, based on  a protected category (i.e. sex, age, disability), sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment, and (4) imputable to the employer.  (Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279.)  Conduct that is occasional, isolated, sporadic or trivial is generally insufficient to establish a claim. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043-44.) If the alleged harasser is a non-supervisory employee, the employer may only be liable if it was aware of the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. (Gov. Code § 12940(j)(1); Rehmani v. Sup. Ct. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 952.)

Here, MP has presented evidence to show that its agents, managers, and supervisors did not make sexual comments to Plaintiff during his employment, that Plaintiff’s harassment complaint was investigated and found to be unsupported, as Plaintiff then acknowledged, that Plaintiff confirmed in 2020 that no other harassment issues or concerns had arisen, and that Plaintiff has offered no evidence in this case to support the claim that harassment ever occurred.  (UF 7-17, 27-29, 38.)  That evidence is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiff to show that there is a triable issue of fact as to COA 1.  As Plaintiff filed no opposition, he failed to meet that burden.

For COA 2, MP has presented evidence to show that Plaintiff had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged employment actions.  (UF 17-37.)  The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence to show that MP’s proffered reason was pretextual. (Slatkin v. University of Redlands (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1156; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354; Le Bourgeois v. Fireplace Manufacturers, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058.)

As Plaintiff filed no opposition, he failed to meet that burden.

For COA 3, Plaintiff must show that he engaged in protected activity, MP subjected him to an adverse employment action, and there was a causal link between the protected activity and that action. (Schmidt v. Sup. Ct. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 587.)   Here, MP has presented evidence to show that no adverse employment action was taken based on Plaintiff’s protected activities. (UF 7-37.) That evidence is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiff for COA 3.  As Plaintiff filed no opposition, he has failed to meet that burden here.

COA 4 is derivative of COAs 1-3, and thus fails with them. (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1166.)

For COA 5,  Plaintiff must show, among other things, outrageous conduct by MP which was “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 

(Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 301,   Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209.) Here, MP has presented evidence to show that its conduct was not extreme and outrageous, while Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to show otherwise. (UF 1-38.)

MP has thus shown that there is no triable issue of material fact on any of Plaintiff’s COAs, and that MP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  MP’s Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.

Counsel for MP is to give notice of this ruling, and submit a proposed judgment which comports therewith.