Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 19STCP01306, Date: 2024-05-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCP01306    Hearing Date: May 7, 2024    Dept: 47

On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff Michael Fletcher  filed a Trial Brief arguing that Defendant’s pleadings in the underlying Default Judgment should be stricken pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.   Defendant Los Angeles County Child Support Services Dept. filed a trial brief on April 25, 2024, opposing Plaintiff’s request to strike these pleadings.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, if the Court determines that subsection (b) has been violated, it may “impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(c).) Violations of subsection (b) include presenting allegations which do not “have evidentiary support” or are not “likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(b)(3).) Sanctions under this section “shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(d).)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s pleadings in the underlying default judgment action should be stricken because Defendant’s Chief Attorney, Alexandra Bauer, could not speak directly to the veracity of Defendant’s filings in that action.  This assertion must be rejected for a number of reasons.

First, Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 only permits a party to attack a pleading under subdivision (b) via a separate motion with sufficient advance notice to comply with the 21-day safe harbor period, as required by subdivision (c). (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(b)-(c).) Second, as Defendant states, it is settled precedent that sanctions under section 128.7 based on the improper filing or advocating of a pleading cannot be granted after judgment has been entered. (Banks v. Hathaway (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 949, 954; Hart v. Hart (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 410, 414.) Finally—and most importantly—Plaintiff offers no authority standing for the position that section 128.7 contemplates or authorizes an attack on a party’s filings in one action through an entirely separate action. Plaintiff’s approach ignores that sanctions under section 128.7 “are not designed to be punitive in nature but rather to promote compliance with the statutory standards of conduct.” (Hart, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 415 [internal citations omitted].) A collateral attack on a party’s filings through a separate action does not serve that purpose, and, if accepted, would threaten to expose any party to an action to a flood of collateral litigation regarding the putative impropriety of their pleadings from a sufficiently aggrieved litigant. The Court declines to adopt such an extreme interpretation.

Defendant’s filings in the underlying action may not be stricken in this action under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, nor will the Court decline to take judicial notice of those filings on that basis, as they are records of a court of this state and properly the subject of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(d).