Judge: Theodore R. Howard, Case: 21-1233170, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling
A) Motion for Leave to Intervene
Non-parties Rocklin Unified School District and Golden Valley Unified School District’s (“Districts” together) Motion for Leave to Intervene (“Motion”) is GRANTED.
The court must initially note that parties have made some arguments regarding the merits of the allegations in the pleadings (i.e. whether defendant Gavin Newsom (“Defendant”) abused his powers under the Emergency
Services Act, ripeness, standing, whether these issues have previously been adjudicated in other actions, etc.), which are not properly the subject of this Motion. The only issue before this court is whether or not Districts are permitted to file a Complaint in Intervention (Motion, Ex. 1 - “CII”) in this matter. As such, while the court will address the general allegations in plaintiffs Orange County Board of Education, Children’s Health Defense, and Children’s Health Defense-California Chapter’s (“Plaintiffs” together) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and the CII, it will not rule on the actual merits of any such allegations at this time. Defendant will have ample opportunity to attack the CII just as he has the SAC.
As to the merits of the Motion itself, Districts argue permissive intervention pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code § 387(d)(2), which states: “The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” (Id.)
“Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “Upon timely application, any person, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding. An intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and the defendant, ...” In this instance, the interveners seek to unite with the defendant County in resisting the claims of the State. [¶] The purposes of intervention are to protect the interests of others who may be affected by the judgment and to obviate delay and multiplicity of actions. [Citation.] Granting or denying leave to intervene is in the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.]” (People ex rel. Rominger v. Cnty. of Trinity (1983) 147 Cal. App. 3d 655, 660 (“Rominger”).)
“[S]ection 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention.” (Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1200.)
“The trial court must balance the interests of those affected by a judgment against the interests of the original parties in pursuing their case unburdened by others. [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion to strike this balance. (Ibid.) We thus review for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We presume the judgment is correct, affirm if it is correct on any theory, and reverse only if the appellant establishes the decision results in a miscarriage of justice or exceeds the bounds of reason.” (S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 71 Cal. App. 5th 314, 320 (“S. Coast”).)
Defendant also argues that this attempt to intervene is not “timely.” The present litigation was first filed on 11/23/21 but the Motion wasn’t filed until six months later.
“’“Timeliness is determined by the totality of the circumstances facing would-be intervenors, with a focus on three primary factors: ‘(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘[D]elay in itself does not make a request for intervention untimely.’ ” [Citation.] When mandatory intervention “is sought, because ‘the would-be intervenor may be seriously harmed if intervention is denied, courts should be reluctant to dismiss such a request for intervention as untimely, even though they might deny the request if the intervention were merely permissive.’ ” [Citation.] [¶] Although the totality of the circumstances should be considered, “prejudice to existing parties is ‘the most important consideration in deciding whether a motion for intervention is timely.’ ” [Citation.] This does not, however, include prejudice that would result from allowing intervention. (Ibid.) Rather, only the “ ‘prejudice caused by the movant's delay’ ” should be considered. [Citation.] Indeed, California courts have found intervention to be timely based solely on the absence of such prejudice.” (Crestwood Behav. Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal. App. 5th 560, 574.)
Here, Districts field their Motion approximately six-months after the original complaint was filed. This action is currently in the pleading phase with no set trial date. A demurrer to the SAC is presently on calendar. Although Defendant argues there has been extensive written discovery, motions filed, and one deposition taken, this matter is not so far along that granting the Motion will prejudice any of the parties. Further, Districts CII is almost identical to the SAC, and Plaintiffs and District are represented by the same attorneys, so there should not be much issue with bringing District up to speed in this case. Defendant also has ample time to conduct additional discovery and file additional motions. There is no showing of prejudice to any of the existing parties by the minimal delay in filing the Motion. The Motion is found to be timely.
Districts claim an interest the litigation and success of Plaintiffs. Namely, both Plaintiffs and Districts argue Defendant has abused his authority under the Emergency Services Act (“ESA”). Districts claim the ongoing State of Emergency (“SOE”) violates constitutional rights of their students, that the Districts are potentially subject to criminal culpability, expulsion from office, and loss of funding if Districts do not abide by various mandates. Districts argue they should, “be able to make decisions that represent the interests of our constituents as it related to vaccination, mask requirements, testing requirements, and instruction.” (Counter Decl. ¶ 5; Wheeler Decl. ¶ 5.) Districts appear to have met the requirement of showing it has an interest in the matter in litigation as presented by the existing parties in their existing pleadings. Again, whether the SAC and/or CII plead sufficient facts/damages is better determined by a demurrer/motion to strike and not at motion for intervention.
