Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 18STCV07526, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 18STCV07526 Hearing Date: October 13, 2022 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: October
13, 2022 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET.
CASE: Juan Manuel Villa v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC.
CASE NO.: 18STCV07526 
MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Juan Manuel Villa
RESPONDING PARTY(S): No opposition on
eCourt as of 10/11/22
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This was a lemon law action, filed on December 7, 2018, alleging a defective
vehicle purchased in 2016. A notice of settlement was filed in June of 2022.
Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees
and costs.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff
moves for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to a settlement.
Entitlement
to Fees
Civil
Code section 1794(d) states:
If the buyer prevails in an action under
this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the
judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including
attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have
been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and
prosecution of such action.
Civil Code section
1717 provides, in relevant part:
In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to
enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or
to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party
prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the
contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to
other costs.
(Civil Code § 1717(a),
bold emphasis added.) A settlement agreement is generally subject to the law of
contract except where otherwise modified by statute. (See, e.g., Nicholson
v. Barab (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1673, 1682.)
Here,
a notice of settlement was filed on June 9, 2022. The settlement agreement
states that Defendant agreed to pay attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs in the
amount of $15,000, or, alternatively, that Plaintiff may have the Court
determine the fees, costs, and expenses recoverable pursuant to Civil Code section
1794(d). (Declaration of Roger Kirnos ISO Mot. Exh. D ¶ 5.) Defendant agreed to
stipulate that Plaintiff, the buyer, is the prevailing party in this action. (Id.)
Reasonableness of
Fees
Reasonable attorney’s fees are
allowable costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc §
1033.5(a)(10), (c)(5)(B).) In actions that are based on a contract, “where the
contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are
incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the
parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the
party prevailing on the contract… shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s
fees in addition to other costs.” (Civil Code § 1717(a) [emphasis added].) A
recovery of attorney’s fees is authorized even in noncontractual or tort
actions if the contractual provision for fee recovery is worded broadly enough.
(See Code Civ. Proc § 10211; Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 984, 993 [agreement to award fees based on outcome of “any dispute”
encompasses all claims, “whether in contract, tort or otherwise]; Lockton v.
O'Rourke (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1076; Lerner v. Ward (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 155, 160.)
The prevailing party must file a noticed motion to claim
contractual attorney fees as costs. (Civil Code § 1717(b)(1); see Russell v.
Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1728.) Reasonable
attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the Court and shall be an element of the
costs of suit. (Civil Code § 1717(a); Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(5)(B).)
Reasonable attorney fees are ordinarily determined by the Court pursuant to the
“lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by
the reasonable hourly rate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134
Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [“California courts have consistently held that a
computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is
fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for
comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court
based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the
extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Ibid.)
In setting the hourly rate for a fee award, courts are entitled to consider the
“fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for
similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin
v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664.) The burden
is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to prove the reasonableness of the
fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.)
The Court has broad discretion in
determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be
overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law,
or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi
v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.) The
Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded
in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will
suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258,
274-275.)
Plaintiff has
provided the complete billing records on this case as of the filing of the
instant motion, showing a total of $41,657.50 in fees, based on 129.1 hours of
attorney time at rates between $175.00 and $450.00 per hour, plus $15,710.03 in
costs, for a total of $57,367.53. (Kirnos Decl. Exhs. A, B.) Plaintiff requests
a 1.5x multiplier on the fees as billed, adding an additional $20,828.75 to the
fee award.
Plaintiff argues
that a 1.5 multiplier is reasonable in light of the contingent nature of this
action, Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience and specialized knowledge, and the
extensive work performed, including nine depositions taken and defended. Multipliers
for successful representation on a contingency basis are common and frequently
justified. (See, e.g., Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334,
352.) Plaintiff also contends that Plaintiff’s counsel received an excellent
result by procuring $75,000 in a settlement for Plaintiff, from which
Plaintiff’s counsel received nothing.
As Defendant has
not opposed this motion, and in light of the considerable motion practice and
the evidence of extensive litigation that was performed in this matter, the
Court finds Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs to be reasonable.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2022 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should
be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order
which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.