Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 21STCV14409, Date: 2024-12-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV14409 Hearing Date: December 5, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: December 5, 2024 TRIAL
DATE: January 14, 2025
CASE: Walter Le Vaughn Mann, Sr. v. County of
Los Angeles
CASE NO.: 21STCV14409 
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Walter
Le Vaughn Mann, Sr.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action for employment discrimination and whistleblower
retaliation that was filed on April 15, 2021. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to extensive
retaliation for reporting serious financial misconduct within the Los Angeles
County Probation Department, including a demotion and denial of accommodations
for his medical condition.
Defendant moves for summary
judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant
moves for summary judgment on the Complaint. As Defendant is not entitled to
summary adjudication of each cause of action for the reasons stated below,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Motion for Summary Adjudication
Defendant
moves in the alternative for summary adjudication of each cause of action.
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing
party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if not, to
enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure
Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion
for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the
affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of
fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of
Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v.
Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is
not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet
their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)
Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
First Cause of Action: Disability Discrimination
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for disability
discrimination on the grounds that this cause of action lacks merit.
Defendant relies on the
burden-shifting framework advanced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
(1973) 411 U.S. 792 to support its argument. Although the California Supreme
Court has adopted this test for employment discrimination cases generally (Guz
v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354), the test is
only available for disability discrimination claims when there is no direct
evidence of disability discrimination. (Wallace v. County of Stanislaus
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109, 122-23.) When there is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent—i.e., “evidence that the motive for the employer’s
conduct was related to the employee’s physical or mental condition,” the
burden-shifting test does not apply. (Id. at 123.) As Plaintiff does not
contend that there is direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the
Court finds that the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting standard is
applicable to this case.
To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the Plaintiff must show that (1) the employee is a member of a
protected class; (2) the employee was qualified for the position sought or
performing competently in the position held; (3) the employee suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) some other circumstance suggests a
discriminatory motive. (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411
U.S. 792, 802.) To challenge an employment discrimination claim on summary
judgment, an employer must either show that one or more of the prima facie
elements is lacking, or must offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action. (See Caldwell v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist.
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189.) If the
employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of discrimination “drops out of the picture,” and the burden shifts
back to the employee to prove that the claimed legitimate reason is merely a
pretext. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1028, 1042.)
"In responding to the
employer's showing of a legitimate reason for the complained-of action, . . .
'" . . . the employee' "must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them 'unworthy of credence,'
[citation], and hence infer 'that the employer did not act for the [ . . .
asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.' [Citations.]"'"'" (McRae
v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 377, 388-389.) "The plaintiff must do more than raise the
inference that the employer's asserted reason is false. '[A] reason cannot be
proved to be "a pretext for discrimination" unless it is
shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.' [Citation.] If the plaintiff
produces no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
infer that the employer's true reason was discriminatory, the employer is
entitled to summary judgment. [Citation.]" (Hicks v. KNTV Television,
Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.)
"Although an employee's
evidence submitted in opposition to an employer's motion for summary judgment
is construed liberally, it 'remains subject to careful scrutiny.' [Citation.]
The employee's 'subjective beliefs in an employment discrimination case do not
create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-serving
declarations.' [Citation.] The employee's evidence must relate to the
motivation of the decision makers and prove, by nonspeculative evidence, 'an
actual causal link between prohibited motivation and [discrimination].'" (Featherstone
v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.)
As alleged in the Complaint,
Plaintiff has been employed by the Probation Department of the County of Los
Angeles since 1990. (Complaint ¶ 9.) By 2019, Plaintiff was employed as
director of the Department’s Staff Training Office. (Complaint ¶ 10.) On or
about April 9, 2019, Plaintiff was asked by the Department’s Chief Deputy,
Sheila Mitchell, to assist with securing a location for a leadership retreat
for the Department’s management staff. (Complaint ¶ 13.) Plaintiff discovered
shortly thereafter that plans had already been made for the retreat to be held
at Shutters on the Beach in Santa Monica—an arrangement which Plaintiff
believed violated County policies. (Complaint ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff reported
this potential misuse of funds internally. (Complaint ¶ 16.) The retreat
proceeded at Shutters on the Beach on June 14, 2019. (¶ 17.) Four days later,
local news media formally requested that the County turn over documents
concerning the retreat. (¶ 18.)