Districts would also be affected in having to comply with State regulations if the court were to ultimately rule in favor of Defendant or would be able to not have to enforce the mandates if the court were to rule in favor of Plaintiffs. Districts have adequately pled an interest in the disposition of the action. Given the allegations in the CII are almost identical to the SAC, it also does not appear the intervention will enlarge the issues raised by the original parties or the scope of litigation.
Districts have met the requirements for permissive intervention. The reasons for intervention outweigh the opposition by Defendant at this time, especially given “section 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention.” (Simpson Redwood Co., supra, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1200.)
The Motion is GRANTED.
Districts must file and serve their CII within five-days of the hearing. Districts must make certain to include the exhibits with their CII as those were missing from the proposed version filed with the court.
B) Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“PI”), or Alternatively for an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), is DENIED.
In this action Plaintiffs request a preliminary injunction (“PI”) requiring Defendant to terminate the statewide state of emergency related to COVID-19 that he declared in March 2020. (Motion, 2:4-11.) Plaintiffs argue the California Emergency Services Act requires termination of the statewide state of emergency. (Id.) Alternatively, Plaintiffs request the Court issue an order to show cause as to why Defendant should not terminate the statewide COVID state of emergency given Defendant said Californians had successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19 and protected the state’s healthcare system from collapse, which were the conditions of “extreme peril” that caused the Governor to declare the statewide emergency. (Id.) The court notes Plaintiffs made no arguments regarding why an OSC should be issued and as such, the court will deny the alternatively requested relief.
“(a) A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the opposing party.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 527(a).)
“The general purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination on the merits of the action.” (SB Liberty, LLC v. Isla Verde Assn., Inc. (2013) 217 Cal. App. 4th 272, 280.) The burden to prove all elements necessary to support the issuance of a PI is on the party seeking the relief. (O'Connell v. Superior Ct. (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1481.)
“A superior court must evaluate two interrelated factors when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. [Citation.] Weighing these factors lies within the broad discretion of the superior court.” (Smith v. Adventist Health Sys./W. (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 729, 749.)
“The trial court's determination must be guided by a “mix” of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. [Citation.] Of course, “[t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.” [Citation.] A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 668, 678.)
“Where, as here, the defendants are public agencies and the plaintiff seeks to restrain them in the performance of their duties, public policy considerations also come into play. There is a general rule against enjoining public officers or agencies from performing their duties. [Citations.] This rule would not preclude a court from enjoining unconstitutional or void acts, but to support a request for such relief the plaintiff must make a significant showing of irreparable injury.” (Tahoe Keys Prop. Owners' Assn. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 1459, 1471 (“Tahoe”).) “On the other side of the scale we consider the potential harm to defendants if a preliminary injunction is granted. Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin public officers and agencies in the performance of their duties the public interest must be considered.” (Id., at 1472-73.)
“In reviewing the injunction issued in this case, we must also bear in mind the extent to which separation of powers principles may affect the propriety of injunctive relief against state officials. In that context, our Supreme Court has emphasized that “principles of comity and separation of powers place significant restraints on courts' authority to order or ratify acts normally committed to the discretion of other branches or officials. [Citations.] In particular, the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3) obligates the judiciary to respect the separate constitutional roles of the Executive and the Legislature.” (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 695.) In the same context, the Supreme Court has stressed that “a judicial remedy must be tailored to the harm at issue [citations],” and that “[a] court should always strive for the least disruptive remedy adequate to its legitimate task.” ‘ “ (O'Connell v. Superior Ct. (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1464.)
1) The California Emergency Services Act is Not an Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power
Plaintiffs argue the Act is unconstitutional as it improperly delegates legislative power to the executive branch, which the non-delegation doctrine prohibits.
“The California Emergency Services Act [“Act”] recognizes and responds to a fundamental role of government to provide broad state services in the event of emergencies resulting from conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to life, property, and the resources of the state. Its purpose is to protect and preserve health, safety, life, and property. (§ 8550 et seq.) A state of emergency may be proclaimed by the Governor under the conditions proscribed for any area affected (§ 8625). The act confers broad powers on the Governor to deal with emergencies. [¶] For example, during a state of emergency, the Governor may suspend any regulatory statute or statute proscribing the procedure for conduct of state business, or suspend the orders, rules or regulations of any state agency, if these would prevent, hinder or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency (§ 8571).” (Martin v. Mun. Ct. (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 693, 696.)
