Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 19STCV39355, Date: 2023-03-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV39355 Hearing Date: March 30, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: March 30, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: May 23, 2023
CASE: Jan Williams v. County of Los Angeles et
al.
CASE NO.: 19STCV39355 
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles,
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Jan
Williams, in pro per.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment discrimination action filed on November 1, 2019. In
her May 11, 2020 First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
subjected her to multiple adverse employment actions and ultimately terminated
her on the basis of her age and disability.
Defendant County of Los Angeles
moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of all
causes of action asserted against it.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION:
Motion for Summary Judgment
For the
reasons stated below, the Court has granted summary adjudication as to each
cause of action alleged against this Defendant in the First Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
//
Motion for Summary Adjudication
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an
opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if
not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment
if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from
the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge
v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is
not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet
their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)
Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Procedural Violations
Defendant
objects to the numerous procedural deficiencies in Plaintiff’s responsive
filings.
In
opposition to this motion, Plaintiff initially filed a three-page opposition
without supporting evidence or a separate statement of disputed material facts,
as is required to properly oppose a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(1)-(2).) To cure this defect,
Plaintiff filed and served an “Amended Opposition,” with accompanying exhibits,
a supporting declaration, and a Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts on March 16, 2023. These filings were timely pursuant
to section 437c(b)(2)’s requirement that any opposition papers be filed 14 days
before the date of the hearing. (Id.) However, Plaintiff’s exhibits Nos
7-10 were filed on March 20, 2023, only 10 days before the hearing, without
leave of Court. These exhibits are therefore untimely, and the Court refuses to
consider them.
Further,
Plaintiff’s Amended Opposition is exactly 100 pages in length, five times
the limit imposed by the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rule of Court 3.113(d) [“In a
summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no responding memorandum may
exceed 20 pages.”].) The Court refuses to consider such a flagrantly and
unjustifiably overlength opposition.
Even
further still, Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, where it identifies disputed
facts, consistently relies on bulk citations to the entirety of Plaintiff’s
417-paragraph declaration in support of her opposition, or on bulk citations to
all 10 of her exhibits in support. (See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response to Separate
Statement Nos. 67, 69, 70, 72-76.) Such bulk citations are not sufficient to
set forth a dispute of material facts. (See Cal. Rules of Court Rule
3.1350(f).) The Court will therefore not consider these citations when
reviewing Plaintiff’s evidence.
First Cause of Action: FEHA Discrimination
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for discrimination is without
merit.
The California Supreme Court has adopted the
federal burden-shifting test for assessing employment discrimination claims. (Guz
v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) To establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, the Plaintiff must show that (1) the employee is
a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was qualified for the position
sought or performing competently in the position held; (3) the employee suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) some other circumstance suggests a
discriminatory motive. (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411
U.S. 792, 802.) To challenge an employment discrimination claim on summary
judgment, an employer must either show that one or more of the prima facie
elements is lacking, or must offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action. (See Caldwell v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist.
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189.) If the
employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of discrimination “drops out of the picture,” and the burden shifts
back to the employee to prove that the claimed legitimate reason is merely a
pretext. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1028, 1042.)
"In responding to the
employer's showing of a legitimate reason for the complained-of action, . . .
'" . . . the employee' "must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them 'unworthy of credence,'
[citation], and hence infer 'that the employer did not act for the [ . . .
asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.' [Citations.]" '" '" (McRae
v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 377, 388-389.) "The plaintiff must do more than raise the
inference that the employer's asserted reason is false. '[A] reason cannot be
proved to be "a pretext for discrimination" unless it is
shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.' [Citation.] If the plaintiff
produces no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
infer that the employer's true reason was discriminatory, the employer is
entitled to summary judgment. [Citation.]" (Hicks v. KNTV Television,
Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.)
"Although an employee's
evidence submitted in opposition to an employer's motion for summary judgment
is construed liberally, it 'remains subject to careful scrutiny.' [Citation.]
The employee's 'subjective beliefs in an employment discrimination case do not
create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-serving
declarations.' [Citation.] The employee's evidence must relate to the
motivation of the decision makers and prove, by nonspeculative evidence, 'an
actual causal link between prohibited motivation and [discrimination].'" (Featherstone
v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.)
Defendant contends that this cause
of action is without merit because (1) there was no discriminatory motive or
intent on the part of the County, and (2) Defendant had a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.
1.
Discriminatory Motive
Defendant contends that Plaintiff
cannot prove discriminatory intent on the part of the County. To prevail on an
employment discrimination claim, a party must prove that an adverse employment
action occurred under circumstances suggesting discriminatory motive. (Guz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at 355.) Defendant contends that, because Plaintiff was
discharged because of multiple incidents of discipline and egregious misuse of
her position, there is no evidence to suggest some discriminatory motive. (See
Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Nos. 66, 73-74,
78.) This evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot produce
evidence suggesting the existence of a discriminatory motive. Instead,
Defendant appears to conflate a legitimate business reason with a challenge to
Plaintiff’s prima facie case. Evidence of a legitimate motive is not
sufficient to meet Defendant’s burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot
establish an element of her case.
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s
claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of a disability is
without merit because Plaintiff improperly conflates a failure to accommodate
claim under Government Code section 12940(m) with a discrimination claim under
subdivisions (a) and (k). (See FAC ¶¶ 72, 74.) Defendant is correct that a
failure to accommodate claim is separate from a generic discrimination claim.
