Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 21-1207625, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling

The Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative Summary Adjudication filed by Defendant Monireh Mohases, trustee of the trust that owned the residence where it employed plaintiff’s employer on construction projects.  The motion is GRANTED.

The Privette doctrine creates a rebuttable presumption that affects the burden of producing evidence on summary judgment. (Alvarez v. Seaside Transp. Servs., Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 642-643; Degala v. John Stewart Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 158, 166-167.) Once a defendant establishes that it hired an independent contractor to perform certain work, and that the plaintiff is an employee (or independent contractor) thereof, who was injured in the course of the work, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to produce evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to application of a Privette exception.

There is undisputed that Defendant hired Newport Construction Group, Inc. (“NCG”) as an independent contractor and that Plaintiff was working for NCG when injured at the worksite.  Plaintiff does not argue that one of the exceptions to Privette applies, but rather argues that Privette does not apply at all because the roof inspection was not within the scope of the contracted work to replace the fascia. The underlying principle to the Privette doctrine is the delegation of the manner in which the work is to be performed, thus the hirer also delegates the responsibility to ensure that the worksite is safe and the work is performed safely.  (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41.)

Plaintiff admits in his opposition that Mohases did not instruct him as to maintenance tasks “because ‘she’s not technical and she has no idea what the technical job is’ ”, citing to Defendant Abghari’s deposition. Applying the basic principle, Defendant delegated both the manner of work and therefore the workplace safety to NCG, thus Privette applies. 

Further, Plaintiff’s assertion that this work was outside the scope of the written agreement does not indicate that the Privette doctrine does not apply as Plaintiff’s Additional Material Fact indicates that NCG did work outside of written agreements on some occasions.  Plaintiff provides no authority that requires a written agreement with an independent contractor to invoke the Privette doctrine. As Plaintiff has not argued that any exception applies, summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice.