Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 21STCV36355, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 21STCV36355, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36355 Hearing Date: January 26, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: January 26, 2024 JUDGMENT: December 4, 2023

CASE: Sian Durham v. AIDS Healthcare Foundation

CASE NO.: 21STCV36355

(1) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT;

(2) MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Sian Durham

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant AIDS Healthcare Foundation

CASE HISTORY:

· 10/01/21: Complaint filed.

· 11/17/21: First Amended Complaint filed.

· 12/04/23: Judgment entered on jury verdict.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action for disability discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant demoted her and placed her on an unpaid leave of absence because of her disability which prevent her from working in the office full-time.

Plaintiff moves for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is [DECISION].

Plaintiff’s alternative Motion for New Trial is [DECISION].

Moving Party to give notice.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

Plaintiff Sian Durham moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on each of her causes of action for (1) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation; (2) Failure to Engage in Interactive Process; and (3) Disability Discrimination under Gov. Code § 12940, et seq., on the ground that Plaintiff proved each cause of action and there was no substantial evidence to the contrary.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 629 states that “[t]he court, before the expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, either of its own motion, after five days’ notice, or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has been rendered, shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 629.)

A JNOV motion ordinarily challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the claims or defenses asserted by the opposing party and now embodied in the jury’s verdict. (Moore v. San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733-34; see Martin v. Ideal Packing Co. (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 232, 235 [a JNOV motion is “in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence”].) It thus has the same function as a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, the only difference being that the JNOV motion lies after a verdict for the opposing party has been rendered. (Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 310, 327; CC-California Plaza Assocs. v. Paller & Goldstein (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1050.)

All evidence supporting the verdict is presumed true, so the issue is whether the facts then constitute a prima facie case or defense as a matter of law. (Fountain Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner's Ass’n v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 743, 750.) “The court may not weigh evidence, draw inferences contrary to the verdict, or assess the credibility of witnesses. The court must deny the motion if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict.” (Begnal v. Canfield & Assocs., Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.

A JNOV motion is governed by the same rules that govern a motion for directed verdict or nonsuit. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110; Rollenhagen v. City of Orange (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 414, 417 [disapproved on other grounds in Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 738].) Further, a JNOV motion “may be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support.” (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1137-38.) A JNOV in favor of a plaintiff is proper “only when no substantial evidence and no reasonable inference therefrom support the jury’s verdict,” such that the plaintiff should recover as a matter of law on the causes of action alleged. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 104, 110.)

Jurisdiction to Rule on Motion

The purpose of a JNOV motion “is to allow a party to prevail as a matter of law where the relevant evidence is already in.” (DLI Properties LLC v. Hill (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6; see Sukoff v. Lemkin (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 740, 743 [“The purpose of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not to afford a review of the jury’s deliberation but to prevent a miscarriage of justice in those cases where the verdict rendered is without foundation.”].) A trial court's discretion in granting a JNOV motion is severely limited. (Garretson v. Harold I. Miller (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 563, 568.)

A motion for JNOV must be decided by the trial court within 75 days after the clerk’s service of notice of entry of the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 629(b), 659, 660(c); see Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1277.)

[Code of Civil Procedure section 629] specifically limits a trial court’s power to rule on the motion in the following ways: First, the trial court must enter j. n. o. v. ‘before . . . expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial,’ otherwise the judgment is invalid. Section 660 indicates that ‘the power of the court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire [75] days from and after the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court . . .’ Second, on the trial court's own motion it can grant j. n. o. v., but only after giving five days’ notice to the parties and only in accordance with the procedure just noted. Third, the trial court is precluded from ruling on a motion for j. n. o. v. ‘until the expiration of the time within which a motion for a new trial must be served and filed . . .’ which according to section 659 is 15 days ‘of the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment . . .’

(Sturgeon v. Leavitt (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 957, 963 [decided before January 1, 2019, amendment extending time period for court to rule on new trial motion to 75-day period].) Thus, a trial court “can grant j. n. o. v. so long as it acts before expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, [75] days, and¿after expiration of the time within which a motion for a new trial must be served and filed, 15 days.” (Id. at 964.)

