Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 20STCV41020, Date: 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 20STCV41020    Hearing Date: July 27, 2022    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     July 27, 2022              TRIAL DATE: October 13, 2022

                                                          

CASE:                         Rhonda R. Boyer v. American Furniture Rentals, Inc., et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 20STCV41020           

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants Lauren Goldberg and Alex Carril

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Rhonda Boyer

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is an employment discrimination action filed on October 26, 2020.  In her First Amended Complaint, filed on April 1, 2021, Plaintiff alleges disability-based discrimination; medical-condition-based discrimination; harassment; failure to prevent discrimination; failure to engage in the interactive process; failure to provide reasonable accommodations; wrongful termination; intentional infliction of emotional distress; unfair business competition; and failure to timely furnish payroll records.

 

Defendants Lauren Goldberg and Alex Carril move for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for harassment based on disability or medical condition.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to Defendant Alex Carril and DENIED as to Defendant Lauren Goldberg.

 

DISCUSSION:

 

            Defendants Alex Carill and Lauren Goldberg move for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for harassment on the basis of a disability or medical condition under the Fair Employment and Housing Act on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

 

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           Legal Standard

 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer.  (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198).  Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994). Any defects must either appear on the face of the pleading, or else be taken by judicial notice.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-22).  The parties’ ability to prove their respective claims is of no concern.  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 99.)  Though the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint and answer as true (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), it will not do so for “conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or [judicially noticed] facts…” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-20).

 

Meet and Confer

 

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a)(4).)

 

            Defendants filed a declaration under penalty of perjury stating that they attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff via a meet and confer letter and telephone communications. (Declaration of Geoffrey Lee Regarding Meet and Confer Efforts ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendants have satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 439.

 

Timing

 

           A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought by a defendant at any time after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(f)). Unless a court orders otherwise, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be made after entry of a pre-trial conference order, (Cal. Rules of Court 3.720-3.730) or 30 days before the initial trial date, whichever is later. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(e). No pre-trial conference order was entered in this case, and the motion was filed more than 30 days before the initial trial date.

 

            Requests for Judicial Notice

 

The Court may take judicial notice of the acts of the legislative or executive branch of this state. (Evid. Code § 452(c).) The court may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the documents.  (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)   Documents are only judicially noticeable to show their existence and what orders were made.  The truth of the facts and findings within the documents are not judicially noticeable.  (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 885.)

 

Defendant requests that the Court to take judicial notice of the Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC and DFEH against American Furniture Rentals, Inc. on July 27, 2020 with the accompanying Right to Sue letter. Defendants’ request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c) (official acts).

 

In granting this request, the Court, as is required by law, takes judicial notice of the existence of these documents as court records only and not the truth of any of the facts or findings therein.

 

Analysis

 

           Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for violation of FEHA on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against these Defendants.

 

           Before filing an employment discrimination lawsuit under FEHA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies before the EEOC or DFEH. (Gov. Code §§ 12960; 12965(b); see Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88.) This requirement is jurisdictional. (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 878, 889-90.)

 

           Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she named neither Defendant Carril nor Defendant Goldberg in the caption of the administrative charge. Defendants contend that this defect constitutes a failure to exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies, relying on Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, which it characterizes as holding that a party may not be sued in a discrimination lawsuit unless named as a charged party in an administrative discrimination charge.   

 

           In opposition, Plaintiff concedes as to Defendant Carril, but maintains that judgment on the pleadings should not lie as to Defendant Goldberg because she was identified by name in the body of the administrative charge along with her role in the alleged discrimination against Plaintiff.  The charge of discrimination states, in relevant part:

In November of 2018, I was diagnosed with recurrent breast cancer.  My boss at the time was Kate Bartlett . . . [who] was very supportive . . . [and who] told me that I could do 20 field visits, rather than the goal of 40 while undergoing my treatment plan. 

 

Then in October 2019 Lauren Goldberg became my new Sales Manager . . . After a surprise visit by her in December 2019, everything changed.  She immediately began to question my performance.  She said I would be held to the same standards as other employees regarding 40 field visits despite the fact that my production remained the highest of any other rep in our office.  She knit picked by orders. She continually referred to my cancer, telling me I need to look into FMLA.  She required that I get doctor’s notes for everything including each chemo treatment appointment (that was not required before).  Unbeknownst to me at the time she began to give my accounts to a new sales rep.

