Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 19STCV39355, Date: 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV39355 Hearing Date: May 15, 2023 Dept: 47
Ruling on Matter Taken Under
Submission
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: March 30, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: May 23, 2023
CASE: Jan Williams v. County of Los Angeles et
al.
CASE NO.: 19STCV39355 
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles,
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Jan
Williams, in pro per.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment discrimination action filed on November 1, 2019. In
her May 11, 2020 First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
subjected her to multiple adverse employment actions and ultimately terminated
her on the basis of her age and disability.
Defendant County of Los Angeles
moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of all
causes of action asserted against it.
FINAL RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication as to the second cause of action for retaliation is DENIED, but is
otherwise GRANTED.
//
DISCUSSION:
Motion for Summary Judgment
For the
reasons stated below, the Court has not granted summary adjudication as to each
cause of action alleged against this Defendant in the First Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Motion for Summary Adjudication
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an
opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if
not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment
if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from
the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge
v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is
not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet
their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)
Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
//
//
Procedural Violations
Defendant
objects to the numerous procedural deficiencies in Plaintiff’s responsive
filings.
In
opposition to this motion, Plaintiff initially filed a three-page opposition
without supporting evidence or a separate statement of disputed material facts,
as is required to properly oppose a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(1)-(2).) To cure this defect,
Plaintiff filed and served an “Amended Opposition,” with accompanying exhibits,
a supporting declaration, and a Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts on March 16, 2023. These filings were timely pursuant
to section 437c(b)(2)’s requirement that any opposition papers be filed 14 days
before the date of the hearing. (Id.) However, Plaintiff’s exhibits Nos
7-10 were filed on March 20, 2023, only 10 days before the hearing, without
leave of Court. These exhibits are therefore untimely, and the Court will not
consider them.
Further,
Plaintiff’s Amended Opposition is exactly 100 pages in length, five times
the limit imposed by the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rule of Court 3.113(d) [“In a
summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no responding memorandum may
exceed 20 pages.”].) The Court refuses to consider such a flagrantly and
unjustifiably overlength opposition, but will review and consider the other
opposition papers timely filed by Plaintiff.
Finally, at
the first hearing on this motion, the Court granted newly hired counsel for
Plaintiff’s oral request that the hearing be continued to provide him with time
to review the Court’s Tentative Ruling and prepare an oral argument in response
to it. The hearing was, thus, continued
to April 11, 2023. In the interim,
however, Plaintiff filed an unauthorized brief, entitled "Response to
Court’s Tentative Ruling in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Order and Request for Settlement
Agreement Acceptance Between Plaintiff and County of Los Angeles and Case
Dismissal.” The Court has not reviewed
and will not rely on this improperly filed brief.
As noted
above, while Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s improper filings have merit,
the Court took the matter under submission to consider Plaintiff’s oral
arguments at the second hearing and her timely filed pleadings and now rules on
Defendants’ motion.
First Cause of Action: FEHA Discrimination
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for discrimination based on age
and disability is without merit.
The California Supreme Court has adopted the
federal burden-shifting test for assessing employment discrimination claims. (Guz
v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) To establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, the Plaintiff must show that (1) the employee is
a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was qualified for the position
sought or performing competently in the position held; (3) the employee
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) some other circumstance suggests
a discriminatory motive. (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973)
411 U.S. 792, 802.) To challenge an employment discrimination claim on summary
judgment, an employer must either show that one or more of the prima facie
elements is lacking, or must offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action. (See Caldwell v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist.
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189.) If the
employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of discrimination “drops out of the picture,” and the burden shifts
back to the employee to prove that the claimed legitimate reason is merely a
pretext. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1028, 1042.)
"In responding to the
employer's showing of a legitimate reason for the complained-of action, . . .
'" . . . the employee' "must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them 'unworthy of credence,'
[citation], and hence infer 'that the employer did not act for the [ . . .
asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.' [Citations.]" '" '" (McRae
v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 377, 388-389.) "The plaintiff must do more than raise the
inference that the employer's asserted reason is false. '[A] reason cannot be
proved to be "a pretext for discrimination" unless it is
shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.' [Citation.] If the plaintiff
produces no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
infer that the employer's true reason was discriminatory, the employer is
entitled to summary judgment. [Citation.]" (Hicks v. KNTV Television,
Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.)
