Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 19STCV41768, Date: 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV41768    Hearing Date: January 26, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     January 26, 2023                   TRIAL DATE: February 21, 2023

CASE:                         Talia del Carmen Rodriguez v. Jacqueline Stein, et al

CASE NO.:                 19STCV41768           

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Talia del Carmen Rodriguez and Non-Parties Streetropical Media LLC and Musicares Foundation, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Jacqueline Stein, Standard Home Lending, Inc., and Matthew Roton

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is an action for breach of contract that was filed on November 19, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that she contracted with Defendants to execute a lien loan agreement on her home, and that the Defendants falsely recorded a notice of default and are pursuing a foreclosure sale on the property.

Plaintiff, along with non-parties Streetropical Media LLC and Musicares Foundation, Inc, move to quash a subpoena served on Citibank, N.A. for production of bank records.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff and Non-Parties’ Motion to Quash is DENIED.

Defendants’ request for sanctions is also DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff, along with non-parties Streetropical Media LLC and Musicares Foundation, Inc, move to quash a subpoena served on Citibank, N.A. for production of bank records.

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Legal Standard 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1(a) states, in relevant part: 
 

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion . . . may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely . . . In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).) There is no meet and confer requirement in section 1987.1.

Analysis

Plaintiff and Non-Parties move to quash a subpoena for production of business records propounded to Citibank, N.A.

On November 4, 2022, Defendants served a deposition subpoena for production of business records on Citibank, N.A., requesting “all bank statements, deposits, withdrawals and checks written on accounts of STREETROPICAL MEDIA, LLC and MusiCares Foundation, Inc. between 10/1/2018 and 8/1/2020.” (Declaration of Gina Lisitsa ISO Opp. Exhs. A-B.) Plaintiff objected to the production of the documents on December 8, 2022 as “Irrelevant, Oppressive, and Violation of Rights to Privacy.” (Declaration of Patricia Rodriguez ISO Mot. Exh. A.)

1.      Relevance

Plaintiff and Non-Parties first argue that the documents sought are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence because the movement of funds in the corporate accounts at issue in the subpoena is irrelevant to this action. Defendants oppose arguing this information is directly relevant to an issue of material fact identified in the Court’s August 18, 2022 ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. In that ruling, the Court stated that a material issue remained as to whether “Plaintiff’s alleged June 3 and July 1 payments [on the underlying loan] were processed, or [whether] they were never made.” (August 18, 2022 Ruling on Matter Taken Under Submission p. 7.) Defendants contend that, since the loan was originally issued as a business purpose loan to fund Streetropical Media, LLC, (Lisitsa Decl. Exh. G), a subpoena of the bank records of Streetropical Media, LLC is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence as to whether the June 3 and July 1 payments were made. In reply, Plaintiff and Non-Parties argue that the request is overbroad because it is concerned with more than the two dates identified by Defendants.

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument. The scope of discovery is extremely broad, and the standards of “relevance to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” are applied liberally. (See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Perry) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790, fns. 7-8.) Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that the documents are not reasonably calculated to admissible evidence and citation to Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (Thiem Industries, Inc.) is not well taken. As Defendants correctly state, Calcor concerned a document request to a non-party containing six pages of complex definitions and instructions, without reasonably specificity as to the items sought, which the Court of Appeal concluded would have no evidentiary value. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (Thiem Industries, Inc.) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 219-221.) Here, Defendants are seeking documents which are directly related to an issue which the Court expressly ruled was a dispute of material fact which rendered summary adjudication improper. The Court cannot conclude that the documents sought are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence about the disputed issue. The Court therefore finds that the documents sought are relevant to this case.

As to MusiCares Foundation, Inc., Defendants state that Citibank reported that MusiCares does not have any bank accounts with Citibank, and that therefore the motion is moot as to MusiCares. Plaintiff and Non-Parties do not contest this position.

2.      Oppression

Plaintiff and Non-Parties make no effort to justify their objection that the Subpoena is Oppressive in the body of the motion. As the movants, Plaintiff and Non-Parties have therefore failed to establish that the subpoena should be quashed on this basis.

3.      Privacy

California Constitution, article I, section 1, provides, “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”  In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, the Supreme Court laid out the standards to be used in assessing whether particular conduct should be considered a violation of an individual’s privacy rights.  Under Hill, “[t]he party claiming a violation of the constitutional right of privacy established in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.”  (International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL–CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 338, citing and summarizing Hill, supra, at pp. 39–40.)   

These three Hill elements are simply the threshold factors that screen out contentions that do not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy interest.  (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 999).  Proof of these elements does “not eliminate the necessity for weighing and balancing the justification for the conduct in question against the intrusion on privacy resulting from the conduct in any case that raises a genuine, nontrivial invasion of a protected privacy interest.”  (Id.)   

The nature of the balancing test shifts depending on the character of the Hill elements.  As the Supreme Court explained in Hill,   

The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the critical factor in the analysis.  Where the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a “compelling interest” must be present to overcome the vital privacy interest.  If, in contrast, the privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed.   

(Ibid. at p. 34; see also American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 307, 329-330 [recognizing that “general balancing test” was applied in Hill while “compelling interest test” is used when “a challenged action or regulation directly invades ‘an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.’”].) Even where the countervailing interests are found to outweigh the kind of privacy invasion at issue, the individual asserting his or her privacy rights may “undertake the burden of demonstrating the availability and use of protective measures, safeguards, and alternatives to the defendant’s conduct that would minimize the intrusion on privacy interests.”  (Hill, supra, at p. 38). 

Defendants contend that the Non-Parties are corporations and, thus, do not have a protected right of privacy under the California Constitution, nor is the privacy of a corporation a valid basis to quash a subpoena under section 1987.1. Not so. Although corporations do not have a fundamental right to privacy as is afforded to individuals under the California Constitution, corporations do have a general right to privacy under the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corporation (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 795.) The strength of this right “depends on the circumstances.” (Id. at 797.) Two critical factors in the determination of the strength of the right to privacy are “the strength of the nexus between the artificial entity and human beings and the context in which the controversy arises.” (Id.)

As the moving party, the burden falls on Plaintiff and Non-Parties to demonstrate the existence of a protectable privacy interest. Plaintiff makes no effort to do so, instead arguing that Defense counsel is acting to intimidate Plaintiff and embark on a fishing expedition to pursue unrelated documents. This conclusory assertion is not remotely sufficient to establish any sort of protected privacy interest whatsoever. For this reason alone, Plaintiff and Non-Parties have failed to justify this objection.

The Court declines to address Defendants’ arguments regarding standing to bring this motion as, whether standing exists or not, the moving parties would not be entitled to relief on the merits.

Sanctions

            Defendants request monetary sanctions against the moving parties for having brought what they argue is a motion without substantial justification.

            Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 states that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.2(a).)

            Defendants contend that the motion was filed without substantial justification because the motion was moot as to MusiCares, because Plaintiff did not have standing to file this motion, and because Streetropical is a suspended entity that cannot seek redress with the Court. As the Court declined to rule on the latter two issues, the Court cannot conclude that the motion was without substantial justification on this basis. Further, the fact that the motion was moot as to MusiCares is not sufficient to establish that the motion was not “well grounded in both law and fact.” (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1434.)

            Defendants also contend that sanctions are warranted because Plaintiff and moving parties did not meet and confer before filing this motion, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.020. However, a motion to quash under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 does not require that the parties meet and confer before filing the motion. Sanctions are therefore not warranted under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.020.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff and Non-Parties’ Motion to Quash is DENIED.

Defendants’ request for sanctions is also DENIED.

            Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2023                                 ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.