Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 22STCV00661, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV00661, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV00661 Hearing Date: April 18, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: April 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: July 2, 2024

CASE: Maritza Padilla, individually and as Successor in Interest to Leonel Chavez, et al. v. State of California

CASE NO.: 22STCV00661

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendants State of California (sued as California Highway Patrol) and Officer Daniel Castaneda

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Jesus Chavez and Maritza Padilla, individually and as Successors in Interest to Leonel Chavez

CASE HISTORY:

· 01/06/22: Complaint filed.

· 01/28/22: Carlos Posada named as Doe Defendant.

· 05/19/22: Daniel Castaneda named as Doe Defendant.

· 06/07/23: Carlos Posada dismissed with prejudice.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a civil rights and wrongful death action. On September 28, 2021, officers of the California Highway Patrol responded to a traffic collision in which the decedent was involved at the intersection of Medford and Indiana Streets in Los Angeles. Plaintiffs allege that CHP officers attempted to detain the decedent, who was unarmed, without just cause. Plaintiffs further allege that when the decedent attempted to break free, the officers tased the decedent, shot him, and denied him medical attention, causing his death.

Defendants move for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of all causes of action.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED IN PART with respect to the third, fifth, and sixth causes of action and with respect to punitive damages, and otherwise DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment. As the Court has found that Defendants are not entitled to summary adjudication of each cause of action for the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Motion for Summary Adjudication

Defendants move in the alternative for summary adjudication of each cause of action.

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiffs raise several objections to the Declaration of Daniel Castaneda in support of the motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows:

Objection No. 1: SUSTAINED as hearsay. (Evid. Code § 1200(a).) However, the statements are admissible to show their effect on Defendant Castaneda with respect to the reasonableness of his use of force.

Objection No. 2: SUSTAINED as hearsay. (Evid. Code § 1200(a).) However, the statements are admissible to show their effect on Defendant Castaneda with respect to the reasonableness of his use of force.

Objection No. 3: SUSTAINED as improper speculation. (Evid. Code § 702.)

Objection No. 4: OVERRULED. The statement describing what the witness indicated is not hearsay nor speculation because it is not offered to prove its truth but to explain Defendant Castaneda’s conduct.

Objection No. 5: OVERRULED. Does not lack foundation and is not speculative.

Objection No. 6: OVERRULED. Not an improper opinion, lay or otherwise.

Objection No. 7: OVERRULED. Does not lack foundation and is not speculative.

Objection No. 8: OVERRULED. Does not lack foundation and is not speculative.

Objection No. 9: OVERRULED. Not an improper opinion, lay or otherwise.

Objection No. 10: OVERRULED. Objection goes to weight, not admissibility. To the extent Defendant Castaneda’s testimony is contradicted by video evidence, that contradiction may be justification for denial of summary judgment or adjudication on the basis that there is a dispute of material fact.

Objection No. 11: OVERRULED. Does not lack foundation and is not speculative.

Objection No. 12: OVERRULED. Objection goes to weight, not admissibility. To the extent Defendant Castaneda’s testimony is contradicted by video evidence, that contradiction may be justification for denial of summary judgment or adjudication on the basis that there is a dispute of material fact.

Objection No. 13: OVERRULED. Does not lack foundation and is not speculative.

Plaintiffs also raise several objections to the Declaration of Jennifer Sanchez in support of the motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows:

Objection No. 2: OVERRULED. Objection goes to weight, not admissibility. To the extent Officer Sanchez’s testimony is contradicted by video evidence, that contradiction may be justification for denial of summary judgment or adjudication on the basis that there is a dispute of material fact.

Objection No. 3: OVERRULED. The instructions given by Defendant Castaneda are not statements offered for their truth.

Objection No. 4: OVERRULED. Objection goes to weight, not admissibility. To the extent Officer Sanchez’s testimony is contradicted by video evidence, that contradiction may be justification for denial of summary judgment or adjudication on the basis that there is a dispute of material fact.