"Although an employee's evidence
submitted in opposition to an employer's motion for summary judgment is
construed liberally, it 'remains subject to careful scrutiny.' [Citation.] The
employee's 'subjective beliefs in an employment discrimination case do not
create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-serving
declarations.' [Citation.] The employee's evidence must relate to the
motivation of the decision makers and prove, by nonspeculative evidence, 'an
actual causal link between prohibited motivation and [discrimination].'" (Featherstone
v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.)
In support of its defense that it
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged conduct, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff was denied transfer, reassignment, and promotion and was
ultimately dismissed for her continuing violations of County policies.
To justify the adverse actions
taken against Plaintiff, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s supervisors received
multiple complaints from her clients that she engaged in flagrant misconduct in
her assignments from December 31, 2014 to August 3, 2016, including extorting
and threatening caregivers (SSUMF Nos. 50-56), demanding to purchase the
belongings of caregivers for small fractions of their worth (Nos. 57-58, 60), yelling
at clients, lecturing them about religion and treating them with disrespect (Nos.
27-28, 33-34, 37-40), and failing to
make or coming late to scheduled appointments with caregivers (Nos. 59-60). There is evidence that Plaintiff was subjected
to several disciplinary actions regarding her professionalism and compliance
with DCFS policy. (No. 64.) According to
Defendant, Plaintiff was ultimately discharged because her disciplinary history
and the evidence collected showed a pattern of unprofessional behavior and
egregious misuse of her position. (No. 66.) This evidence is more than
sufficient to set forth a legitimate business reason for the adverse employment
actions taken against Plaintiff. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to
demonstrate that this legitimate reason is a mere pretext for discriminatory
intent.
To defeat a motion for summary
judgment based on a showing of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, “an
employee claiming discrimination must offer substantial evidence that the employer’s
stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual
. . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged
in intentional discrimination.” (Hersant v.
Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 997, 1004-1005.) “The
employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based
on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a
discriminatory reason.” (Veronese v. Lucasfilm Ltd. (2012). 212 Cal.
App. 4th 1, 21.) “While an employer’s judgment or course of action may seem
poor or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question is…whether the given
reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination.” (Id.)
Here, Plaintiff’s production does
not satisfy the burden of creating a triable issue of pretext. Much of Plaintiff’s
rebuttal evidence consists of denials that she behaved in the manner described
by Defendants’ clients, unsupported accusations that the clients had motives to
launch false charges against her, and unfounded contentions that Defendants
solicited false statements from the clients.
(See, e.g, Declaration of Jan Williams ISO Opp. ¶¶ 7-8, 9, 28-32,
36, 38-69, 92-94, 122, 375-393, 137, 139-159, 410-412.) Similarly, Plaintiff
flatly denied complaints leveled by staff members but did not offer evidence
that her rating supervisors did not hear such complaints from her
co-workers. (Id., ¶ 10.) The issue here is whether Defendants actually
relied on client and staff complaints or used them as a pretext for
discrimination, so Plaintiff’s denial of the substance of the client and staff complaints
does not raise a triable issue about whether Defendants grounded their adverse
employment actions on these complaints. It
might be different if Plaintiff had evidence, instead of mere accusations,
about Defendants’ alleged misconduct in soliciting false statements against
Plaintiff but she lacks any such evidence. Further, the evidence in the record
revealing that Defendants conducted an extensive internal investigation in
which clients were interviewed about their interactions with Plaintiffs
reinforces Defendants’ contention that they were serious about grounding their
employment decision on the actual facts provided by clients and
caregivers. (SSUMF No. 50-51, 57-60.)
In response to Defendants’
contention that Plaintiff failed to attend to her duties at the Lancaster
office, Plaintiff merely stated that she was “available to come in” but did not
deny that she failed to do so. (SSUMF
No. 35; Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 123.) As
with many of her attempts to rebut Defendants’ evidence, Plaintiff denies that
her absence from the office caused other staff members to rearrange their
schedules to accommodate Plaintiff’s absence and perform her tasks, but
provides no evidence to contradict Defendants’ showing, nor even establishes a
foundation for her knowledge of what happened at the office in her
absence. Plaintiff also raises other
complaints, including that she was denied a permanent desk and equipment for
about 1½ years apparently sometime before 2010 and that she had an angry
confrontation in 2009 with Gary Roberts who wanted to get Plaintiff to sign her
performance evaluation, but these grievances are both remote in time, unrelated
to the key decisionmakers here, and not evidence of age or disability
discrimination. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶13-27.)