In the matter of Newsom v. Superior Ct. (2021) 63 Cal. App. 5th 1099 (“Newsom”, the Court of Appeal has already analyzed the claim of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power issue and determined that the Act is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power as Plaintiffs in the present matter have argued. (Id., at 1113-1118.)
2) Plaintiffs Have Made No Showing of existing or threatened Harm
“'To qualify for preliminary injunctive relief plaintiffs must show irreparable injury, either existing or threatened.'“ [Citation.] To satisfy this requirement it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to present evidence.” [Emphasis added.] (Loder v. City of Glendale (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782–83.)
In cases such as this one where a party seeks to enjoin a public official from performing its duties, Plaintiffs are required to make a significant showing of the irreparable harm Plaintiffs would likely suffer if the injunction were denied. (Tahoe, supra, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1471.)
Plaintiffs request the court issue a preliminary injunction (“PI”) requiring Defendant to end the state of emergency (“SOE”) that was previously instituted in early 2020. Plaintiffs state Defendant has largely ended the majority of the applicable SOE, and that only 10% of the SOE is still in effect. Plaintiffs also state that the ongoing SOE (but not any specific active executive order issued under the SOE) has prevented Plaintiffs (school boards and a not-for-profit membership organization) from controlling their own affairs and having to follow “ever-changing guidelines from state and federal health officials or risk losing funding.” (Notice, 2:22-25.) Although the motion and declarations briefly discuss mask and vaccine mandates and the threats of cutting off funding (Motion, 10:24-11:2; Barke Decl. ¶¶ 4-5), the motion specifically states, “[o]f course, this case is not about masks, vaccines, or lockdowns.” (Motion, 11:20.) Plaintiffs have also not cited that there any active executive orders pertaining to school-aged children that are currently in effect, or which are under threat of being imminently instituted. While Plaintiffs claim, “terminating the [SOE] will protect every child’s right to a quality education,” Plaintiffs failed to show there is an imminent threat to any child’s ability to obtain an education.
In short, Plaintiffs have identified no imminent threat to the school boards or their students, or to the not-for-profit membership organization, that would support a PI.
On the other side of the harm scale, when Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a public officer in the performance of their duty, the public interest must be considered. (Tahoe, supra, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1472-73.) Defendant has provided evidence that as of 06/17/22, there are approximately 5% of COVID-19 related executive order provisions that remain in place. Those that are still in effect are 1) COVID testing and processing of at least 500,000 test per day; 2) vaccinations and boosters programs that will continue to distribute 200,000 doses per day and provide temporary licensing requirements so pharmacists and pharmacy technicians can administer vaccines; 3) protecting hospital capacities and vulnerable populations during COVID surges, including permitting out-of-state health care workers to provide services in state and enable the Dept. of Developmental Services to provide remote and expanded nonresidential services; and 4) provisions that prohibit infant formula price gouging. (Rutherford Decl., Ex. 49; RTJN, Exs. D9, I at GOV211, K.) The real harm to the general public on potentially not having ongoing access to testing facilities, vaccinations, medical services, and non-priced gouged formula, outweighs the total lack of any identified harm to Plaintiffs. (Id., at 1472-73.)
This factor weighs in favor of Defendant.
3) Plaintiffs Have Not Made a Showing They Will Be Likely to Be Successful on the Merits
The second interrelated factor is the likelihood Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their case. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges the following two causes of action: 1) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief re Terminating State of Emergency; and 2) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief re Constitutionality of Emergency Services Act. As noted, supra, the Court of Appeal has already ruled the Act is not unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and thus Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on that cause of action. (Newsom, supra, (2021) 63 Cal. App. 5th at 1113-1118.) This leaves the first cause of action for terminating the SOE for this court to determine.
Plaintiffs argue Defendant was required to end the SOE under Gov’t. Code § 8629, which states:
“The Governor shall proclaim the termination of a state of emergency at the earliest possible date that conditions warrant. All of the powers granted the Governor by this chapter with respect to a state of emergency shall terminate when the state of emergency has been terminated by proclamation of the Governor or by concurrent resolution of the Legislature declaring it at an end.” [Emphasis added.] (Gov't Code § 8629.)