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

Defendants raise several evidentiary objections to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4 (Objection No. 1); the expert declaration of Roger Clark attached as Exhibit 6 (Nos. 2 through 30) and Exhibit 8 (No. 31.) The Court rules on these objections as follows:

Objection No. 1: SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff’s counsel is not competent to lay the necessary foundation for this exhibit. (See Evid. Code § 1271.)

Objection No. 2: SUSTAINED as improper speculation. (Evid. Code §§ 210, 350-352.)

Objection No. 3: SUSTAINED as lacking foundation, speculation, and improper conclusion. (Evid. Code §§ 210, 350-352.)

Objection No. 4: SUSTAINED as lacking foundation for expert opinion. The expert is not qualified to speak to Officer Sanchez’s mental state. (Evid. Code § 801, 803.)

Objection Nos. 5-10: SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay. These portions of the report incorporate a separate document without establishing the underlying facts necessary to lay a foundation for these statements. (See Evid. Code § 1271.)

Objection Nos. 11-23: OVERRULED. Not speculation, does not lack foundation or personal knowledge. Not conclusions of ultimate fact, merely opinion on whether the officers’ conduct breached the standard of care.

Objection No. 24: SUSTAINED as improper speculation with respect to “lack of adequate training, and a direct reflection of CHP’s inadequate supervision, and training policies.”

Objection No. 25: SUSTAINED as an improper legal conclusion.

Objection No. 26-28: SUSTAINED as speculation. (Evid. Code §§ 210, 350-352.)

Objection No. 29-30: SUSTAINED as an improper legal conclusion.

Objection No. 31: SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff’s counsel is not competent to lay the necessary foundation for this exhibit. (See Evid. Code § 1271.)

Undisputed Facts

At the outset, the Court finds it appropriate to recite the undisputed facts regarding the incident which gave rise to this case. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for assault, battery, false arrest, negligence, and violation of the Bane Act against the State of California and Officer Daniel Castaneda of the California Highway Patrol for the death of Leonel Chavez during a CHP response to a traffic collision.

On September 28, 2021, Defendant Castaneda and Officer Jennifer Sanchez were dispatched to the scene of a traffic accident involving the decedent. (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Disputed Fact No. 1.) Defendant Castaneda spoke to a witness upon arriving at the scene who identified the decedent. (SSDF Nos. 3-4.) After driving down the street, the officers exited the vehicle and approached the decedent, who was in the middle of the street near a crashed vehicle. (SSDF Nos. 9-10.)

The parties agree that Defendant Castaneda identified himself as a peace officer and instructed decedent to stop walking away but disagree on the exact order of events in this respect. (SSDF Nos. 12-14.) Regardless, the decedent then turned around and raised his hands above his head. (SSDF No. 15.) Defendant Castaneda approached the decedent and placed his hands on the decedent’s own. (SSDF No. 18.) The decedent spun around to face Defendant Castaneda, and, after a brief struggle, the two men separated. (SSDF Nos. 18, 21.) This struggle is the first major point of contention between the parties.

After Defendant Castaneda and decedent Chavez separated, both Castaneda and Officer Sanchez drew their sidearms and pointed them at the decedent. (SSDF No. 24.) Defendant Castaneda began backing away from the decedent, who kept walking toward the Defendant. (SSDF 27-29.) As Defendant Castaneda backed away, he began to approach a fence and dirt area off the side of the road. (SSDF No. 30.) While backing away and approaching this area, Defendant Castaneda drew his Taser and pointed it at Chavez as the decedent continued to approach. (SSDF Nos. 33-34.)

From this point, the order of events is heavily disputed, forming the second major point of contention. What is not, however, is that Defendant Castaneda discharged his Taser at nearly the same time that the decedent began to quicken his pace toward the Defendant. (SSDF Nos. 37-38.) Defendant Castaneda then dropped the Taser and fired his sidearm at Chavez repeatedly in a continuous cycle. (SSDF No. 47.) Seven of the Defendant’s shots hit the decedent, three or four of which were fatal within seconds to minutes. (SSDF Nos. 62-63.) Approximately ten seconds elapsed from Defendant Castaneda touching the decedent to the fatal shooting. (SSDF No. 49.)