On June 14, 2019, Plaintiff alleges
that he was contacted by the County’s Chief Probation Officer, Terri McDonald,
who told him that he should have reported the matter to her directly, rather
than following internal reporting procedures. (Id.) That same day, Ms.
McDonald allegedly reassigned her executive assistant to be Acting Bureau Chief
of the Staff Training Office, making that person Plaintiff’s direct supervisor.
(Complaint ¶ 20.) On July 24, 2019, CBS allegedly aired an investigative report
concerning the Shutters retreat. (Complaint ¶ 22.) Plaintiff thereafter alleges
that, starting in September 2019 and proceeding through at least March 2021, he
was subjected to harassment and discrimination on the basis of his disability
in retaliation for his role as a whistleblower. (¶¶ 24-48) Alleged examples of
the mistreatment include being the subject of an investigation into purchasing
improprieties (¶ 24), loss of certain job functions (¶¶ 26, 39), reassignment
to a new supervisor (¶ 27), transfer out of his director position at the Staff
Training Office to a more junior position in Adult CORE services (¶¶ 28, 31),
extreme delays in transferring Plaintiff’s ergonomic equipment (¶¶ 32, 44-45),
ignoring Plaintiff’s requests to transfer to other divisions (¶¶ 33-34, 37),
and being repeatedly passed over for promotion to other director positions (¶¶
37-38, 42-43; 46-48.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiff
cannot state a prima facie case for disability discrimination or, alternatively,
that Defendant has a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for all the conduct
of which it is accused. As pled in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the
entire course of conduct set forth above constituted disability discrimination.
(Complaint ¶ 55.) Defendant attempts to narrow the scope of issues for
determination on this motion by reference to Plaintiff’s responses to special
interrogatories asking Plaintiff to state the facts supporting each cause of
action, arguing that those responses both narrow the scope of Plaintiff’s
claims relative to the Complaint and are “factually devoid.” (See Defendant’s
Exh. 3.). Factually devoid discovery responses can be an evidentiary showing in
support of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, (Union Bank v.
Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.) In Union Bank, the
plaintiffs in that case provided a short conclusory assertion in response to
Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 as it related to a denial of a request for
admission. (Union Bank, supra, at 578.) Here, however, although
Plaintiff’s responses to the contention interrogatories included similarly short
restatements of his theories of the case, those responses were provided subject
to numerous specific objections as to each interrogatory. (See, e.g.,
Defendants’ Exh. 3. No. 1.) Nothing in Union Bank indicates that any
objections were asserted by the respondents, and subsequent authority states that
objections to discovery, by themselves, cannot be construed as factually devoid
responses. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 892-93
[objection to deposition question not a factually devoid response].) The recent
case Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726,
relying on Gaggero, similarly found that responses to interrogatories
are not factually devoid even if they improperly rely on references to
documents pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, reasoning that such
responses, like objections, do not indicate the absence of facts, even if they
are not proper responses. (Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 726, 736.) Applying that same reasoning, Plaintiff’s responses
to the interrogatories were made subject to objections whose merits have not
been litigated, and, consequently, cannot be taken to demonstrate the absence
of facts in the shadow of those unresolved objections. The Court therefore
concludes that Defendant cannot rely on Plaintiff’s responses in support of
this motion.
Because Defendant’s attack on the
first cause of action is confined by Defendant’s improper reliance on
Plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories, Defendant has not addressed the full
set of allegations pled with respect to this cause of action. “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367,
381-82.) Defendant is therefore not entitled to summary adjudication of the
first cause of action.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action is DENIED.
Second Cause of Action: Failure to Accommodate
Defendant moves for summary
adjudication of the second cause of action for failure to provide reasonable
accommodation for lack of merit. As with the first cause of action, the
Complaint relies on the entire set of underlying facts in asserting this claim.
(Complaint ¶ 62.) Defendant again attempts to rely upon Plaintiff’s responses
to special interrogatories to narrow the scope of the issues relevant to this
claim. For the reasons stated above, Defendant cannot rely on those responses
as they were provided subject to unresolved objections. Consequently, Defendant
has not addressed the full set of allegations pled with respect to this cause
of action. “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is
to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or
declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within
the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993)
12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231
Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.) Defendant is therefore not entitled to summary
adjudication of the second cause of action.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action is DENIED.
