Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 20STCV40080, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV40080 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: 47
DR. MELINA ABDULLAH, ET AL. V. JACQUELYN LACEY, ET AL.,
Case No. 20STCV40080
TENTATIVE RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE (MIL)
Defendants’ MIL # 5: to exclude all evidence not disclosed in
discovery.
RULING: DENIED.
Defendants have not identified any specific evidence that should
be excluded nor demonstrated a right to an exclusion order.
In general, a party who has responded to formal written
discovery has no affirmative duty to supplement its responses when new
information comes into its possession. (Biles
v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318–1319, 1328.) “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, such as
repeated and egregious discovery abuses,” courts will not impose an evidentiary
sanction for a failure to disclose unless there has been a “willful” failure to
disclose. (Id., at p. 1327.) Here, there has been no showing that any of
Defendant’s discovery responses were willfully false or incomplete. (Id., at p. 1323-1324.) Nor have Defendants pointed to any violation
of a court order directing Plaintiffs to provide further answers to Defendants’
discovery.
Here, Defendants have not only failed to identify specific
evidence that they claim should be excluded, but they has made no effort to
show that any non-disclosure by Plaintiffs was willful or that the failure to
disclose violated a court order. On this
record, there is no basis for an exclusion order, but if there are specific
objections made at trial grounded on the proper showing, the Court will
consider whether previously unproduced evidence should be excluded.
RULING: DENIED.
While Plaintiffs may not argue that they knew the gun was
loaded, they may offer evidence and argument that they believed they were
confronting a loaded gun and the basis for their beliefs. Evidence about Plaintiffs’ beliefs that the
gun was loaded and the facts that led to those beliefs, including Mr. Lacey’s
threat that he was prepared to shoot them, are centrally relevant to their claims
for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress and to their
prayers for damages for emotional distress.
Defendants’ MIL # 7:
to exclude testimony by Plaintiff Justin Marks that his father is or was
a law enforcement officer.
RULING: DENIED.
The testimony by Plaintiff Marks is directly relevant to his
perception of imminent threat and the fear and trauma that arose from that
perception. His mention of his father lends credence to his belief that guns
are generally loaded and is thus admissible to bolster the validity of his
perceptions. To avoid any jury confusion
about whether this testimony is expert testimony that all guns are loaded, the
Court will instruct the jury that Plaintiff Marks is conveying his perceptions
about guns to support his claim of emotional distress, that his testimony is
not being offered as evidence of the loaded or unloaded status of guns or how
they should be handled.
Defendants’ MIL #8: seeking to
exclude any evidence regarding (1) the details of officer-involved shooting
incidents that took place during Jacquelyn Lacey’s tenure as the District
Attorney; and (2) prosecutorial decisions made by Ms. Lacey in connection with
such cases.
TENTATIVE RULING: GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
The parties do not disagree that Plaintiffs can provide broad
descriptions of their policy-based opposition to Jacquelyn Lacey’s tenure and
candidacy including her failure in Plaintiffs’ view to vigorously prosecute
police officers involved in use-of-force incidents. Plaintiffs indicate in their opposition,
however, that they do not intend to offer any details about any specific
police-related death cases that Ms. Lacey failed to prosecute or her reasoning behind
any privileged prosecutorial decisions.
The debate between the parties, thus, turned to whether Plaintiffs can
offer statistics about the number of use-of-force incidents that occurred
during Lacey’s tenure as the D.A. This
depends on whether Plaintiffs can substantiate the numbers they advance but,
since this issue was raised primarily, on reply, they have not had an
opportunity to do so. Thus, the Court
finds Plaintiffs shall make an offer of proof before offering any specific
figures estimating the number of use-of-force cases that occurred during
Lacey’s time as the D.A.
Defendants’ MIL #9:
seeking to exclude testimony of treating therapist, Monica Ellison,
regarding whether the incident at issue in this case caused Plaintiff
Abdullah’s and Marks’ symptoms, their diagnosis or prognosis, and what symptoms
were reported by Plaintiffs to Ellison.
TENTATIVE RULING: GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Based on the Ellison testimony offered by Defendants, the Court
excludes any testimony by Ellison about the degree of Plaintiffs’ stress that
was created by the incident at issue in this case and/or that this incident
fostered Plaintiffs’ emotional distress rather than other stressors in their
lives. The Court disagrees, however,
that Ellison needed to do psychological testing to form a diagnosis or that a
treating therapist does not form a diagnosis as part of the treatment she
provides. Nor is the Court convinced
that the testimony cited by Defendants reflects that Ellison made no diagnosis as
to either Plaintiff’s condition or that she is unqualified to do so. It appears from the quoted deposition
testimony that Ellison was not asked if she came to a diagnosis for either
plaintiff or, if so, what it was. If she
offers any diagnoses at trial, she will be permitted to describe the statements
made by Plaintiffs that support those diagnosis. Further, it may be that her testimony about
Plaintiffs’ reported symptoms will be admissible as exceptions to the hearsay
rule, so such rulings will be reserved for trial. (E.g., Evidence Code §§ 1236, 1250.)
Defendants’ MIL #10:
seeking to preclude Plaintiff’s expert, David Lombardo, from testifying
at trial.
TENTATIVE RULING: GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiffs may present Lombardo to testify that pointing a gun
with one’s finger on the trigger at people who come to the door is unsafe and
dangerous, to the extent he can establish that this opinion arises from his
expertise in human factors and firearms safety.
He may not testify about the other matters discussed in Defendants’
moving papers.