“The Emergency Act empowers the Governor to proclaim a state of emergency when conditions of “extreme peril” caused by, among other things, an “epidemic” are “likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city ....” (§ 8558, subd. (b).) In those circumstances, the Governor has “complete authority over all agencies of the state government and the right to exercise within the area designated all police power vested in the state ... to effectuate the purposes of [the Emergency Act].” (§ 8627.) Police power includes “the power to legislate.” [Emphasis added.] (Newsom, supra 63 Cal.App.5th at 1113.) Thus, under the Emergency Act the Governor may “make, amend and rescind orders and regulations” which “shall have the force and effect of law” and take effect immediately. (§ 8567, subd. (a).)” (640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom (2022) 78 Cal. App. 5th 840, 852 (“640 Tenth”).)
The Legislature empowered the Governor of California to issue an SOE pursuant to the requirements of Gov’t Code § 8625. A, “ ’ “State of Emergency” means the duly proclaimed existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the state caused by conditions . . . epidemic . . . which, by reason of their magnitude, are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. . .” (Gov’t Code § 8558(b).) “During a state of emergency the Governor shall, to the extent he deems necessary, have complete authority over all agencies of the state government and the right to exercise within the area designated all police power vested in the state by the Constitution and laws of the State of California in order to effectuate the purposes of this chapter. In exercise thereof, he shall promulgate, issue, and enforce such orders and regulations as he deems necessary, in accordance with the provisions of Section 8567.” [Emphasis added.] (Gov't Code § 8627.) Under the Act, Defendant has been given both the power to make a determination as to when to institute an SOE, but also to determine when to terminate an SOE. (Gov't Code §§ 8625 and 8629.)
““The courts will interfere by mandamus when the action taken by [a government entity] is ‘so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.’” (Los Angeles City etc. Emps. Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ. (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 851, 856 (“LA City”).) Nothing in Defendant’s actions in this matter suggest Defendant is not acting within the scope of his authority under the Act, or that Defendant is attempting to expand his powers in excess of what is permitted under the Act.
Plaintiffs argue Defendant has a ministerial duty to terminate the SOE. (Lazan v. Cnty. of Riverside (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 453, 460.) Even if that were the case, the text of the Act is vague as to the requirements of when an SOE must be terminated, requiring only that, “[t]he Governor shall proclaim the termination of a state of emergency at the earliest possible date that conditions warrant.” (Gov’t. Code § 8629.) Plaintiffs concede that SOE can be extended through the “recovery” phase of an emergency, but argue that the recovery phase cannot be indefinite. (Motion, 7:3-5.) But, “[t]he term “emergency” depends upon the circumstances of each case; its central idea is that a sudden or unexpected necessity requires speedy action. [Citation.] . . . Where, as here, the statute speaks of an emergency affecting the public health or safety, the vital element is not official prescience or its lack but rather the acuteness of the threat to the public interest. Moreover, the scope of judicial review of the Controller's decision is relatively limited. In reviewing a quasi-legislative action, the court inquires only whether the agency has exceeded its authority or indulged in arbitrary action. [Citations.] The authorizing legislation may contemplate an action based upon evidence which is judgmental as well as factual. [Citation.] The courts will not superimpose their own policy judgment upon that of the agency unless the latter's decision was arbitrary or capricious.” [Emphasis added.] (Malibu W. Swimming Club v. Flournoy (1976) 60 Cal. App. 3d 161, 166 (“Malibu”).)
A, “writ will not lie to control discretion conferred upon a public officer or agency. [Citations.] Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent [citations]; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty[.]” [Citation.] [¶] Where a statute leaves room for discretion, a challenger must show the official acted arbitrarily, beyond the bounds of reason or in derogation of the applicable legal standards. [Citation.] Where only one choice can be a reasonable exercise of discretion, a court may compel an official to make that choice.” (California Corr. Supervisors Org., Inc. v. Dep't of Corr. (2002) 96 Cal. App. 4th 824, 827 (“CCSO”).)