Defendant Castaneda took up a position at his patrol car and reported shots fired. (SSDF Nos. 50-51.) The decedent, by this point, lay face down on the ground with his hands under him. (SSDF No. 52.) The officers commanded Chavez to put his arms out to the side so they could provide medical care. (SSDF No. 54.) When the decedent did not respond to this command, the officers devised a tactical approach plan, secured Chavez with handcuffs, and attempted to provide medical care. (SSDF Nos. 56-58.) Medical care was not initiated until about 5 minutes after the shooting. (SSDF No. 59.) The sufficiency of the care provided to Chavez is the third major point of contention between the parties.

The entire incident was captured on video, without sound, from the dashcam of the officers’ patrol vehicle. (Defendants’ Exh. I, Plaintiffs’ Exh. 1.)

Fourth Cause of Action: Negligence

Defendants move for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for negligence.

“Actionable negligence involves a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the … legal cause of the resulting injury.” (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 594.) Plaintiffs set forth two theories of negligence liability against the Defendants: first, that Defendant Castaneda did not use reasonable force in the execution of his duties, and, second, that Defendants fell below the standard of care in execution of their duties by failing to provide prompt medical care to the decedent.

1. Use of Deadly Force

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their theory that Defendant Castaneda did not use reasonable force.

“[P]eace officers have a duty to act reasonably when using deadly force.” (Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 629.) Penal Code section 835a sets out the parameters for an officer’s use of deadly force:

In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable officer. [¶]... [T]he decision by a peace officer to use force shall be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation, based on the totality of the circumstances known to or perceived by the officer at the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight, and that the totality of the circumstances shall account for occasions when officers may be forced to make quick judgments about using force.

(Pen. Code, § 835a(a).) “[A] peace officer is justified in using deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary ... [t]o defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person.” (Pen. Code, § 835a(c)(1).) “A threat of death or serious bodily injury is ‘imminent’ when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person.” (Pen. Code § 835a(e)(2).) “‘Totality of the circumstances’ means all facts known to the peace officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of deadly force.” (Id. at subd. (e)(3).)

Defendants contend that Castaneda’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. According to Defendants, witnesses identified decedent Chavez and described him acting in a manner which suggested he was armed. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Nos. 4-8.) Defendants claim that when Defendant Castaneda approached the decedent to pat him down for weapons, the decedent spun around and tried to remove Castaneda’s weapon from its holster. (SSUMF Nos. 17-19.) As Castaneda backed away and raised his Taser, Defendants contend that Chavez quickened his pace toward Castaneda, and that Castaneda saw “something black that could have been a weapon” come out of the decedent’s pocket as he fired the Taser. (SSUMF Nos. 38-41.) Defendants argue that Castaneda had good cause to fear imminent injury or death because (a) witness statements led him to believe Chavez was armed; (b) Chavez had attempted to remove Castaneda’s pistol from its holster; (c) Castaneda saw an object that could have been a weapon emerge from Chavez’s pocket; and (d) Chavez was rapidly approaching Castaneda. According to Defendants, the totality of these circumstances known or perceived by Defendant Castaneda justified his use of deadly force.

There are several issues with Defendants’ narrative. First, although Defendant Castaneda and Officer Sanchez’s testimony is competent evidence of what transpired during the initial struggle between Chavez and Castaneda, the video footage is markedly less clear as the decedent’s hands are only briefly visible. (Defendants’ Exh. I, 15:33:38-15:33:42; Exh. J, 15:33:38-15:33:42; Exh. K, 15:33:38-15:33:42; Exh. L, frames 3436- 3550; Exh. M, frames 3436-3550; Exh. N.) Second, no black object is visible in the video footage to support the contention that there was an object in Chavez’s pocket. (Defendants’ Exh. I, 15:33:49-15:33:51; Exh. J, 15:33:49- 15:33:51; Exh. K, 15:33:49-15:33:51; Exh. L, frames 3436-3767; Exh. M, frames 3436- 3767.) Third, it is extremely ambiguous whether the decedent began running at Castaneda first, whether he began running after the Taser was fired, or whether he began running after Castaneda began firing his pistol, as, even on video, all three occur within the span of a second and are very close together. (Defendants’ Exh. I, 15:33:49-15:33:52; Exh. J, 15:33:49- 15:33:52; Exh. K, 15:33:49-15:33:52; Exh. L, frames 3436-3767; Exh. M, frames 3436- 3767.)

Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as required in the context of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the video footage—which is much more ambiguous—contradicts the categorical assertions by the officers. Thus, Defendants’ own evidence discloses a dispute of material facts with respect to what the decedent attempted to do in his struggle with Defendant Castaneda, whether there was anything in his pocket at all, and whether the decedent actually charged Defendant Castaneda before the lethal shots were fired. These disputes go directly to whether the totality of the circumstances actually perceived by Defendant Castaneda justified the use of deadly force. Because this evidence discloses triable issues of fact, the Court finds that Defendants have not carried their burden to demonstrate that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their negligence claims on this basis.

2. Failure to Render Medical Care

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their theory that Defendant Castaneda negligently failed to provide medical care.

Under section 1799.106 of the Health and Safety Code, a police officer “who renders emergency medical services at the scene of an emergency shall only be liable in civil damages for acts or omissions performed in a grossly negligent manner or acts or omissions not performed in good faith.” (Health & Saf. Code § 1799.106.) “[G]ross negligence” is “want of even scant care” or “an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754.) Gross negligence is “a failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use.” (Decker v. City of Imperial Beach (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 349, 358.) A public entity need only “exercise some care” to avoid a finding of gross negligence. (Id. at 361.)

Defendants contend that Castaneda could not have acted with gross negligence because he provided Chavez with medical care, thereby acting with “some care,” and because the five-minute delay in providing medical care does not amount to gross negligence. (SSUMF Nos. 52-59.) Defendants rely on Decker for the position that the provision of medical care constitutes “some care,” and on City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (Magana) for the position that a five-minute delay is not gross negligence. (Decker, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at 361; City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (Magana) (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 999, 1007.) Close reading of these cases reveals substantial factual differences from the instant matter. Both opinions concern the alleged failure of lifeguards and rescue personnel to provide adequate care in responding to an accidental injury. In Decker, the Court of Appeal reasoned that rescue personnel were not grossly negligent in their attempt to rescue an endangered surfer because the rescuers arrived promptly at the scene and continuously attempted to rescue the decedent, without success. (Decker, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at 361.) In Santa Cruz, the Court of Appeal found that there could be no gross negligence when a lifeguard failed to respond to an injury in their assigned area for 20 minutes. (Santa Cruz, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at 1002.) Those facts bear little factual similarity to this case, where the injury was not merely an accident to which the Defendants were responding, but rather the direct result of the intentional use of lethal force by Defendant Castaneda. These authorities do not stand for the proposition that a delay of five minutes in treating multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a police officer cannot constitute “gross negligence” as a matter of law. Defendants have therefore failed to carry their burden with respect to this argument.

Defendants also argue that there can be no negligence liability for the failure to render medical care because Plaintiff cannot show causation. Defendants argue that there was nothing that could have been done to save Chavez because several of his wounds were fatal in “seconds to minutes.” (SSUMF No. 64.) However, close reading of the deposition of Dr. Brice Hunt, who performed the autopsy, as presented by Defendants reveals that Dr. Hunt only testified that Chavez’s wounds “had the potential to kill someone pretty quickly.” (Defendants’ Exh. P. p.16:15-17.) This testimony does not state—and therefore is not evidence showing—that Chavez was beyond help with or without prompt medical care. Defendants have thus likewise failed to carry their burden to show Plaintiffs cannot prevail for lack of causation.

As a final matter, Defendants argue in reply that because Plaintiff Maritza Padilla withdrew her claim for negligence arising from the failure to provide medical care, that withdrawal should bar Plaintiff Jesus Chavez’s corresponding claim. However, Defendants concede that no authority supports their position. The Court therefore rejects this argument.

Accordingly, as each of Defendants’ arguments with respect to this cause of action have failed, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the fourth cause of action is DENIED.

Fifth Cause of Action: Negligence Per Se

Defendants move for summary adjudication of the fifth cause of action for negligence per se on the grounds that this cause of action is without merit and, separately, because negligence per se is not a distinct cause of action.