Plaintiff exposes some procedural
irregularities that she highlights as evidence that the process leading to her
termination was pretextual or discriminatory. For example, she attests to what
she found during her review of her personnel file in 2016, describing the
absence of any of the Confirmation of Conferences, written warnings, written
reprimands, or written discipline that were later relied on by Defendants in
terminating her. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶
319.) She also reports finding three
performance evaluations from 2014 and 2015 that were never discussed with nor even
disclosed to her. (Id. ¶¶
304-305.) When Plaintiff confronted her
supervisor about this procedural deficiency, the supervisor simply replied that
she was busy and forgot to set up the evaluation meeting and then walked
away. (Id. ¶ 307.) Plaintiff also states in her declaration that
she received her first overall evaluation of Needs Improvement soon after she
reached the No-Fault Settlement Agreement on her disability discrimination
complaint with Defendants in 2017 and that, although she successfully grieved
the evaluation to secure a revised Competent rating, the pre-grievance
evaluation was used as a basis for Defendant’s termination in Plaintiff’s Skelly
hearing. (Id., 309-311;
Defts. Exh. D). In addition, Plaintiff’s declaration discusses the fact that
the June 23, 2016 Confirmation of Counseling memorandum addresses an issue that
occurred 21 months before issuance of the memo, but only two days after
Plaintiff’s doctor directed that she be removed from the supervision of LSW Amia Whitaker and ARA Andrea Duncan. (Plaintiff’s
Decl., ¶¶ 126-128; Plaintiff’s Exh. 2; Nichols Decl, Exh. B, pp. 131-132.)
Plaintiff also makes broad arguments
that are unsupported by evidence, baldly challenging Defendants’ actions as
wrongful, discriminatory, or retaliatory, but these statements do not create a
triable issue of fact. (E.g., id., ¶¶ 10, 12, 312-318.) In addition, Plaintiff recounts hearsay and
double hearsay statements from third parties about derogatory comments by
Defendant’s supervisors regarding disabled or injured employees, but these do
not constitute admissible evidence. (Id., ¶¶ 230-233.) Plaintiff offers no evidence at all that the
legitimate business reason offered by Defendants constitutes a pretext for age
discrimination. The question of whether
Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of disability discrimination is a closer question,
but she still fails to offer the kind of “substantial evidence that the
employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or
pretextual . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination.” (Hersant v. Department of
Social Services, supra, 57 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1004-1005.)
On this record, the Court cannot
conclude that evidence creates a triable issue of disability
discrimination. Indeed, there is
evidence that Defendants granted Plaintiff a permanent work restriction to keep
her from having to interact with a co-worker who attacked her. As a result of a physical interaction between
Plaintiff and another CSW, Raven Austin, and consistent with her doctor’s advice,
Defendants provided Plaintiff with a permanent work restriction on or about
July 25, 2016, that she was to be protected from “undue stress” by working in
Lancaster office on days when Raven Austin is not there, in recognition that
Plaintiff is not to “work in proximity to Raven Austin.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 2-4;
Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶ 96-119 [describing conflict with Ms. Austin]; ¶ 151
[authenticating exhibits.]) While it is true that Plaintiff’s supervisors
criticized her work performance because she would not come to the Lancaster
office to do necessary onsite tasks, despite “special accommodations” that had
been provided her, this reproach was grounded on Plaintiff’s apparent refusal
to come to the Lancaster office even during the designated protected times
allotted to her. (See Defendants’
Exh. I, pp. 3-7.) Although Plaintiff may
suggest that Defendant’s accommodation was insufficient, this is the stuff of a
failure to accommodate claim – which is not asserted by Plaintiff in her
Complaint -- and does not offer sufficient probative evidence in this context to
raise a triable issue of discriminatory intent.