In this matter, notice of entry of judgment had not yet been mailed when Plaintiff gave notice of intention to move for a new trial on December 11, 2023. (See December 5, 2023 Minute Order.) Thus, by operation of law, the Court has power to rule on Plaintiff’s motions through February 24, 2024, which is 75 days from the date Notice of Intention to Move for New Trial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 660(b)-(c).) Plaintiff’s motion is therefore timely.

Substantive Discussion

Plaintiff asserted three causes of action against Defendants: (1) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations; (2) Failure to Engage in Interactive Process; and (3) Disability Discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. The jury found in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on all three claims. (See November 13, 2023 Jury Verdict.) Plaintiff contends that the jury’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

1. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

Plaintiff first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding against her on the first cause of action for Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation. During its deliberations, the jury found that Plaintiff was unable to perform the essential duties of her position with reasonable accommodation on June 11, 2021, thereby defeating that claim. (Jury Verdict Question No. 1.) As the jury found that Plaintiff could not perform her job functions, the jury made no finding as to Defendant’s failure to provide reasonable accommodation or its contribution to Plaintiff’s injury. (Id. Nos. 2-3.)

Plaintiff contends that the evidence showed that she was able to perform the essential functions of her position as National Nursing Director for Standards. Plaintiff states that the essential duties of the position, as set forth in the written job description, involved maintaining compliance with all applicable laws, standardizing the provision of care throughout Defendant’s clinical teams, and developing innovative models as assigned by the Chief Medical Officer. (Declaration of Timothy Pico ISO Mot. Exh. D.) Plaintiff also points to testimony by her treating physician that she was able to work from home and could perform computer-based work. (Id. Exhs. G-H.) Plaintiff claims, without citation to the record, that she testified to the projects she was working on at the time she was placed on leave. Plaintiff also states that Defendant’s CMO, Michael Wohlfeiler, and another witness, Robert Heglar, testified at trial that the position was structured specifically for Plaintiff so that she could perform her work remotely, and dismisses any testimony to the contrary as mere speculation. However, Plaintiff does not cite to any portion of the trial record in support of this claim, only to deposition testimony which was not admitted into evidence and thus may not be considered. The sole piece of admitted evidence on which Plaintiff relies to advance the claim that Defendant’s actions were not based on her job performance is Defendant’s response to Form Interrogatory No. 201.4. (Pico Decl. Exh. K.) That interrogatory queried whether Defendant’s adverse employment actions against Plaintiff were based on her job performance. (Id.) After asserting various objections, Defendant responded “Without waiving the forgoing objections, no. Defendant engaged in the interactive process, provided reasonable accommodations, and did not terminate or demote Plaintiff.” (Id.)

In opposition, Defendant contends that it produced substantial evidence at trial showing that Plaintiff was not able to perform the essential functions of her job. Defendant relies principally on the testimony of Dr. Heglar, who stated that each of the core job functions required, at minimum, local travel, but would escalate to travel across the country. (Declaration of Jacqulin Givelber ISO Opp. Exh. B. 60:17-23.) Dr. Heglar unequivocally stated that travel was essential for “spearheading innovative models of care,” which was one of the core functions identified in the job description. (Givelber Decl. Exh. B. 61:28-62:24; Pico Decl. Exh. D.) Defendant also contends that Dr. Wohlfeier corroborated Dr. Heglar’s testimony. (Givelber Decl. Exh. M. 45:12-26.)

In addition, Defendant offers trial testimony from several witnesses, including Dr. Heglar, Dr. Wohlfeiler, Plaintiff’s treating physician Lia Kransdorf, Plaintiff’s friend and colleague Trevor Flynn, and even Plaintiff herself as to her impairment from her condition. Drs. Heglar and Wohlfeier testified to firsthand observation of Plaintiff’s difficulty in staying alert and maintaining concentration. (Givelber Decl. Exh. B 46:14-47:25; Exh. M. 52:17-24.) Dr. Kransdorf testified that Plaintiff’s inability to work was a result of her inability to lift her head, which would limit her ability to sustain continuous work without breaks. (Givelber Decl. Exh. E. 86:4-16; see also Exhs. C-D.) Trevor Flynn testified that Plaintiff appeared to fall asleep mid-conversation on several occasions, much to Plaintiff’s distress. (Id. Exh. F. 143:1-16.) Plaintiff also testified that she was not able to fully participate in Zoom meetings because of her condition. (Id. Exh. G. 57:10-14.)

