Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 19STCP01306, Date: 2022-08-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCP01306 Hearing Date: August 25, 2022 Dept: 47
MICHAEL R FLETCHER v. MATTHEW FLETCHER, Case No. 19STCP01306
TENTATIVE RULINGS ON PRETRIAL MATTERS
Court’s Motion to Bifurcate Equitable Claims
On July 5, 2022,
the Court issued an order announcing its own motion, pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 598, to bifurcate the trial in this matter to try the
equitable issues presented by five of Plaintiff Michael Fletcher’s causes of
action for declaratory relief, specifically his Fourth through Eighth Causes of
Action, during an initial bench trial and to reserve any remaining issues not
resolved during the first phase for a subsequent jury trial.
The Court noted
that five of Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claims appear to raise equitable
issues that should be tried to the Court.
The issues asserted in the five causes of action at issue are:
(1) Whether
CSSD failed to register its lien concerning 4033 Fairman Street and 5655 East
The Toledo within 45 days of judgment as mandated under California Code of
Regulations section 116130(a) (Fourth Cause of Action);
(2) Whether
Defendant Matthew Fletcher has been the equitable owner of 4033 Fairman Street
since 2004 (Fifth Cause of Action);
(3) Whether
the child support judgment underlying the liens on Plaintiff’s real property is
“void” under the principle of priority of jurisdiction and may be “challenged
at any time” (Sixth Cause of Action);
(4) Whether
CSSD’s liens violated the automatic stay provision under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. section 362, and are void (Seventh Cause of Action); and
(5) Whether
CSSD should be estopped from re-litigating whether Defendant Matthew Fletcher
is the equitable owner of 4033 Fairman Street (Eighth Cause of Action).
Based on this
observation, the Court issued an order to show cause why these five causes of
action are not equitable claims that should be tried to the Court and, if they
are equitable, whether the trial should not be bifurcated to allow for an
initial bench trial on these claims and a subsequent trial on any legal claims
not resolved by the Court during the first phase of the trial.
The Court directed
the parties to submit their arguments in response to the Court’s bifurcation
motion with each side permitted a brief of up to 15 pages to be filed by August
9, 2022, and set a hearing on the bifurcation motion for August 18, 2022 at
1:30 p.m. Both Plaintiff Michael R.
Fletcher and Defendant County of Los Angeles timely submitted briefs, which the
Court has reviewed and considered.
Analysis
Code of Civil
Procedure section 598 provides:
The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of
justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be
promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an
order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which
such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30
days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof
shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case,
except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597
and 597.5. The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at any time.
. . .
(Code Civ. Proc. §
598 [Emphasis added].)
Code of Civil
Procedure section 592 states:
In actions for the recovery of specific, real, or personal property,
with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract, or as
damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact must be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is ordered, as
provided in this Code. Where in these
cases there are issues both of law and fact, the issue of law must be first
disposed of. In other cases, issues of fact must be tried by the Court,
subject to its power to order any such issue to be tried by a jury, or to
be referred to a referee, as provided in this Code.
(Code Civ. Proc. §
592 [Emphasis added].)
“The major
objective of bifurcated trials is to expedite and simplify the presentation of
evidence.”¿ (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon¿(1971) 3 Cal.3d 875,
888.)¿ This objective is thwarted if the proposed separate trial requires the
presentation of evidence that would also be presented at a later stage of a
bifurcated trial.¿ (Id.)
Our Supreme Court has
outlined the standards governing a right to a jury trial under Article 1,
section 16 of the California Constitution as follows:
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by our Constitution. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 16.) We have long acknowledged that the right so guaranteed,
however, is the right as it existed at common law in 1850, when the
Constitution was first adopted, “and what that right is, is a purely historical
question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or
legal fact.” [Citations.] As a general proposition, “The jury trial is a matter
of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity.”