In summary, the evidence offered by
Plaintiff, even viewed in the light most favorable to her, does not
“demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsis-tencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find
them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [Citation], and hence infer 'that the employer did
not act for the [ . . . asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’ [Citations.]” (McRae,
supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 388-89.) Even if Plaintiff is correct that Defendant’s
claimed basis for Plaintiff’s discipline and dismissal is not entirely true, that
argument does not meet Plaintiff’s burden on summary judgment for an employment
discrimination claim. The Court finds Plaintiff’s supporting evidence is not
sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant’s reasons for disciplining and dismissing
Plaintiff are mere pretexts for discrimination.
Defendant is therefore entitled to summary adjudication of this cause of
action.
For these reasons, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the first cause of action for
discrimination.
Second Cause of Action: FEHA Retaliation
Defendant contends that the second
cause of action is without merit for the same reasons as the first cause of
action. While Defendant’s initial
showing on a motion for summary judgment may be the same for both claims, the
Court’s analysis of the evidence may differ because the elements of the two
claims and the relevant unlawful intent to be proven by Plaintiff are distinct.
"[I]n order to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or
she engaged in a 'protected activity,' (2) the employer subjected the employee
to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the employer's action. [Citations.] Once an employee
establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the
employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of retaliation '" 'drops out of the picture'"' and the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation." (Yanowitz
v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) “Protected
activity” for the purposes of a retaliation claim occurs when a plaintiff “has
opposed any practices forbidden under [FEHA] or because the person has filed a
complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [FEHA].” (Gov. Code §
12940(h).)
As with its attack on Plaintiff’s
discrimination cause of action, Defendant contends that the retaliation cause
of action is without merit because Defendant had a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, and Plaintiff lacks any evidence to
demonstrate that its reason was a pretext for retaliation. The Court finds, based on the same evidence
discussed above, that Defendant has met its initial burden of proof and shifted
the burden to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has offered evidence of
protected conduct including her April 2016 DFEH/EEOC complaint filed after the
disclosure of the “Walking Wounded” memo accusing Defendant of disability
discrimination and naming Plaintiff’s supervisors, Amia Whitaker and ARA Andrea
Duncan. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶ 234-236.) According to Plaintiff, this complaint was
settled in October 2016 and a settlement agreement signed in early 2017. (Id., ¶ 236; Defts. Exh. D). This settlement also constitutes protected
conduct. In addition, Plaintiff engaged
in protected conduct when she submitted her June 21, 2016 doctor’s note in
which her physician indicated that Plaintiff’s stress condition required that
she be removed from the supervision of LSW Amia Whitaker and ARA Andrea Duncan.
(Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶ 119, 126-128; Plaintiff’s Exh. 2.)
All parties acknowledge that
Plaintiff was subjected to adverse actions beginning with the June 23, 2016 Confirmation
of Counseling memorandum and continuing with a July 6, 2017 three-day
suspension and September 7, 2017 Notice of Intent to Discharge through to her
ultimate termination on November 9, 2017.
(SSUMF No. 36, 42, 47-48.)
Plaintiff also raises, as an adverse action, the 2017 performance
evaluation that gave her an overall rating of Needs Improvement for the first
time in her career. In focusing on its legitimate non-retaliatory reason for
these actions, Defendant poses the question of whether Plaintiff can offer
sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact about whether these
actions taken by Defendant were motivated at least in part by retaliatory
intent.
Plaintiff has offered evidence of
the temporal proximity of her protected conduct and Defendant’s negative
personnel actions. “Close proximity in time of an adverse action to an
employee's resistance or opposition to unlawful conduct is often strong
evidence of a retaliatory motive.” (Taylor
v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th
1216, 1235, disapproved of on other grounds by Jones v. Lodge at Torrey
Pines P'ship (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1158 [Citations omitted].) Plaintiff’s evidence reveals that the initial
Confirmation of Counseling memo was issued on June 23, 2016, only two days
after Plaintiff’s doctor opined that her stress condition required her removal
from the supervision of Whittaker and Duncan. It was also issued during the
pendency of Plaintiff’s DFEH/EEOC complaint implicating Whittaker and Duncan as
complicit in the disability discrimination alleged in the complaint. Defendant’s notice of suspension issued in
July 2017 -- just a few months after Plaintiff settled her DFEH/EEOC
complaint. Further, Plaintiff states in
her declaration that she received her first overall performance evaluation of
Needs Improvement in 2017 soon after she reached the No-Fault Settlement
Agreement on her disability discrimination complaint with Defendants earlier
that year. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶ 309-311.) The relationship between the dates
when Plaintiff asserted her rights and the dates when Defendant took action
against her are “strong evidence of a retaliatory motive. (Taylor, supra, 144 Cal. App. 4th at
1235; Mendoza v. W. Med. Ctr. Santa Ana (2014)