Finally, Defendant states that Dr. Heglar offered extensive testimony of various job duties which Plaintiff was not fulfilling from her condition, including, inter alia, rolling out COVID vaccines and managing their administration and storage, attending and contributing during meetings, and conducting health screenings for prospective employees. (Givelber Decl. Exh. B. 47:26-50:26.) Dr. Heglar testified that their conclusion that Plaintiff could not travel, which they considered an essential duty of the position, was reinforced by the succession of physician’s notes stating that Plaintiff could only work remotely with a flexible schedule. (Id. 67:26-69:10.) Defendant also elicited testimony that Plaintiff could only recall working on one project. (Givelber Decl. Exh. G. 60:16-61:12).

Plaintiff did not reply to Defendant’s opposition to this motion. However, Plaintiff offered a reply brief to Defendant’s opposition to the Motion for New Trial, which, as stated below, concerns identical issues. Construing Plaintiff’s reply brief as pertaining to both motions, Plaintiff dismisses the testimony by the various witnesses offered by Defendant as mere speculation. Plaintiff asserts—again without citation to the record—that Ms. Castille testified that the driving factor in her decision to place Plaintiff on a leave of absence was that Defendant could not continue to permit her to work from home. Plaintiff further claims, also without citation, that Mr. Flynn testified that his experiences occurred “closer to the onset of Ms. Durham’s condition.” (Reply p. 4:21.)

As to Plaintiff’s job functions, Plaintiff also claims in her reply brief that the evidence showed that her only duty after her new position was created was the development of internal policies, and that she had no management or supervisory role, was no longer involved in the vaccine rollout, and was not involved in assessment reviews. Once again, this claim is not supported by a citation to the record.

There is no question that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Plaintiff was unable to perform the essential duties of the NNDS position even with accommodation. Although it is true that Drs. Heglar and Wohlfeier testified that they created the NNDS position as a way to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability and allow her to work from home, Dr. Heglar explained at length that several of the core job responsibilities, including the need to spearhead innovative models of care and conduct audits, would require visits to local clinics in the initial weeks of the job with travel to out-of-state locations in the months to follow. (Defendants’ Exh. B, pp. 66-67.) Dr. Heglar testified that he clarified these requirements in his discussions with Plaintiff about the NNDS position. (Id.) He also highlighted for the jury his past experience with Plaintiff’s inability to concentrate and lack of output and the critical importance that she be able to upgrade her focus and productivity to perform the tasks required of the NNDS. (Id., pp. 46-50, 60, 63.) Given these NNDS job requirements, Drs. Heglar and Wohlfeiler were dismayed to read the job restrictions defined by Plaintiff’s doctor in the May 27, 2021 Accommodation Questionnaire. (Defendant’s Exh. D, p. 2.) In that form, Dr. Lisa Kransdorf stated, inter alia, that Plaintiff “cannot maintain concentration due to pain and continuing significant impairments” and requires “[c]ontinued reduced, flexible work schedule 5 hours per day, working from home, until her evaluation and treatment are complete,” and that Plaintiff’s impairment will endure for “[w]eeks ongoing through 12/31/21.” (Id.) Although a June 11, 2021 letter from Dr. Kransdorf lifted the 5-hour-per-day limitation, it reinforced the “significant physical impairments” suffered by Plaintiff, the need for work from home and a flexible schedule, and an end-date of 12/31/21 for the noted restrictions. (Plaintiff’s Exh. G.) Indeed, Dr. Wohlfeiler testified about his serious concerns that Plaintiff would be unable to muster the sustained concentration necessary for the job in his conversation with Anita Castille about placing Plaintiff on leave. (Defendants’ Exh. M, pp. 64-65.) Although Defendant relies on additional evidence in its opposition, this recitation of evidence makes clear that there is substantial evidentiary support for the jury’s determination that Plaintiff could not perform the essential job duties of the NNDS position even with accommodation.