Third Cause of Action: Failure to Engage in Interactive
Process
Defendant moves for summary
adjudication of the third cause of action for failure to engage in the
interactive process for lack of merit. As with the first cause of action, the
Complaint relies on the entire set of underlying facts in asserting this claim.
(Complaint ¶ 62.) Defendant again attempts to rely upon Plaintiff’s responses
to special interrogatories to narrow the scope of the issues relevant to this
claim. For the reasons stated above, Defendant cannot rely on those responses
as they are provided subject to unresolved objections. Because Defendant has
not addressed the full set of allegations pled with respect to this cause of
action, Defendant is not entitled to summary adjudication of the third cause of
action.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the Third Cause of Action is DENIED.
Fourth Cause of Action: Retaliation (Fair Employment
& Housing Act)
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for retaliation in
violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act for lack of merit.
The California Supreme Court has
adopted the federal burden-shifting test for assessing retaliation claims. (Guz
v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) "[I]n order to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must
show (1) he or she engaged in a 'protected activity,' (2) the employer
subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link
existed between the protected activity and the employer's action. [Citations.]
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to
offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.
[Citation.] If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse
employment action, the presumption of retaliation '" 'drops out of the
picture, '"' and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove
intentional retaliation." (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36
Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) “Protected activity” for the purposes of a retaliation
claim occurs when a plaintiff “has opposed any practices forbidden under [FEHA]
or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any
proceeding under [FEHA].” (Gov. Code § 12940(h).)
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a prima facie case for
retaliation because, first, Plaintiff’s factually devoid discovery responses
establish the absence of evidence and, second, none of the complained-of
conduct constitutes an adverse employment action. For the reasons stated above,
Defendant cannot rely on Plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories because those
responses were provided subject to objections, and thus the absence of evidence
cannot be inferred from the responses.
As to the
conduct alleged, Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that none of the
actions alleged constitute an “adverse employment action” to carry its burden
on summary adjudication. An adverse employment action must materially affect the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to be actionable. (Yanowitz,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1052.) Among the various allegations, Plaintiff claims
that he was stripped of certain duties as Director of Staff Training.
(Complaint ¶¶ 26, 39.) This allegation, if true, plainly sets forth a material
change in the terms, conditions, and privileges of Plaintiff’s employment on
its face. Defendant, in its moving papers, attempts to defeat this allegation
by claiming that Bureau Chief Bettino “modified a specific duty shifting from
Director to the Bureau Chief position.” (Motion p.16:13-14.) Defendant’s
assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, this is a straightforward concession
that Plaintiff had certain duties removed—i.e., stripped—from his
position, and, therefore, that Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment
action. Defendant has thus failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that
Plaintiff cannot establish that he was subjected to such an adverse employment
action.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action is
DENIED.
Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Retaliation and
Discrimination
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the fifth cause of action on the grounds that
it is derivative of the fourth cause of action. As Defendant is not entitled to
summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED.
Sixth Cause of Action: Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor
Code section 1102.5)
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action for whistleblower
retaliation for lack of merit.
Labor Code section 1102.5(b)
states:
An employer, or any person acting on
behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing
information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or
may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a
person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance,
or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state
or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or
federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is
part of the employee’s job duties.
(Labor Code § 1102.5(b).) Defendant challenges this cause of
action on three grounds: first, that Plaintiff’s claims are limited by the
six-month time limit for presentation of claims under the Government Tort
Claims Act; second, that Plaintiff’s factually devoid discovery responses limit
the scope of the issues and demonstrate the lack of merit of his claims; and
third, that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action.
1.
Claim Presentation Requirement
Claims for whistleblower
retaliation against a public entity must first be presented to the public
entity within a specified time period before a civil action may be brought.
(Gov. Code § 911.2.) For claims of personal injury or wrongful death, the time
period is six months. (Id. subd. (a).) Claims of pain, suffering, and
emotional distress, like those alleged in the Complaint place a claim within
the six-month time period. (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48
Cal.App.4th 1104, 1118-19 fn. 9.) However, claims which accrued before June 30,
2021 are subject to a 120-day extension of the claim presentation requirement
pursuant to Executive Orders N-35-20 (issued March 21, 2020), N-71-20 (issued
June 30, 2020) and N-08-21 (issued June 11, 2021.) (Coble v. Ventura Cnty
Health Care Agency (2021) 73 Cal.App.4th 417, 422.)