(See Gov. Code §§ 12940(k), (m).) However, Plaintiff alleges she was also
denied promotions and transfers and was ultimately terminated because of her
disability. (See, e.g. FAC ¶¶ 47, 65, 69.) “The function of the pleadings in a
motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function
of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable
issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County
of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc.
v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-82.) By failing to address all
the allegations in the pleadings, Defendant has failed to carry its burden to
show that this cause of action is without merit on this basis.
Defendant has therefore, for the
foregoing reasons, failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to summary
adjudication of this cause of action based on this contention.
2.
Legitimate Business Reason
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff
was denied transfer, reassignment, and promotion and was ultimately dismissed
for continuing violations of County policies.
“[T]o avoid Summary Judgment [once
the employer makes the foregoing showing], an employee claiming discrimination
must offer substantial evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual . . . such that a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in intentional
discrimination.” (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997)
57 Cal. App.4th 997, 1004-1005.) “The employer may fire an employee for a good
reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at
all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” (Veronese v.
Lucasfilm Ltd. (2012). 212 Cal. App. 4th 1, 21.) “While an employer’s
judgment or course of action may seem poor or erroneous to outsiders, the
relevant question is…whether the given reason was a pretext for illegal
discrimination.” (Id.)
As stated above, Defendant contends
that Plaintiff engaged in flagrant misconduct in her assignments from December
31, 2014 to August 3, 2016, including extorting and threatening caregivers (SSUMF
Nos. 50-56), demanding to purchase the belongings of caregivers for small fractions
of their worth (Nos. 57-58, 60), and failing to make scheduled appointments
with caregivers (Nos. 59-60). There is
evidence that Plaintiff was subjected to several disciplinary actions regarding
her professionalism and compliance with DCFS policy. (No. 64.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff was
ultimately discharged because her disciplinary history and the evidence collected
showed a pattern of unprofessional behavior and egregious misuse of her
position. (No. 66.) This evidence is more than sufficient to set forth a
legitimate business reason for the adverse employment actions taken against
Plaintiff. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that this
legitimate reason is a mere pretext.
Here, Plaintiff’s production does
not satisfy that burden. Plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence consists entirely of
citations to her 417-paragraph self-serving declaration which offers little but
conclusory negations of Defendant’s argument. Plaintiff offers no evidence that
the legitimate business reason offered by Defendant is pretextual, only
assertions, unsupported by evidence, that Defendant’s witnesses are liars and
the documents are falsified. (See, e.g, Declaration of Jan Williams ISO
Opp. ¶¶ 46, 51, 84, 91, 105.) Further, Plaintiff’s timely-filed evidence lacks
authentication. Even if the Court were to consider that evidence, the documents
provided consist entirely of a reprimand issued to Plaintiff for a failure to
relocate (Exh. 1); two doctor’s notes which state that Plaintiff should be
removed from the supervision of Defendants Whitaker and Duncan, with
accompanying correspondence (Exhs. 2-3, 6), an email explaining the County’s
policy for approving medical time-off requests (Exh. 5), and a permanent work
restriction barring Plaintiff from being in the office on the same days as a
Raven Austen (Exh. 6).
This evidence, even in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, does not “demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [Citation], and
hence infer 'that the employer did not act for the [ . . . asserted]
non-discriminatory reasons.’ [Citations.]” (McRae, supra, 142
Cal.App.4th at388-89.) Even if Plaintiff
is correct that Defendant’s claimed basis for Plaintiff’s discipline and
dismissal is untrue, that argument does not meet Plaintiff’s burden on summary
judgment for an employment discrimination claim. Plaintiff’s supporting
evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant’s reasons for
dismissing Plaintiff are mere pretexts for discrimination. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary
adjudication of this cause of action.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the first cause of action for
discrimination.
Second Cause of Action: FEHA Retaliation
Defendant contends—and Plaintiff
does not dispute—that the second cause of action is without merit for the same
reasons as the first cause of action. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in
connection with the first cause of action, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication is GRANTED as to the second cause of action for retaliation.
Third Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s
third cause of action for breach of contract is without merit because Plaintiff
has not complied with the Government Claims Act.
Section 945.4 of the Government
Code prohibits a suit for money or damages from being brought against a
government entity unless the plaintiff has first presented a written claim to
that entity which has been rejected. (Gov. Code § 945.4.) A claim arising from
an express contract must be presented to a government entity. (Gov. Code § 905.)
Thus, Plaintiff must plead and prove that her breach of contract claim was
presented to the County of Los Angeles before she may pursue it in court.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff did
not allege compliance with the Government Claims Act in either version of the
complaint (SSUMF No. 79), has never produced any evidence despite Defendant’s
requests seeking it that such a claim was filed (No. 80), and did not affirmatively
state in her deposition whether a claim was filed. (No. 81.) Factually devoid
discovery responses can be an evidentiary basis in support of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication, (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590; see also Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC, (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 96, 101.) As Defendant directly requested evidence showing a
timely claim was made, and Plaintiff did not provide it, the Court finds that
Defendant has carried its burden to show that this cause of action is without
merit.
Here, Plaintiff has not met her
burden to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s three
material facts identified in connection with this cause of action by claiming
that the Government Tort Claim Act does not apply to federal causes of action,
and therefore Plaintiff is not required to file a claim in this case. (See SSDF
Nos. 79-81.) This assertion, without reference to any supporting authority, is
undermined by Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which does not allege any
cause of action under federal law. Plaintiff has therefore failed to
demonstrate that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether she timely
filed a government claim. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary
adjudication of the third cause of action for breach of contract.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the third cause of action.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 30, 2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.