 

She advised me that she was not happy with the accommodation arrangement.  Without conferring with me, she decided and advised me that she was terminating the accommodation and put in writing a 30, 60, 90 plan, telling me that . . . she would no longer accommodate my disability and that I was required to perform the same as the other Sales Reps without disabilities.  During this meeting, she continually referred to my cancer and told me I should look into FMLA.  The pressure was too much and the stress became unbearable. 

 

After that meeting, she sent e-mails that were aggressive and insensitive.  I felt humiliated by some of her e-mails.  As a result of this campaign by her, the pressure and stress were affecting me greatly.  Finally, on February 26th, I was contacted by HR in an e-mail saying that she was informed I want to [go] out on a FMLA leave.  I advised her that I did not want to take a leave but she insisted. 

 

(Plaintiff’s Opp., Exh. 1.)  Based on this charge, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant Goldberg is not just named in the body of Plaintiff’s discrimination charge, she is the primary focus of Plaintiff’s charges. 

 

Given the language of her discrimination charge, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ reliance on Valdez is misplaced, and that the applicable case law uniformly holds that even where a plaintiff employee did not identify an individual defendant as a charged party or obtain a right to sue letter as to that person, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain a civil action against that defendant if he or she was named in the body of the discrimination charge.  Plaintiff contends that this is the rule in the Second Appellate District (see, e.g., Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1511 [“plaintiff’s lawsuit is viable as against Mr. Rossi because he was named in the body of the administrative charge as a person who discriminated against plaintiff”]; Martin v. Fisher (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 118, 119 [same]), as well as the Fourth Appellate District (e.g., Saavedra v. Orange County Consolidated Transportation etc. Agency (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [Fourth District held that plaintiff could sue manager not named in the charge because he was the only individual manager described in the administrative charge and the only person with whom the plaintiff dealt]).   

 

           In reply, Defendants contend that Valdez is controlling authority because that opinion is from the Second District, and therefore somehow overrides conflicting precedent from other districts of the Court of Appeal. Defendants cite no law supporting this contention, which is not surprising, as the opposite is well-settled precedent. “Decisions of every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the . . . superior courts of this state . . . Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher Court.” (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [emphasis added].) However, “the rule [of stare decisis] has no application where there is more than one appellate court decision, and such appellate decisions are in conflict. In such a situation, the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions.” (Id. at 456 [emphasis added].)

 

           Even so, there is no need to resolve a split of authority here, because all cases relied on by the parties demonstrate that the Second District Court of Appeal has embraced the rule that a defendant who is named in the body of a discrimination charge may be sued in a civil suit.  Defendants’ contrary construction of Valdez is mistaken. Valdez explored the split between the federal Circuit Courts regarding whether a defendant in a civil suit must be named in the administrative complaint. (Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1061.) The view of the Fourth Circuit, which the Valdez Court expressly adopted, is that the party “must have been named somewhere in the body of the charge.” (Id., citing Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service. (4th Cir. 1967) 377 F.2d 239, 242.) The Valdez Court was explicit in its adoption, stating “[w]e are convinced that the rule expressed in Mickel . . . is more efficacious, will lead to more speedy resolution of disputes at the administrative level and is in keeping with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1061.) The Second District later reaffirmed the Valdez standard by explicitly holding that a manager who is named in the body of a discrimination charge is a proper defendant in a subsequent lawsuit.  (See Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist., supra, at p. 1511; Martin v. Fisher supra, at p. 119.

 

In this case, Plaintiff has done exactly what is required by Valdez, Cole, and Martin: she has named Defendant Goldberg in the body of the charge. (RJN Exh. 1.) Under the holdings in these Second District cases, there is no question that Plaintiff’s discrimination charge reflects a sufficient exhaustion of administrative remedies. Defendant Goldberg is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this basis.

 

           Defendant also contends, without reference to the allegations of the Complaint or to any judicially noticed material, that Plaintiff never served any defendants with the EEOC or DFEH papers. Defendant Goldberg has failed to support this contention and is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this basis.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to Defendant Alex Carril and DENIED as to Defendant Lauren Goldberg.

 

            Moving Parties to give notice.

 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: July 27, 2022                           ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.