Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 20STCV37586, Date: 2022-12-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV37586 Hearing Date: December 21, 2022 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: December 21, 2022 TRIAL DATE: January 3, 2023
CASE: Rodolfo Sanchez v. Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 20STCV37586 ![]()
MOTION TO COMPEL APPEARANCE AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AT TRIAL
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Rodolfo Sanchez.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Hub Metals and Trading, Inc.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action for whistleblower retaliation and assault and battery that was filed on October 1, 2020. Plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining because his supervisor pushed him during an argument.
Plaintiff Rodolfo Sanchez moves for an order compelling Defendant Hub Metals and Trading, Inc. to appear and produce documents at trial.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Hub Metals and Trading, Inc. to Appear and Produce Documents at Trial is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff Rodolfo Sanchez moves for an order compelling Defendant Hub Metals and Trading, inc. to appear and produce documents at trial.
On September 25, 2022, Plaintiff served the Notice to Appear and Produce Documents at Trial on Defendant. (Declaration of Lincoln Ellis ISO Mot. ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) The Notice contained 24 requests for production at trial. Defendant objected to each of the requests for production as improperly seeking financial information not authorized under Civil Code section 3925 and as insufficiently specific under Civil Code section 1987(c). (Id. Exh. 2.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 governs motions to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of documents at trial as follows:
(b) In the case of the production of a party to the record of any civil action or proceeding or of a person for whose immediate benefit an action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended or of anyone who is an officer, director, or managing agent of any such party or person, the service of a subpoena upon any such witness is not required if written notice requesting the witness to attend before a court, or at a trial of an issue therein, with the time and place thereof, is served upon the attorney of that party or person. The notice shall be served at least 10 days before the time required for attendance unless the court prescribes a shorter time. If entitled thereto, the witness, upon demand, shall be paid witness fees and mileage before being required to testify. The giving of the notice shall have the same effect as service of a subpoena on the witness, and the parties shall have those rights and the court may make those orders, including the imposition of sanctions, as in the case of a subpoena for attendance before the court.
(c) If the notice specified in subdivision (b) is served at least 20 days before the time required for attendance, or within any shorter period of time as the court may order, it may include a request that the party or person bring with him or her books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things. The notice shall state the exact materials or things desired and that the party or person has them in his or her possession or under his or her control. Within five days thereafter, or any other time period as the court may allow, the party or person of whom the request is made may serve written objections to the request or any part thereof, with a statement of grounds. Thereafter, upon noticed motion of the requesting party, accompanied by a showing of good cause and of materiality of the items to the issues, the court may order production of items to which objection was made, unless the objecting party or person establishes good cause for nonproduction or production under limitations or conditions. The procedure of this subdivision is alternative to the procedure provided by Sections 1985 and 1987.5 in the cases herein provided for, and no subpoena duces tecum shall be required.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1987(b)-(c) [emphasis added].)
A cursory review of the notice to appear at trial demonstrates that the document requests seek categories of documents related to Defendants’ financial information from 2018 through the present. Section 1987(c) requires that the requests “shall state the exact materials or things desired and that the party or other person has them in his or her possession or under his or her control.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987(c).) Plaintiff’s requests are improper on their face. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to an order compelling the production of the requested categories of documents at trial.
Plaintiff also seeks an order compelling Defendant to produce a person most knowledgeable to authenticate the documents. This request is not stated in the notice of motion, and for this reason alone, the Court is not empowered to grant the request. Further, Plaintiff cites no law entitling him to an order compelling an unnamed person most qualified to appear at trial, as opposed to a deposition. As Defendants correctly state in opposition, there is no analogous provision in section 1987 for the provision in the Discovery Act requiring a party to designate a person most knowledgeable for deposition. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2025.010, 2025.230.)
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Hub Metals and Trading, Inc. to Appear and Produce Documents at Trial is DENIED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 21, 2022 ___________________________________
Theresa M. Traber
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.
Tentative Ruling - Re: Jury Instructions
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: December 21, 2022 TRIAL DATE: January 3, 2023
CASE: Rodolfo Sanchez v. Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 20STCV37586
It is unlawful for an employer to subject an employee to violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace. Unlawful violence includes any assault or battery, but not any lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others. A credible threat of violence includes a knowing and willful statement or conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety and that serves no legitimate purpose. It is a violation of public policy for an employer to discharge an employee for opposing workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace.
