Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case 21STCV31123 2023-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 21STCV31123, Date: 2023-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31123 Hearing Date: March 29, 2023 Dept: 47

TENTATIVE RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: March 28, 2023 TRIAL DATE: April 11, 2023

CASE: Erik Uribe v. Matthew Bernal et al.

CASE NO.: 21STCV31123

Plaintiff’s MIL #1: Seeking to preclude admission of any documents or records not disclosed in discovery.

Tentative ruling: DENIED without prejudice, because no specific documents or records have been identified or shown to have been withheld during discovery.

The Court cannot grant this motion in limine because it fails to identify any specific evidence or documents sought to be excluded. Nor has Plaintiff shown that specific evidence was sought and withheld during discovery. In general, a party who has responded to formal written discovery has no affirmative duty to supplement its responses when new information comes into its possession. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318–1319, 1328.) Further, there is no evidence here that Defendants engaged in a pattern of discovery abuse or intentionally withheld any documents or information from the discovery it provided. “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, such as repeated and egregious discovery abuses,” courts will not impose an evidentiary sanction for a failure to disclose unless there has been a “willful” failure to disclose. (Id., at p. 1327.).

Plaintiff’s MIL #2: Seeking to preclude any evidence or testimony from Defendants that Plaintiff was not an employee of Accel Builders, Inc.

Tentative ruling: DENIED.

Plaintiff’s moving papers do not establish that Defendants stipulated to Plaintiff’s employment status on the prior administrative proceeding. Instead, the evidence shows that Defendants agreed to accept certain administrative discipline rather than oppose charges that included an accusation that Plaintiff was acting as an unregistered home improvement contract salesperson. The record also reveals that this settlement was solely to resolve the charges against Defendants, whose admissions were “only for purposes of [the administrative] proceeding, or any other proceedings in which the Registrar of Contractors, Contractors’ State License Board, or other professional licensing agency is involved, and shall not be admissible in any other criminal or civil proceeding.” (Exh. B, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff offers no authority for the Court to disregard this limitation on the impact of Defendants’ administrative concessions by admitting the settlement into evidence at trial.

Nor is there any basis for a finding that Defendants are collaterally estopped from presenting evidence or argument contesting Plaintiff’s employment status. The settlement agreement presented by Plaintiff establishes none of the prerequisites for a finding of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326.)

Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. (Citations omitted.) The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.

(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, bold emphasis added.) Once the moving party shows that these requirements are met, “the propriety of preclusion depends upon whether application will further the public policies of ‘preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation.’” (Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481 (citation omitted).)

Based on the record presented here, it is undisputed that the question of Plaintiff’s employment status was neither actually litigate nor necessarily decided and that there was no final decision on the merits. Nor has there been an adequate showing that the issue litigated in the administrative proceeding – that Plaintiff was an unregistered home improvement contract salesperson – is the identical issue in dispute in this case. It is plain, therefore, that Plaintiff has not satisfied the standards for invoking collateral estoppel with respect to his employment status.

Based on these conclusions, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion in limine and will exclude the administrative settlement agreement as evidence of Plaintiff’s employment status. That said, Defendants go too far in suggesting that deposition testimony of Matthew Bernal admitting that Plaintiff acted as an employee of Defendants should be excluded simply because it was captured in different lawsuits or legal proceedings. Instead, the admissibility of such testimony will be evaluated as any other evidence offered at trial by applying relevant provisions of the Evidence Code, including sections 1220 and/or 1290-1292.

Defendants’ MIL #1: Seeking to bar admission of Defendant Matthew Bernal’s deposition testimony in an unrelated lawsuit.

Tentative ruling: DENIED.

Defendants’ motion seeks to exclude Defendant Matthew Bernal’s deposition testimony in another case by arguing that it does not satisfy the requirements of Evidence Code §§ 1290-1292 or Code of Civil Procedure § 2026.620(g) for the admission of prior testimony. Reliance on these statutes and their prerequisites is unavailing where, as here, the prior testimony is that of a party to this action, and the testimony may be offered at trial by the opposing party under Evidence Code § 1220.

Under § 1220, the hearsay rule does not bar the admission of relevant out-of-court statements of a party, whether sworn or unsworn, if they are offered as evidence by the opposing party. To paraphrase the Second District Court of Appeal, Matthew Bernal “is a defendant in the case. Any statement, oral or written, made by him was admissible as to him under the hearsay exception for party admissions. (See Evid.Code, § 1220.) That includes prior testimony, whether given in a deposition, during the arbitration hearing, in judgment debtor proceedings, or in another matter.” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 486, 523-524.) “Evidence Code section 1220 makes a ‘statement’ of a party an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence when the statement is offered against that party. . . . [T]he exception applies to all statements of the party against whom they are offered. Here, defendant's deposition testimony consisted of statements, defendant made the statements, the statements were offered against her, and she was a party to this action. Thus, the statements came within an exception to the hearsay rule.” (People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal. 4th 587, 637 [Citation omitted].) Further, to the extent that Bernal is shown to be a person authorized to speak on behalf of the other defendants, “his statements [would be] admissible as to them under the exceptions for party or authorized admissions,” pursuant to Evidence Code § 1222. (Greenspan, supra, at p 524 [Citations omitted].)

Defendants also object that Bernal’s statements are improper legal conclusions about Plaintiff’s employment status. Even if the Court were to agree that Bernal is unqualified to opine on Plaintiff’s employment status, this would not matter if his statements were admissible under § 1220. To the contrary, the statement of a party opponent is admissible even if it is framed as an otherwise inadmissible opinion or is untethered to any personal knowledge of the party declarant. (1 Witkin, California Evidence 5th Hearsay §§ 95-96 (2021).)

Nor is the Court persuaded that Bernal’s prior testimony should be excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code § 352. While it may be damaging to Defendants’ case to have to explain Bernal’s prior sworn admissions as to Plaintiff’s employment status, this does not mean the testimony must be excluded at trial. Because Defendant Bernal will be present at trial, he will have the opportunity to distinguish his prior testimony or explain why the situation he was confronting in the prior case was different from the context here. This is all that is required for party admissions under § 1220. (Law Revision Commission Comment to Ev. Code § 1220.)

Defendants’ MIL #2: Seeking to bar admission of Defendant Victor Bernal’s deposition testimony in an unrelated lawsuit.

Tentative ruling: DENIED, for the reasons explained above with respect to Defendants’ MIL #1.

Defendants’ MIL #3: Seeking to bar admission of a bail bond application signed by Defendant Victor Bernal in December 2019 regarding an unrelated matter.

Tentative ruling: DENIED, for the reasons explained above with respect to Defendants’ MIL #1.

Defendants’ MIL #4: Seeking to bar admission of Defendants’ written discovery responses in another action identifying Plaintiff as an employee.

Tentative ruling: DENIED, for the reasons explained above with respect to Defendants’ MIL #1. While acceptance of a request to admit a fact in one action may not be conclusive on that issue in a different action, the Court concludes that such admissions and other discovery responses by party opponents are admissible as evidence in a subsequent lawsuit. (See, e.g., Dolinar v. Pedone (1944) 63 Cal. App. 2d 169, 176 [defendant’s failure to deny that plaintiff acted within scope of employment in prior lawsuit was admissible against defendant in subsequent action].)

Defendants’ MIL #5: Seeking to exclude any witness testimony and documentary evidence not disclosed in discovery.

Tentative ruling: DENIED without prejudice, because no specific testimony, documents or records have been identified or shown to have been withheld during discovery.