(C & K
Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8 [Citations
omitted].) The C&K court also stated the standard for determining
whether an action is one at law or in equity:
“If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable
in courts of law, it is to that extent an action at law. In determining whether
the action was one triable by a jury at common law, the court is not bound
by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and
the facts of the particular case—the gist of the action. A
jury trial must be granted where the gist of the action is
legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law.” [Citation.] On the
other hand, if the action is essentially one in equity and the relief sought “depends
upon the application of equitable doctrines,” the parties are not entitled
to a jury trial.
(C & K,
supra, 23 Cal.3d at 9.) “It is well established that, in a case involving
legal and equitable issues, the trial court may proceed to try the equitable
issues first, without a jury. . . and that if the court’s determination of
those issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains
to be tried by a jury.” (Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974)
10 Cal.3d 668, 671.)
In the context
of declaratory relief actions,
the right to a jury trial depends on whether the
issues raised in the complaint are legal or equitable in nature. (Entin v. Superior Court (2012) 208
Cal. App. 4th 770, 774.) “’In determining whether
the action was one triable by a jury at common law, the court is not
bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights
involved and the facts of the particular case—the gist of the action. A
jury trial must be granted where the gist of
the action is legal, where the action is in reality
cognizable at law.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, if the action is
essentially one in equity and the relief sought ‘depends upon the
application of equitable doctrines,’ the parties are not entitled to a jury
trial. [Citations.] Although ... ‘the legal or equitable nature of a cause
of action ordinarily is determined by the mode of relief to be
afforded’ [citation], the prayer for relief in a particular case is not
conclusive. [citations.]’” (Id., at p. 776-777, quoting C &
K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8–9.)
All five causes of
action are solely claims for declaratory relief. “Declaratory relief actions generally, but
not necessarily, are deemed equitable in nature. (See, e.g., Interinsurance
Exchange v. Savior (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 691, 694.) The proper inquiry is
whether the issues raised in the action are legal or equitable in nature. (Entin
v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 770, 777; Manneck v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300.)” (Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal. App.
4th 146, 161.) Accordingly, the Court
examines each cause of action to assess its essential nature.
Plaintiff’s fourth
cause of action seeks a declaratory judgment about whether CSSD failed to
register its lien concerning 4033 Fairman Street and 5655 East The Toledo
within 45 days of judgment as mandated under California Code of Regulations
section 116130(a). Through this cause of
action, Plaintiff challenges the procedure used by CSSD to affix its child
support lien to Plaintiff’s property.
This is an equitable issue that must be tried to the Court. (Selby Constructors v. McCarthy (1979)
91 Cal. App. 3d 517, 525-527.) Selby
Constructors involved the enforcement of a mechanics lien against defendant
homeowners who invoked their right to a jury trial. The trial court denied a jury trial on all
issues in the case, holding that the foreclosure of a lien is an action
sounding in equity. On appeal, the Court
of Appeal reversed holding that the claim involved both legal and equitable aspects. The validity of the underlying claim raised
legal issues as to which a jury trial right attached, but “[i]f the challenge
to the lien is procedural, relating to the question of compliance with
statutory requirements for its perfection, it may be seen that no jury trial is
necessary as a matter of right.” (Id.,
at p. 526.) Unlike the mixed claim
raised in Selby Constructors, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action does
not challenge the substance of the underlying judgment but rather simply CSSD’s
procedural compliance in asserting its lien, that is, whether the lien was
registered within 45 days of the judgment as required by the regulation. As a result, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of
action raises only equitable issues and must be tried to the Court.
In his fifth cause
of action, Plaintiff seeks a declaration about whether his brother, Matthew
Fletcher, has been the equitable owner of 4033 Fairman Street since 2004. In general, “actions to quiet title are
equitable in nature. (Caira v. Offner
(2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 12, 26 [Citations omitted].) Indeed, “it is well settled that an action to
establish title which does not include a prayer to obtain possession of the
property is equitable in nature.” (Id., at p. 28 [Citation and internal
quotation marks omitted].) Thus,
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is plainly an equitable claim to be tried to
the Court.