222 Cal. App. 4th 1334, 1344.)
The irregularities in the process
also tend to support a triable issue of retaliation. That the June 23, 2016 Confirmation of
Counseling addressed an incident that occurred in September 2014 raises doubts
about the good faith nature of the disciplinary action. While there may be reasons for the 21-month
delay in raising the issue with Plaintiff, it creates a jury question about
whether Defendant was affirmatively probing Plaintiff’s employment history to
unearth problems that could be used to terminate her in 2016 or thereafter. It
is also suspicious that Plaintiff was not given notice of the mediation session
set up to deal with the Confirmation of Counseling memo until after the fact,
when she was questioned about why she was a “no-show.” (Plaintiff’s Decl. ¶¶ 128-129.) As noted above, although Defendant cited them
as a basis for its termination of Plaintiff, there were no Confirmation of
Conference memoranda, written warnings, written reprimands, or other written
discipline in Plaintiff’s personnel file when she reviewed it in 2016. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 319.) Further, during that review, she found three
performance evaluations from 2014 and 2015 that were never discussed with or
disclosed to her. (Id. ¶¶ 304-305.)
When Plaintiff confronted her supervisor about this procedural
deficiency, the supervisor simply replied that she was busy and forgot to set
up the evaluation meeting and then brusquely walked away. (Id. ¶ 307.) Plaintiff also protests that, although she successfully
grieved the “Needs Improvement” evaluation to obtain a revised Competent
rating, the earlier more negative evaluation was the one considered by the
hearing officer evaluating Defendant’s termination decision during the Skelly
hearing. (Id., ¶¶ 309-311.).
This is not a case where a stellar
employee is abruptly fired after a protected complaint. (See Mendoza v. W. Med. Ctr. Santa Ana,
supra, at p. 1344.) On the other
hand, there are sufficient facts in this record to raise a triable issue of
fact as to whether retaliation was a substantial factor in prompting Defendant’s
actions, even if it was not the only factor.
Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendant's motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s second cause of
action for retaliation.
Third Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s
third cause of action for breach of contract is without merit because Plaintiff
has not complied with the Government Claims Act.
Section 945.4 of the Government
Code prohibits a suit for money or damages from being brought against a
government entity unless the plaintiff has first presented a written claim to
that entity which has been rejected. (Gov. Code § 945.4.) A claim arising from
an express contract must be presented to a government entity. (Gov. Code § 905.)
Thus, Plaintiff must plead and prove that her breach of contract claim was
presented to the County of Los Angeles before she may pursue it in court.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff did
not allege compliance with the Government Claims Act in either version of the
complaint (SSUMF No. 79), has never produced any evidence despite Defendant’s
requests seeking it that such a claim was filed (No. 80), and did not affirmatively
state in her deposition whether a claim was filed. (No. 81.) Factually devoid
discovery responses can be an evidentiary basis in support of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication, (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590; see also Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC, (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 96, 101.) As Defendant directly requested evidence showing a
timely claim was made, and Plaintiff did not provide it, the Court finds that
Defendant has carried its burden to show that this cause of action is without
merit.
Here, Plaintiff has not met her
burden to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s three
material facts identified in connection with this cause of action by claiming
that the Government Tort Claim Act does not apply to federal causes of action,
and therefore Plaintiff is not required to file a claim in this case. (See SSDF
Nos. 79-81.) This assertion is undermined by Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, which does not allege any cause of action under federal law.
Plaintiff has therefore failed to demonstrate that there is a triable issue of
fact as to whether she timely filed a government claim. Defendant is therefore
entitled to summary adjudication of the third cause of action for breach of
contract.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the third cause of action.
CONCLUSION:
For the reasons explained above, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication as to the second cause of action for retaliation is DENIED but is
otherwise GRANTED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 15, 2023
___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court