2. Failure to Engage in Interactive Process

Plaintiff next argues that she proved each of the elements of her claim for Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process, and that the jury’s finding for Defendant was not supported by substantial evidence. The jury, in reaching its verdict, concluded that Plaintiff requested that Defendant make reasonable accommodations for her physical disability, and that she was willing to participate in an interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations. (See Pico Decl. Exh. A. Questions Nos. 4-5.) However, as to whether Defendant failed to participate in a timely, good faith interactive process with Plaintiff, the jury answered “No.” (Id. No. 6.)

Plaintiff asserts that the undisputed evidence shows that Defendants did not meet with her on or around June 11, 2021, when she was placed on leave, to determine if any reasonable accommodation could be made. Plaintiff offers no citation to admitted evidence in support of this position, save for an email dated August 25, 2021 to Plaintiff’s counsel. (Pico Decl. Exh. L.)

Defendant, in opposition, states that Plaintiff ignores extensive evidence that Defendant made multiple attempts to contact her throughout June and July 2021. Defendant offered evidence that Drs. Heglar and Wohlfeiler’s executive assistant, Shirley Oliver, sent a text message to Plaintiff stating that Drs. Heglar and Wohlfeiler wanted to discuss her latest doctor’s letter on June 14, 2021. (Givelber Decl. Exh. H.) Plaintiff testified that she missed this message because she was not checking her phone. (Id. Exh. G. 86:18-87:3, 90:10-26.) Defendant also produced testimony from its Human Resources Benefits Coordinator A’ja Preston, who called Plaintiff on July 16, 2021, but received no response. (Givelber Decl. Exh. I: 1517-17:24; see also Exh.s J, K.) Defendant’s Vice President of Human Resources testified that she was intending to call Plaintiff on July 30, 2021, and only refrained from doing so because she received a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel banning Defendant from communicating directly with Plaintiff. (Id. Exh. N. 163:9-164:16.)

In reply, Plaintiff simply restates her assertion that the evidence proved that Defendant did not engage in a good-faith interactive process. The Court does not agree. There was substantial evidence that Defendant reached out to Plaintiff several times before her attorney’s instruction to direct all communications to him. As Defendant points out, for the most part, Plaintiff does not contest these efforts but only explains that she was not checking her cell phone or email during certain periods. This does not negate Defendant’s overtures to Plaintiff, and the jury was entitled to find based on this evidence that Defendant did not fail in its obligation to continue the interactive process even after Plaintiff was placed on leave. Thus, there is plainly sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, undermining Plaintiff’s request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

3. Disability Discrimination

Plaintiff challenges the jury’s finding on her third cause of action for disability discrimination as unsupported by substantial evidence. On this claim, when asked whether Plaintiff’s disability was a substantial motivating reason for Defendant’s decision to put Plaintiff on unpaid leave, the jury found in the negative. (Pico Decl. Exh. A Question No. 9.) Plaintiff claims this decision was not supported by the evidence because, had the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on her first two causes of action, those findings would compel a conclusion that Defendant was discriminated against based on her disability. Even if this logic is valid, the fact that the first two challenged jury findings enjoy substantial support in the evidence submitted at trial means that Plaintiff’s attack on the jury’s disability discrimination verdict also fails.

Motion for New Trial

As an alternative to her JNOV motion, Plaintiff moves for a new trial.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 657 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

5. Excessive or inadequate damages.

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court’s reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated.

A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 657.) A motion for new trial is a creature of statute, and the Court may grant a new trial only by conforming to the statutory procedures.¿ (Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 899-900.)¿ Further, under Article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution, no judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the Court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.¿ (In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 519, 526.)¿

Timing of Motion

A motion for new trial must be served and filed either “(1) After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment” or “(2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest.” (Code Civ Proc. § 659.) However, the Court’s authority to rule on a motion for new trial expires “75 days after the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5 or 75 days after service on the moving party by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, whichever is earlier, or if that notice has not been given, 75 days after the filing of the first notice of intention to move for a new trial.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 660.)