Plaintiff’s sixth
cause of action seeks a legal declaration that the child support judgment
underlying the liens on his real property are “void” under the principle of
priority of jurisdiction and may be “challenged at any time.” Questions of jurisdiction are generally
issues of law for the Court’s resolution, not matters for the jury to
decide. (Hollingsworth v. Heavy
Transp., Inc. (2021) 66 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1176.) Even if there are factual questions related
to the jurisdictional issues raised in an action, there is no right to a jury
trial of these factual disputes. (Id.) Thus, the sixth cause of action is an
equitable claim that must be resolved by the Court.
Through his seventh
cause of action, Plaintiff requests declaratory relief establishing that CSSD’s
liens violated the automatic stay provision under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 362, and are therefore void.
Again, this cause of action raises a question of whether CSSD violated
procedural requirements in enforcing its liens, which is an equitable issue for
the Court to decide. (Selby Constructors v. McCarthy, supra, at pp. 525-527.) What is more, CSSD contends that the central
question at issue is one of federal preemption.
If so, this is plainly a legal issue to be determined by the Court. (Risperdal & Invega Cases (2020)
49 Cal. App. 5th 942, 953-954 [affirming trial court’s ruling denying a jury
trial of factual disputes underlying jurisdictional question].) Thus, this cause of action too is an
equitable one that must be tried to the Court.
Plaintiff’s eighth
cause of action seeks the answer to whether CSSD should be estopped from
re-litigating whether Defendant Matthew Fletcher is the equitable owner of 4033
Fairman Street. “As the name suggests,
equitable estoppel is an equitable issue for court resolution. (Driscoll
v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305, 61 Cal.Rptr. 661,
431 P.2d 245; see C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co.,
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 9, 151 Cal.Rptr. 323, 587 P.2d 1136
[“equitable estoppel may be tried by the court without a jury”].)” (Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal. App.
4th 146, 161.) Because Plaintiff’s
eighth cause of action asserts an equitable defense to CSSD’s enforcement of the
child support judgment, it is an equitable claim as to which there is no right
to a jury trial.
Based on these
conclusions about the equitable character of Plaintiff’s fourth through eighth
causes of action, the Court orders a bifurcation of the trial in this matter
with these equitable matters to be tried first to the Court and any remaining
matters to be resolved in a subsequent jury trial.
Parties’ Disputes
Over Jury Instructions
At the Final Status Conference
on July 5, 2022, the Court requested briefing from the parties regarding the
disputed jury instructions on the claims to be tried to the jury. Initial briefs were to be simultaneously
submitted by August 9, 2022, with replies permitted to be filed by August 15,
2022. The Court has reviewed the briefs
submitted pursuant to this order as well as any relevant briefing in the
parties’ trial briefs.
The Revised Set of Jury
Instructions with Objections Noted discloses the parties’ disputes about jury
instructions for use at trial. CSSD
objects to the following instructions proposed by Plaintiff: CACI 3023, 3060, 3061,
3067, 3507, 3514, 3600, and 3601, as well as verdict forms VF3030 and VF
3031. Plaintiff objects to CSSD’s
Special Instruction Nos. 1 and 3.
The
Court sustains CSSD’s objections to the following instructions proposed by
Plaintiff:
CACI 3023: Plaintiff cannot rely on the elements for a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he has explicitly disavowed any intention
to “raise or allege any fact that would confer federal question jurisdiction in
this Complaint” and asserts “[t]here is no federal question jurisdictional
claim alleged in this Complaint.”
(Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2.) A claim
under 42 U.S.C § 1983 is a claim within the federal question jurisdiction of
the federal district courts. (Dahlstrom
v. Lifecare Centers of Am., Inc. (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2022) 2022 WL 584246, at *3, report
and recommendation adopted, No. C21-1465-TL-SKV, 2022 WL 579312 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 25, 2022); Langford v. Gates (C.D. Cal. 1985) 610 F. Supp.