Rodolfo Sanchez claims that Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., discharged him because of his opposition to workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace. To establish this claim, Rodolfo Sanchez must prove all of the following:
1. Rodolfo Sanchez was fired by Hub Metals and Trading, Inc.;
2. Rodolfo Sanchez’s opposition to workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace was a substantial motivating reason for Rodolfo Sanchez being fired;
3. Rodolfo Sanchez was harmed; and
4. The firing was a substantial factor in causing Rodolfo Sanchez’s harm.
Rodolfo Sanchez need not prove that the conduct he opposed constituted unlawful workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in violation of the law to prevail on his wrongful termination claim. He may prevail if he proves that he had a reasonable belief that the conduct he opposed was unlawful.
(Sources: CCP §527.8; CACI 2430 and 2505.)
Rodolfo Sanchez claims he was discharged in retaliation for his opposition to workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace. Hub Metals and Trading Inc. claims that Rodolfo Sanchez was discharged for making threats to other employees, which is a lawful reason.
If you find that retaliation was a substantial motivating reason for Rodolfo Sanchez’s discharge, you must then consider Hub Metals and Trading Inc.’s stated reason for the discharge.
If you find that Rodolfo Sanchez’s threats to other employees were also a substantial motivating reason for his discharge, then you must determine whether Hub Metals and Trading Inc. has proven that it would have discharged Rodolfo Sanchez anyway at that time based on his threats to other employees, even if Hub Metals and Trading Inc. had not also been substantially motivated by retaliation.
In determining whether Rodolfo Sanchez’s threats to other employees were a substantial motivating reasons, determine what actually motivated Hub Metals and Trading Inc., not what it might have been justified in doing.
If you find that Hub Metals and Trading Inc. discharge Rodolfo Sanchez for a retaliatory reason, you will be asked to determine the amount of damages that he is entitled to recover. If, however, you find that Hub Metals and Trading Inc. would have discharged Rodolfo Sanchez anyway at that time for making threats, then Rodolfo Sanction will not be entitled to damages.
(CACI 2512.)
Pursuant to California’s whistleblower statute, Rodolfo Sanchez claims that Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., discharged him in retaliation for his complaint to his supervisor about workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace. To establish this claim, Rodolfo Sanchez must prove all the following:
1. That Hub Metals and Trading, Inc. was Rodolfo Sanchez’s employer;
2. That Rodolfo Sanchez made a complaint about workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace to a person with authority over him;
3. That Rodolfo Sanchez had reasonable cause to believe that he was complaining about workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace that violated state law;
4. That Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., discharged Rodolfo Sanchez;
5. That Rodolfo Sanchez’s complaint about workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace was a contributing factor in Hub Metals and Trading, Inc.’s decision to discharge Rodolfo Sanchez;
6. That Rodolfo Sanchez was harmed; and
7. That the discharge was a substantial factor in causing Rodolfo Sanchez’s harm.
A “contributing factor” includes any factor, which alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision and need not be the exclusive reason for the decision.
(CACI 4603.)
If Rodolfo Sanchez proves in connection with his claim, under the California whistleblower statute, that his complaint about workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace was a contributing factor to his discharge, Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., is not liable if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged Rodolfo Sanchez anyway at that time for legitimate, independent reasons.
(CACI 4604.)
Rodolfo Sanchez claims that Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., discharged him in retaliation for his complaint about being subjected to unsafe working conditions or practices. To establish this claim, Rodolfo Sanchez must prove all the following:
1. That Rodolfo Sanchez was an employee of Hub Metals and Trading, Inc.;
2. That Rodolfo Sanchez made an oral complaint about workplace violence or a credible threat of violence in the workplace;
3. That Rodolfo Sanchez had reasonable cause to believe that he was complaining about unsafe working conditions or practices;
4. That Hub Metals and Trading, Inc., discharged Rodolfo Sanchez;
5. That Rodolfo Sanchez’s complaint about unsafe working conditions or practices was a substantial motivating factor in Hub Metals and Trading, Inc.’s decision to discharge Rodolfo Sanchez;
6. That Rodolfo Sanchez was harmed; and
7. That the discharge was a substantial factor in causing Rodolfo Sanchez’s harm.
(CACI 4605.)