With respect to Defendants’ arguments on the merits, the Court finds that there are triable issues of fact which preclude summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, as discussed above. However, as Defendants state, negligence per se is not a distinct cause of action for negligence, but “merely codifies the rule that a presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285.) The Court therefore finds that summary adjudication should be granted as to this cause of action on the basis that it is duplicative of the fourth cause of action. This ruling does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence based on the underlying facts associated with this cause of action, as they may be asserted under the fourth cause of action.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the fifth cause of action is GRANTED.

First and Second Causes of Action: Assault & Battery

Defendants move for summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action for assault and battery on the grounds that these causes of action are without merit. As the parties agree that these claims survive or fail on the same basis, the Court will address them together.

Claims for assault and battery by a police officer are subject to the same standard as claims for unreasonable use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S. Code section 1983. (Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1274-75.) Thus, to establish liability for assault and battery by a peace officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable based on the facts and circumstances confronting the officer. (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 527.) Unlike the “totality of the circumstances” test employed in the negligence context, this test focuses “more narrowly on the moment when deadly force is used.” (Hayes, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 639, citing Billington v. Smith (9th Cir. 2022) 292 F.3d 1177, 1190; see Plumhoff v. Rickard (2013) 572 U.S. 765, 777.)

Defendants rely on the same facts and evidence offered with respect to the negligence claims to argue that probable cause existed to believe Chavez posed a significant threat of death or serious injury. As the Court finds that this evidence discloses triable issues of fact that go directly to whether Defendant Castaneda had justification to use deadly force, this argument is unavailing. Moreover, focusing on the moment the shots were fired and excluding all else, as required for these claims, is of no help to Defendants. The video evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, does not clearly show any object emerging from Chavez’s pocket. (Defendants’ Exh. I, 15:33:49-15:33:51; Exh. J, 15:33:49- 15:33:51; Exh. K, 15:33:49-15:33:51; Exh. L, frames 3436-3767; Exh. M, frames 3436- 3767.) Further, Chavez appears to run directly at Castaneda either contemporaneous with or just after the first shot is fired. (Defendants’ Exh. I, 15:33:49-15:33:52; Exh. J, 15:33:49- 15:33:52; Exh. K, 15:33:49-15:33:52; Exh. L, frames 3436-3767; Exh. M, frames 3436- 3767.) As these ambiguities must be construed against Defendants on summary adjudication, the evidence offered by Defendants does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on these claims.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the first cause of action is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the second cause of action is DENIED.

Third Cause of Action: False Imprisonment

Defendants move for summary adjudication of the third cause of action for false imprisonment. Plaintiff Padilla states that she dismisses her claim against Defendants on this basis. Plaintiff Chavez, however, maintains his claim on the basis that Defendant Castaneda acted wrongfully by initially stopping decedent Chavez and attempting to handcuff him.

“False imprisonment involves the intentional confinement of another against the person’s will. The elements are (1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” (Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 855 [internal citations omitted].)

Defendants argue that Castaneda had adequate justification to detain Chavez to search him for weapons based on witness statements. “A police officer may detain a suspect for questioning when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties.” (Dawkins v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 22 Cal.3d 126, 133.) The standard for reasonable suspicion is less stringent than probable cause. (People v. Turner (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 160-61.) Defendants contend that information gained from witness interviews suggesting that Chavez attempted to leave the scene of the accident and behaved in a manner suggesting he possessed a weapon (SSUMF Nos. 3-8) provided reasonable suspicion to detain Chavez. This evidence, which identifies witness statements that suggested criminal activity was in progress, is sufficient to carry Defendants’ burden on this cause of action to show that Plaintiffs cannot prevail because Castaneda had a reasonable suspicion.