120, 122.) Thus, reliance on its
elements and principles necessarily raises federal question jurisdiction, which
Plaintiff claims to eschew in his Complaint.
Nor can Plaintiff simply argue that he is invoking the First,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as the foundation for
his claims while borrowing from the CACI instruction for a section 1983
claim. (Complaint, ¶¶ 52, 57, 107.) “[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a
constitutional right does not have
a direct cause of action under the United States
Constitution but must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.
Agency (9th Cir. 2001) 261 F.3d 912, 925.)
Similarly, the section 1983 jury instruction cannot be used
as a template for asserting claims for damages directly under the California
Constitution. Although Plaintiff
purports to assert civil rights claims under the California Constitution seeking
damages (Complaint, Second Cause of Action, pp. 10-11; Third Cause of Action,
pp. 11-12), there is no private right of action for damages under the
California Constitution. (Katzberg v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 321[due process]; Richards
v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverages Control (2006)139 Cal.App.4th 304, 317 [due
process]; Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795, 807 [no damages
cause of action for violation of California Constitution's due process or equal
protection provisions].)
Because none of Plaintiff’s claims can be construed as
arising under the U.S. Constitution or section 1983 and there is no private
right of action for damages under the California Constitution, CACI 3023 is
clearly inappropriate for use in instructing the jury on any of Plaintiff’s damages
claims. Indeed, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action are claims solely for damages
under the state or federal constitution, they are not actionable and should be
dismissed.
Plaintiff asserts a ninth cause of action for declaratory
relief apparently seeking a legal declaration that CSSD “intentionally violated
the civil rights of Plaintiff by retaliating against Plaintiff based on
Plaintiff’s gender and its malicious and wanton disregard for Plaintiff’s constitutionally
protected rights as a male parent which are not less than the rights of a
female parent.” (Complaint, ¶ 106.) Plaintiff invokes his right to be free from
gender discrimination under the federal and state constitutions. (Id., ¶ 107.) While his repudiation of any reliance on
federal question jurisdiction negates his right to rely on the federal
constitution, Plaintiff may properly raise a declaratory relief claim for
gender discrimination under the California Constitution. (Katzberg, supra, 29 Cal. 4th at p.
307.) Such a claim may be tried to a
jury during the second phase of the trial but CACI 3023, which addresses the
elements for an unlawful search and seizure, is not the appropriate instruction
for such an action.
CACI 3060, 3061, and 3067 and VF 3030 and 3031 –
Plaintiff proposes that the Court use jury instructions and verdict forms for
claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act to guide the jury’s deliberations on
his civil rights claims. These are
inapplicable to a case like this one that is brought against a governmental
entity. As a government agency, CSSD is
not a “business establishment” subject to suit under the Unruh Act. (Brennon
B. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Cal. Aug. 4, 2022) No.
S266254, 2022 WL 3096272, at *20.)
CACI 3600 and 3601 – Plaintiff relies on jury
instructions used to guide deliberations on civil conspiracy allegations, but
he raises such allegations only in his third cause of action for violation of
civil rights under the California constitution.
As noted above, this is not an actionable claim for damages.
CACI 3507 and 3514 – Plaintiff requests that the
Court instruct the jury using instructions relevant to eminent domain cases,
but this is not such a case.
The Court sustains
Plaintiff’s objections to the following instructions proposed by CSSD:
Special
Instruction No. 1: As noted above, the question
of whether child support actions and judgments are subject to the automatic
stay in federal bankruptcy actions is a legal question that should not be posed
to the jury.
Special
Instruction No. 3: Unclean hands is an equitable
defense, not an issue that should be presented for jury determination. If such a defense is properly presented in
this action, the Court will rule on its viability in the first phase of the
trial.