Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 21-1220191, Date: 2022-08-04 Tentative Ruling
Before the Court are Plaintiff William Malpica’s (“Plaintiff”) Motions to Compel Defendant Sanam Ladjevardi’s Further Responses to Request for Production (“RFP”), Request for Admissions (“RFA”) and Special Interrogatories (“Special Rogs”), and Motion to Compel Omid Ladjevardi’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (“Form Rogs”), all Sets One.
The motions are GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as set forth below. Further responses are to be provided within 20 days of the date of this ruling.
The Court finds that monetary sanctions against Defendants in the amount of $800 per motion is appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300(d), 2031.310(h) & 2031.320(b), 2033.290(d).) This results in $2,400 in sanctions against Defendant Sanam Ladjevardi as to ROA 44, 52 and 56, and $800 in sanctions against Defendant Omid Ladjevardi as to ROA 48. Sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s counsel of record within 20 days of the date of this ruling.
Motions 1, 2 and 3: as to Defendant Sanam Ladjevardi
A. Requests for Production (ROA 52)
The motion is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 1, 4, 5, 10, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26 and 29 and DENIED as to RFP No. 9.
On a motion to compel further RFP, the moving party must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) “[A]bsent a claim of privilege or attorney work product, the party who seeks to compel production has met his burden of showing good cause simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)
1. RFP Nos. 1, 4, 5, 10, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26 and 29
Plaintiff has set forth good cause justifying the discovery sought by RFP Nos. 1, 4, 5, 10, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26 and 29. These requests seek documents that are generally tailored to the claims and defenses in this litigation.
RFP Nos. 1 and 10 seek production of Sanam’s recorded statement to her insurance company and a recorded witness statement given to Sanam’s insurance company. Sanam objected on the basis of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. Plaintiff argues that full production or a privilege log should be provided. Sanam’s attorney-client privilege objection appears well-taken as to Sanam’s own recorded statement. (See Soltani-Rastegar v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 424.) However, it is uncertain whether the same privilege would apply to the witness statement. A privilege log is necessary to permit evaluation of the merits of the claim of privilege. (See C.C.P. § 2031.240(c)(1).) Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 1 and 10 to the extent it seeks an order requiring Sanam to submit a privilege log.
RFP Nos. 4 and 18 seek documents related to Sanam’s cell phone records for the date of the incident. In her opposition, Sanam argues that her cell phone records are irrelevant because there is no evidence that she was using a cell phone at the time of the incident and she denied doing so in her responses to Special Rogs. However, Plaintiff is still entitled to records verifying Sanam’s assertion that she was not using her cell phone at the time of the incident. (Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 738-739] [a party may use multiple methods to obtain discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under one method is not, by itself, a proper basis to refuse to provide discovery under another method].)
Sanam’s cell phone records for the date of the incident are clearly relevant to causation of the accident. Although Sanam is correct that a privacy interest exists with regard to her cell phone records (see Saunders v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 22), here Plaintiff has demonstrated a compelling need for the records that outweighs the privacy right implicated. As noted, the records are relevant to causation of the accident. Further, the scope of the records sought (for only the date of the subject incident) is reasonable. Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 4 and 18.
RFP Nos. 5 and 14 ask for all documents that relate to any insurance policy providing coverage for the subject incident. In response, Sanam produced her insurance policy declaration page. Plaintiff seeks to compel production of the entire insurance policy, not just the declarations page. The request appears proper pursuant to Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 743-744 [insurance policies are discoverable via a request for production of documents]. Sanam provides no justification for her refusal to provide the complete insurance policy. Thus, the motion as to RFP Nos. 5 and 14 is GRANTED.
RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 23 and 24 ask for documents regarding Sanam’s driving record and fitness/eligibility to drive a motor vehicle. Plaintiff contends these documents are relevant to Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim against Defendant Omid. In opposition, Sanam argues that these requests seek irrelevant information because there is no such negligent entrustment claim as Omid did not own the vehicle.
Plaintiff is correct that Sanam may not unilaterally limit the scope of discovery by contending that one of Plaintiff’s causes of action is “nonexistent.” Plaintiff’s Complaint names Defendant Omid as the owner of the vehicle and contains a claim against Omid for negligent entrustment. As Plaintiff points out, there has been no demurrer or summary judgment motion directed to the negligent entrustment claim. Thus, at this stage, the claim remains viable. The documents sought by RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 23 and 24 appear relevant to the negligent entrustment claim. Further, Sanam offers no reasoned argument for her objections and thus has failed to meet her burden of justifying her refusal to produce documents. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 [burden shifts to objector after good cause shown for RFPs].) Therefore, further responses are necessary. However, the scope of several of the requests is overbroad. The Court will GRANT the motion as to RFP Nos. 16, 19, 20, 23 and 24, but shall limit the scope of these requests to 5 years before the incident to the present.
RFP Nos. 26 and 29 seek records that are relevant to Sanam’s possible defenses in this litigation. Sanam provided no legal or factual authority whatsoever to support her objections. As Sanam offered no reasoned argument for her objections, she failed to meet her burden of justifying her refusal to respond to these requests. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 [burden shifts to objector after good cause shown for RFPs]; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [party claiming the privilege has burden of establishing preliminary facts necessary to support objection].) In addition, as to the equally available objection, a party “is entitled to discover any non-privileged information, cumulative or not, that may reasonably assist it in evaluating its defense, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448-449.)
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 26 and 29.