Plaintiff Chavez, in opposition, asserts that Defendant Castaneda’s suspicion was not reasonable because no weapon was seen, Chavez made no threats, and was initially compliant with Defendant Castaneda’s commands. Plaintiff’s contention that the facts are disputed is not actually supported by the evidence. Plaintiffs admit that Chavez moved his vehicle away from the impact and stopped after witnesses started to take photos. (SSDF No. 6.) Plaintiffs also admit that a witness informed Defendant Castaneda that Chavez raised his sweater, which suggests the existence of a weapon even though one was not seen. (SSDF No. 8.) These statements are sufficient to provide an officer with reasonable suspicion to investigate and determine their veracity. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact with respect to this cause of action because Plaintiff has not shown that Castaneda lacked authority to temporarily detain Chavez.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the third cause of action is GRANTED.

Sixth Cause of Action: Bane Act

Defendants move for summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act.

A party may bring an action under the Bane Act for damages against another person who interferes or attempts to interfere, by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with any individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitutions or laws of the Untied States or California. (Civ. Code § 52.1(b)-(c).) The act of interference with a right “must itself be deliberate or spiteful.” (Shoyoye v. Cnty. of L.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 960.) To prevail on this claim, a party must prove (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the attempted interference is by threat, intimidation, or coercion. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67.)

There is a split of authority on what must be proven to demonstrate coercion. Under one theory, set forth by Shoyoye and its progeny, there must be a showing of coercion “independent from the coercion inherent in the constitutional violation itself.” (Cty. Inmate Tel. Serv. Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 354, 369 citing Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 959.) The alternative theory, set out in Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco, disagrees that a “threat, intimidation, or coercion” must also be “transactionally ‘independent’ from” the violation of a right. (Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 796-97.) Under this theory, the plaintiff must instead show that the defendant had “a specific intent to violate the right.” (Id. at 801-802.) As our Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, this Court is free to choose which authority to follow. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.)

Although Defendants prefer Shoyoye, they contend that under either approach, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Bane Act fail. Under the Shoyoye standard, Defendants argue that there is no coercive conduct independent of Castaneda’s use of force, which they view as the basis for any potential violation of Chavez’s rights. Alternatively, Defendants argue that under Cornell’s specific intent standard, the facts of the case demonstrate the absence of a specific intent to violate Chavez’s rights. (See generally SSUMF Nos. 6-49.) In opposition, Plaintiff Chavez argues that reckless disregard of the decedent’s rights is sufficient to meet the specific intent standard of Cornell. However, the authority cited by Plaintiff, Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., (2021) 985 F.3d 1173, has absolutely no bearing on this point. Moreover, neither Plaintiff addresses which standard the Court should apply, nor do they cite any evidence showing either a specific intent to violate Chavez’s rights or an independent act of coercion.

The Court need not reach the issue of whether Shoyoye or Cornell is the better approach, because, under either standard, Defendants have produced ample evidence that Plaintiffs cannot make the corresponding additional showing, and Plaintiffs offer no evidence to create a triable issue of fact on this point. Although there are triable issues of fact as to whether Defendant Castaneda violated Chavez’s rights, there is no evidence suggesting that Castaneda undertook any act, separate or not, for the express purpose of violating those rights.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the sixth cause of action is GRANTED.

Punitive Damages

Defendants move for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages.

To maintain a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant acted with fraud, malice, or oppression. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Punitive damages are not available against a government entity. (Gov. Code § 818.) Punitive damages are also not available in wrongful death actions. (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 796.) For punitive damages claims in the summary judgment context, the Court “view[s] the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive clear and convincing evidentiary burden.” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158.) “Malice” means conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) “[D]espicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’” (College Hosp. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate malice or oppression because the facts show that Defendant Castaneda did not engage in despicable conduct and did not act with the intent to injure Chavez. (SSUMF Nos. 6-59.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue, without citation to specific evidence, that a jury could find that Castaneda engaged in malicious or oppressive conduct. The Court is not persuaded. As with Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim, nothing in the record demonstrates a specific intent by Castaneda to injure Chavez, notwithstanding triable issues of fact regarding the assault and battery claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not show any conduct that can be construed as “base, vile, or contemptible.” The Court therefore finds that Defendants have shown that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their punitive damages claims, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a triable issue of fact in this respect.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the punitive damages claim is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED IN PART with respect to the third, fifth, and sixth causes of action and with respect to punitive damages, and otherwise DENIED.

Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.