The State and the world in general are still under pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic. Issues involving new variants, goods movement, price gouging and limited availability of some goods, vaccination dissemination, COVID-19 testing, and protecting hospital capacities/providing healthcare are ongoing. As of 06/17/22, Defendant states there are only 5% of COVID-19 related executive order provisions that will remain in place and those that are still in effect are 1) COVID testing and processing of at least 500,000 test per day; 2) vaccinations and boosters programs that will continue to distribute 200,000 doses per day and provide temporary licensing requirements so pharmacists and pharmacy technicians can administer vaccines; 3) protecting hospital capacities and vulnerable populations during COVID surges, including permitting out-of-state health care workers to provide services in state and enable the Dept. of Developmental Services to provide remote and expanded nonresidential services; and 4) provisions that prohibit infant formula price gouging. (Rutherford Decl., Ex. 49; RTJN, Exs. D9, I at GOV211, K.)
It is reasonable to consider conditions do not yet warrant a complete termination of the COVID-19 SOE. Defendant has also produced evidence in the form of expert declaration and recent declarations of continued public health emergencies related to COVID-19 from governors of numerous other states, which support that the pandemic and the need for emergency services related thereto are ongoing concerns both within this state and nationally. (Opposition, Exs. N1-N18; See, Rutherford Decl.) While the Court recognizes that these views are subject to ongoing dispute as is even the “science” called on to back them up’ these have become political disputes which this Court is unable to resolve at this stage.
Plaintiffs have not shown that any of the few remaining executive orders issued under the SOE affect them negatively in any way, nor that any of those orders are outside of the scope of Defendant’s powers under the Act. Plaintiffs have not shown Defendant, “acted arbitrarily, beyond the bounds of reason or in derogation of the applicable legal standards.” (CCSO, supra, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 827.; California Teachers. Assn. v. Ingwerson (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 860, 867 [“Where the underlying act involves an exercise of discretionary power, mandamus may issue only when the action taken by the board is “ ‘ “so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” ’ ”].)
As discussed, Defendant has acted within Defendant’s powers under the Act and there is nothing to suggest the very limited current executive orders under the SOE are arbitrary or capricious, nor that Defendant’s decision to continue the SOE in the face of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is, “so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” As there is no evidence Defendant is acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner, this court cannot superimpose its policy judgment on Defendant and order the SOE be terminated. (Malibu, supra, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 166.) Plaintiffs have failed to show they will be successful under the remaining cause of action.
As Plaintiffs have failed to show any harm, let alone made the requisite significant showing of harm and as Plaintiffs have filed to show they are likely to be successful in the action, an injunction cannot be issued.
The motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
4) Objections and Requests for Judicial Notice (RFJN)
a) Defendant’s Objections
Kaufman Decl.:
Sustained as to Nos. 1-7, 9 – Lack foundation and improper opinion testimony. Kaufman’s expertise appears to be in, ”organizational development, behavioral management and modification, crisis and risk communication and emergency preparedness in public health and business organizations.” (Kaufman Decl., Ex. A.) He does not appear to have any scientific or medical training relating to virology, nor does he cite to any evidence that would be the basis for these opinions.
Overruled as to No. 8 – This does appear to be within Kaufman’s stated area of expertise.
Street Decl.:
Sustained as to Nos. 3 from “He did not know…” to “. . . no longer poses.” – Hearsay, best evidence rule, misstates testimony.
Overruled as to Nos. 1-2; No. 3 from “In the meantime. . .” through to “. . .on June 28.”; and Nos. 4-5 – Street is providing background information on the case with these statements and not legal arguments, which presumably as Plaintiffs’ counsel he would have personal knowledge of.
b) Defendant’s RTJN
The court takes judicial notice of Exs. A-Q pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(b) and/or (c).
c) Plaintiffs’ Objections
The objection is overruled. Plaintiffs appear to be making a blanket objection to the entirety of Defendant’s RTJN instead of to specific exhibits. Each of those exhibits was properly notice pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(b) and/or (c). The court recognizes that although it may take judicial notice of documents, it may not mean the findings of fact are true.
d) Plaintiffs’ RTJN
The court takes judicial notice of Exs. A, C-D, F-G, K, and L pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(c); Ex. H pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d).
The court will not take judicial notice of Exs. B, E, I, and J. Newspaper articles are not proper authorities to establish the truth of matter asserted therein. (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 1141, 1147, fn. 5.)
C) Demurrer to Second Amended complaint
Defendant’s demurrer to the SAC is CONTINUED to 09/22/22.
Defendant to give notice.