For the same reasons discussed above with respect to the JNOV motion, the Court has the authority to rule on the pending motion at the hearing on January 26, 2024 or at any time on or before February 24, 2023.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Defendant raises several objections to the evidence relied upon in Plaintiff’s motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows:

Objection No. 4: SUSTAINED. There has been no showing that this evidence was admitted at trial.

Objection No. 5: SUSTAINED. There has been no showing that this evidence was admitted at trial.

Objection No. 6: SUSTAINED. There has been no showing that this evidence was admitted at trial.

Analysis

Plaintiff moves for a new trial on all causes of action for the same reasons as those set forth in her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that there exists such an “insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict” that after “weighing the evidence the court [should be] convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom . . . that the . . . jury clearly should have reached a different verdict. (Moving papers, p. 7, quoting Code Civ. Proc. §657.) Although the standard for a new trial motion is different from that applicable to a motion for JNOV, the Court is persuaded by the evidence highlighted by Defendant in its opposition, including the key evidence discussed above in connection with the Court’s ruling on the JNOV motion that this motion should be denied.

There was strong evidence from Dr. Heglar about Plaintiff’s lack of concentration and low productivity during the months and weeks leading up to Defendant’s decision to put her on extended leave. This testimony was corroborated at least in part by Dr. Wohlfeiler although he appeared to be less involved in the day-to-day oversight of Plaintiff’s work and more reluctant to emphasize the flaw in Plaintiff’s performance arising from her severe disability. Dr. Heglar also provided persuasive testimony about why local travel was critical to at least two aspects of Plaintiff’s new position and why nationwide travel would be necessary in the near future. Given the essential requirements of the NNDS job, as clarified by Dr. Heglar, and Plaintiff’s weak performance to that point, it was understandable that Defendant would react strongly to Dr. Kransdorf’s Accommodation Questionnaire and letter reinforcing that Plaintiff’s deficits were serious and chronic and would likely continue through the end of the year. Although Defendant points to other probative evidence on this point, the Court cannot say that that the jury should have clearly found that Plaintiff was able to perform the duties of her job with accommodation.

Plaintiff urges the Court to recognize a disconnect between Anita Castille’s focus on keeping Plaintiff from working at home and the notion that the leave decision was based on Plaintiff’s inability to perform the essential duties of the job. (Moving papers, p. 14.) While Ms. Castille’s understanding of Plaintiff’s job duties was limited, it was clear from her testimony and that of Drs. Wohlfeiler and Heglar that she consulted with Dr. Wolhfeiler and considered Dr. Kransdorf’s severe medical restrictions before she implemented the decision to put Plaintiff on leave. The Court cannot conclude based on the evidence at trial that the jury clearly should have agreed with Plaintiff’s argument that the only or even the predominant reason for the leave was Defendant’s general dislike of the practice of working at home. This argument is grounded largely on the swift leave decision made by Defendant shortly after receiving Dr. Kransdorf’s medical restrictions. Given the detailed meetings Drs. Wohlfeiler and Heglar had with Plaintiff in the weeks leading up to the decision and their months-long observations of Plaintiff’s performance deficits because of her disability, it is not surprising that Defendant acted promptly upon receipt of the highly restrictive Accommodation Questionnaire from Dr. Kransdorf. Nor is it surprising that the jury found that Defendant’s decision was firmly grounded on Plaintiff’s inability to do the job rather than on some other improper consideration.

Further, while Defendant’s efforts to reach out to Plaintiff after she was put on leave cannot be considered vigorous, the evidence does not show they were encouraged by Plaintiff who did not respond to initial overtures and then sent a letter from her attorney instructing that further efforts should be directed to counsel Again, the Court cannot find that Defendant clearly failed to engage in the interactive process such that a contrary jury verdict should be reversed.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s alternative Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.