Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 21-1204719, Date: 2023-05-25 Tentative Ruling
A. The Motion for a Protective Order
CCP § 2025.420(b) provides “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” Here, the objections raised by Plaintiff’s counsel at deposition to basic questions were excessive and meritless. Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly asserted that questions were “Rifkind-type contentions”, citing Rifkind v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1255. However, Rifkind was clear:
“We emphasize at the outset what we are not discussing: questions at a deposition asking the person deposed about the basis for, or information about, a factual conclusion or assertion, as distinguished from the basis for a legal conclusion. Thus, if a deponent says that a certain event happened at a particular time or place, it is quite proper to ask the person, at deposition, how he or she became aware of it, his or her knowledge about it, and for similar information of a factual nature.” (Id. at 1259.) Rifkind stands for the idea that “If the deposing party wants to know facts, it can ask for facts; if it wants to know what the adverse party is contending, or how it rationalizes the facts as supporting a contention, it may ask that question in an interrogatory.” (Id. at 1262.)
Here, the questions Plaintiff’s counsel asserted were violating Rifkind included questions like “Are you currently employed”, “Focusing just on the last year, how many days in a month are you working?”, “Do you keep any sort of documentation as to the hours you work?”, and “have you been employed with anyone in the last two years?” All of these questions ask for facts, not legal contentions. Counsel objects to a number of questions that are clearly asking for facts from Plaintiff as calling for a legal conclusion or opinion. As Plaintiff does not provide any argument as to why those objections were appropriate and they were continuously raised to the point the deposition could not move forward, the motion is GRANTED.
The court further orders sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorney in the amount of $1,362.
Moving party to give notice
B. Motion to Bifurcate
Defendants Phi M. Nguyen and Thy Nguyen’s unopposed Motion to Bifurcate Trial between Liability and Damages, filed on 1/26/23, is GRANTED.
CCP § 598 provides, in part: “The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order…that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case”. The statute thus permits bifurcation when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby.
In determining whether bifurcation or severance is appropriate, courts often look to other factors aside from whether the case presents separate issues. For example, courts will consider the complexity of the issues, the risk of jury confusion, judicial economy, and whether the claims present separate and independent issues. (Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1086.)
Here, Defendants seek to bifurcate the liability phase of the trial from the causation and damages phase. There is a reasonable chance that Defendants could win on liability in front of a jury, making the extensive litigation on causation and damages unnecessary. Duplication of testimony would be minimal between the liability and causation/damages phases. In this instance, bifurcation of liability from the causation and damages will serve judicial efficiency as it could completely dispose of the action without the extensive and contentious litigation of causation and damages. Therefore, the Motion to Bifurcate Trial is GRANTED.
Moving party to give notice.