Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 21-12125942, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling
A. Anti-SLAPP Motion
The Special Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Stephen Sponer is DENIED.
In ruling on a special motion to strike made under CCP§ 425.16, the trial court engages in a two-step process. “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
If the defendant meets his burden, then the plaintiff must show the “challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral, 1 Cal.5th at 396.) The Court “accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law.” (Baral, 1 Cal.5th at 385.)
“The anti-SLAPP statute is ‘designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a claim “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1008-1009 (Bonni).)
Defendant asserts that this action is based on protected activity, as all the communications alleged were made in a public forum and concerned HOA business. Defendant provides communications with the HOA to prove that all of this stems from HOA business. However, the allegations in the FAC that Defendant identifies as arising out of protected activity all concern allegations of harassment and threats by Defendant aimed at board members and vendors.
While the communications provided by Defendant with his motion and reply certainly concern HOA business and public interest, that connection does not extend to the activity described in the FAC. “[T]he statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.” Li v. Jin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 481, 495 (quoting FilmOn, 7 Cal.5th at 150). There is no evidence here that any of Defendants’ conduct or statements contributed to the public debate in any way, particularly as the bulk of the alleged conduct is simply Defendant yelling various threats and expletives at a specific board member. Defendant’s assertions that he is innocent of any wrongdoing has no place in an anti-SLAPP analysis. The question is whether the causes of action in the complaint arise out of protected activity. In this case, they do not. As such, Defendant has failed to establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16
The motion is therefore DENIED.
Demurrer
The Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Stephen Sponer is OVERRULED.
A demurrer “tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint.” (Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 42.) Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded facts are assumed to be true by the Court, but the Court does not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Preliminarily, Defendant requests judicial notice of the Petition and the FAC in this case and there is no opposition, so judicial notice of the existence of the documents may be granted.
Defendant asserts that the entire complaint is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the order in the restraining order case.
However, Defendant provides both no documents as to a ruling in the Restraining Order case, nor does that case present the same questions of law and fact as this case, despite involving the same general individuals. Further, Plaintiff asserts that there was no final judgment, as the case was dismissed without prejudice and was not litigated on the merits. As such neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply.
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has unclean hands and is not doing equity but provides no authority for sustaining a demurrer on such grounds. Defendant later asserts that the HOA has not adequately pled that the HOA board voted for or approved this litigation, and thus there is no authority for this litigation. Defendant is essentially alleging that Plaintiff is not following HOA rules in initiating this action, which is not a question before the court at this time. Per Civil Code § 5980, the association has standing to bring this action. As such Defendants demurrer to the complaint as a whole on these grounds is OVERRULED.
First Cause of Action: Breach of Governing Documents
Defendant asserts both that this is not a legitimate cause of action and that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring the action because it does not plead damages. However, Defendant cites Civil Code § 5980 which clearly states that “An association has standing to institute, defend, settle, or intervene in litigation… in matters pertaining to the following: (a) Enforcement of the governing documents.” Further, the allegations in the FAC assert that “Defendant’s actions as outlined above violate the CC&Rs” and indicate which sections and how Defendant has allegedly violated the governing documents. (FAC ¶ 34-40.) As such, the first cause of action is adequately pled and the demurrer as to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.
Second Cause of Action: Nuisance
Defendant asserts that the only conduct alleged is oral/written statements which can never be a nuisance, but provides no legal authority for that assertion. To constitute a nuisance, an activity must: 1) create an interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his or her property; 2) the invasion of the owner's interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her property must be substantial, based on proof of significant harm judged by an objective standard; and 3) the interference with the use and enjoyment must be unreasonable, determined by an objective standard as to whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the social utility of the tortfeasor's conduct, as a question of fact. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.) Here, the FAC alleges that Defendant’s conduct interferes with both the HOA’s ability to operate and interferes with the owners’ use and enjoyment of the property within the development. The allegations are sufficient to plead nuisance and the demurrer as to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.
Third Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief
Defendant’s sole argument as to the declaratory relief cause of action is that it is an equitable remedy, not a cause of action. While the case law cited by Defendant shows that the basis for declaratory relief is some independent cause of action, it does not bar declaratory relief as being pled as a separate claim. Indeed, a complaint for declaratory relief must show “1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and 2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.” (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.) Here, Plaintiff asserts that declaratory relief is necessary as they require a judicial declaration that Defendant’s past actions violated the Declaration and enjoin Defendant from future violations. As such, the demurrer as to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.
Moving party to give notice.