Here, Plaintiff’s Government Claim
was filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing on October 30,
2020. (See Defendant’s Exh. 5.) By operation of statute, that claim constituted
a timely presentation of all claims which accrued in the preceding six months,
i.e., on or after April 30, 2020. Moreover, the 120-day extension pursuant to
the Governor’s Executive Orders also renders that claim, on its face a timely
presentation of any claims accruing in the preceding 120 days—i.e., on or after
January 1, 2020. Thus, the only allegations which fall outside the scope of
this period are (1) the conversation with Terri McDonald and the reassignment
of her executive assistant on June 18, 2019 (Complaint ¶¶ 18-20); (2) Plaintiff
being subject to an investigation as of September 18, 2019 (¶ 23); and (3)
Plaintiff being stripped of certain job functions on December 14, 2019 (¶ 26.)
Plaintiff argues in his opposition
that the remaining contentions are nonetheless timely presented because their
accrual is tolled by the continuing violation doctrine. The continuing
violation doctrine extends the accrual of retaliation claims where the actions
alleged “‘(1) [were] sufficiently similar in kind—recognizing ... that similar
kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to
reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms
[citation]; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not
acquired a degree of permanence.’” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1059,
quoting Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798 at 823.) Plaintiff
does not apply the elements of the doctrine to his claims to establish its effects
here, and thus does not demonstrate that the remaining allegations should be
considered with respect to this cause of action. The Court therefore limits its
inquiry on this claim to allegations post-dating January 1, 2020.
//
2.
Factually Devoid Responses
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s
factually devoid responses to interrogatories further limit the scope of the
issues and demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot produce evidence supporting his
claims. As stated above, Defendant may not rely on Plaintiff’s responses to
support its contention because they were provided subject to objections which
have not been litigated.
3.
Adverse Employment Action
Defendant’s final contention is
that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was subjected to an adverse
employment action. As previously stated, an adverse employment action must
materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to be
actionable. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1052.) Defendant,
incorporating its argument wholesale from its challenge to the fourth cause of
action, claims, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse
employment action because, contrary to his allegations, he was not stripped of
his duties, did not suffer a loss of pay, was not demoted, and did not suffer
any lowered performance ratings. (See Separate Statement of Undisputed Material
Fact Issue 6 Nos. 61-64.) Indeed, the sworn affidavits on which Defendant
relies state that Plaintiff retained his Director title, received a 5.5% pay
increase, and has retained administrative duties. (Id.; see also
Defendant’s Exhibit E [Declaration of Robert Smythe] pp. 3:12-17 and Exhibit F
[Declaration of Hania Bocklen] pp. 3:12-14, 5:17-6:4.) Defendant also contends
that the management personnel who transferred Plaintiff and selected employees
for promotions had no knowledge of his whistleblower status—contentions which
bear on causation, rather than adversity. (SSUMF Issue 6 Nos. 55,
58, 65.) Finally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff was provided with reasonable
accommodations for his disability. (SSUMF Nos. 59-60.) As Defendant’s contentions are supported by
sworn affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge of the relevant
facts, Defendant has offered evidence tending to show that Plaintiff cannot
establish that he suffered an adverse employment action. The burden therefore
shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of fact in this respect.
In response, Plaintiff contends
that, inter alia, while he ostensibly maintained a “Director” position,
during his tenure at the Adult Field Services office, he had no personnel to
supervise and only was given routine, junior-level tasks to perform.
(Plaintiff’s Response to Separate Statement Issue 6 Nos. 62-63; Declaration of
Walter Le Vaughn Mann ISO Opp. ¶ 58.) This contention, by itself, is evidence
of a material change in the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, and
therefore is evidence that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action.
Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether he
suffered an adverse employment action. Defendant is therefore not entitled to
summary adjudication of this cause of action.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the Sixth Cause of Action is DENIED.
//
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication is DENIED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 5, 2024 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.