2. RFP No. 9
Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for the documents sought by RFP No. 9. This request seeks very broad information, documents that are not reasonable for the needs of the case and potentially seeks attorney-client privileged information and premature disclosure of expert witness information. Thus, Sanam’s objections as to RFP No. 9 are well-taken. There is no indication that Plaintiff made any attempt to limit the scope of this request.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 9.
B. Requests for Admission (ROA 44)
The motion is DENIED as to RFA Nos. 2 and 3 and GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 12, 13 and 14.
RFA Nos. 2 and 3 ask Sanam to admit that Plaintiff was injured as a result of the subject incident and admit that Sanam is 100% at fault in causing Plaintiff’s injuries resulting from the subject incident. Sanam’s responses to RFA Nos. 2 and 3 are code-compliant. RFA responses must be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (a). To the extent a party lacks sufficient information or knowledge to be able to admit or deny, the party must “state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Id., subd. (c).) Here, Sanam answered that she is unable to admit or deny the requests, that a reasonable inquiry has been made, and that the information known and readily obtainable is insufficient to enable Sanam to admit the matter. Thus, the responses to RFA Nos. 2 and 3 are adequate and no further response is needed.
RFA Nos. 12, 13 and 14 ask Sanam to admit that she has been involved in prior automobile collisions and moving violations. For similar reasons as discussed above in connection with the RFP motion, Sanam’s responses to RFA Nos. 12-14 are inadequate. Contrary to Sanam’s argument, the information sought by the requests could be relevant to Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim, which at this stage is still at issue. Further, based on the case law cited by Sanam, it is unclear whether a privacy right is even implicated by the disputed RFAs. Thus, Sanam failed to meet her burden of justifying her objections. Even if Sanam is correct that a privacy right is implicated here based on the information sought by the RFAs, Plaintiff has demonstrated a compelling need for the evidence as it is relevant to support the negligent entrustment claim. Thus, a further response should be provided. However, the scope of the requests is overbroad as there is no time limitation for these requests. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 12, 13 and 14, but the scope of these requests is limited to 5 years before the incident to the present.
C. Special Interrogatories (ROA 56)
The motion is GRANTED as to Special Rog Nos. 7, 8, 10 and 31.
Special Rog Nos. 7, 8 and 10 seek information regarding Sanam’s use of a cell phone at the time of the subject incident. For similar reasons as discussed above in connection with the RFP motion, Sanam’s responses to Special Rog Nos. 7, 8 and 10 are inadequate. In her opposition, Sanam argues that her cell phone records are irrelevant and there is no factual foundation for disclosure of this information because there is no evidence that she was using a cell phone at the time of the incident and she denied doing so in her response to Special Rog No. 9. However, Plaintiff is still entitled to information verifying Sanam’s assertion that she was not using her cell phone at the time of the incident. (Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 738-739.)
Sanam’s cell phone records for the date of the incident are clearly relevant to causation of the accident. Although Sanam is correct that a privacy interest exists with regard to her cell phone records (see Saunders v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 22), here Plaintiff has demonstrated a compelling need for the records that outweighs the privacy right implicated. As noted, the records are relevant to causation of the accident and verifying Sanam’s claim that she was not using a cell phone at the time of the accident. Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to Special Rog Nos. 7, 8 and 10.
Special Rog No. 31 asks Sanam to state when she was first put on notice of Plaintiff’s claim for damages. Sanam objected on the grounds of irrelevancy. Plaintiff asserts that this information may be relevant to possible spoilation of evidence and that he is entitled to know when Sanam was first put on notice of the claim so that Plaintiff can evaluate what actions were taken thereafter. Plaintiff has the better argument here. When Sanam first became aware of Plaintiff’s claim could be relevant to whether there has been spoilation of evidence. As the California Supreme Court reaffirmed in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541, “a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. ‘[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” “The discovery statutes were intended to curtail surprises, enable each side to learn as much as possible about the strengths and weaknesses of its case, and thereby facilitate realistic settlements and efficient trials.” (Id. at 543, fn. 3.)
Given the broad right to discovery, the Court will GRANT the motion as to Special Rog. No. 31.
Motion 4: as to Defendant Omid Ladjevardi (ROA 48)
The motion is GRANTED as to Form Rog Nos. 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 and DENIED as to Form Rog No. 17.1.
Form Rog Nos. 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 seek general background information from Omid. Omid failed to provide any pertinent authority to support his objections and, thus, failed to meet his burden of justifying his refusal to fully respond to these interrogatories. These interrogatories seek basic background information regarding Omid, who is a party to this litigation and alleged to be the owner of the vehicle involved in the incident. Omid provides no authority to justify his relevancy or privacy objections as they relate to these specific requests. He also offers no explanation for his refusal to fully answer Form Rog No. 2.1. Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to Form Rog Nos. 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8.
As to Form Rog 17.1, the Court finds Omid’s response to this Form Rog to be adequate. In response to Form Rog 17.1(a), (c) and (d), Omid provided the numbers of the applicable RFA responses and identified responsive individuals and documents as requested. In response to 17.1(b), which asks for all facts upon which he bases his RFA responses, he referred Plaintiff to his applicable explanation in the RFA responses. He thus identified with sufficient detail the documents from which the answer to Form Rog 17.1(b) may be ascertained. (See CCP § 2030.230.) Thus, the response is code-compliant. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to Form Rog No. 17.1.
Moving party to give notice.