Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV05737, Date: 2022-08-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV05737 Hearing Date: August 1, 2022 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: August 1, 2022 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET
CASE: Taylor Stein v. Lisa Helfend Meyer et
al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV05737
MOTION
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Lisa Helfend Meyer; Meyer, Olson, Lowy
& Meyers, LLP; Samantha F. Spector; Spector Law, APLC
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Taylor
Stein
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action for legal malpractice in connection with a
post-judgment parentage action.
Defendants move to compel
arbitration and stay the action pending arbitration.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants’
motion to compel
arbitration is GRANTED, along with the request to stay the case pending
arbitration.
DISCUSSION:
Defendants
move to compel arbitration and stay the action pending arbitration.
Existence of Arbitration Agreement
Under California law, arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
728, 741 (overruled on other grounds by
Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094).) A party petitioning to compel
arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement
to arbitrate, and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.)
Defendants seek to compel
arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the Engagement Agreement between
the parties as to Defendants’ legal representation of Plaintiff.
Paragraph 14 of the Engagement
Agreement states:
14. All disputes
between us regarding any aspect of our attorney-client relationship will be
resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to Sections 1280 et seq. of the Code
of Civil Procedure and not by litigation in Court. This provision applies
to all disputes whether they are about financial matters (fees and costs) or
about the quality of our services (malpractice). By this provision, we are both
giving up our right to have any such dispute decided by a judge or a jury. We
also enclose a separate letter regarding the arbitration clause.
(Declaration of Lisa Helfend Meyer ISO Mot. Exh. A.)
Plaintiff
signed the agreement as the client, under a statement, in bold, stating the
following:
I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED AND
UNDERSTAND ALL OF THE FOREGOING TERMS AND PROVISIONS AND I HEREBY AGREE TO
RETAIN YOUR FIRM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS SET FORTH IN YOUR LETTER DATED
MARCH 27, 2020.
(Id.)
This
evidence shows that Plaintiff agreed to submit claims for legal malpractice to
binding arbitration. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that a valid
arbitration agreement does not exist. As Plaintiff does not dispute the
existence of an arbitration agreement, the Court finds that there is a binding
arbitration agreement.
Applicability of the FAA
Neither
party contends that the arbitration agreement is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Unconscionability
Plaintiff’s
principal argument in opposition is that the agreement is unenforceable because
it is unconscionable.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
“‘To
briefly recapitulate the principles of unconscionability, the doctrine has
“‘both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on
‘“oppression”’ or ‘“surprise”’ due to unequal bargaining ¿power, the latter on ‘“overly harsh”’ … or ‘“one-sided”’
results.” [Citation.] The procedural element of an unconscionable contract
generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, “‘which, imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject
it.’” … [¶] Substantively unconscionable terms may take various forms, but may generally be described as unfairly one-sided.’
[Citation.]” (Citation omitted.)
“Under this approach, both the procedural
and substantive elements must be met before a contract or term will be deemed
unconscionable. Both, however, need not be present to the same degree. A
sliding scale is applied so that ‘the more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to
come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’
(Citations omitted.)
(Walnut
Producers of California v. Diamond Foods, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 634, 645 (bold emphasis
added).)
Plaintiff
argues that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is a
contract of adhesion. This presents a minimal degree
of procedural unconscionability:
“The
procedural element of the unconscionability analysis concerns the manner in which
the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.
[Citation.] The element focuses on oppression or surprise. [Citation.]
‘Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no
real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.’ [Citation.] Surprise is
defined as ‘“the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the
bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to
enforce the disputed terms.”’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted.)
Plaintiffs claim the Agreement is procedurally
unconscionable because it is an adhesion contract. An adhesion contract is “a
standardized contract … imposed upon the subscribing party without an
opportunity to negotiate the terms.” (Citation omitted.) “The term signifies a
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it. [Citation.]” (Citation omitted.)
The California Supreme Court has consistently
stated that “‘[t]he procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally
takes the form of a contract of adhesion … .’ ”
(Citations omitted.)
“Whether the challenged provision is within a
contract of adhesion pertains to the oppression aspect of procedural
unconscionability. A contract of adhesion is “imposed and drafted by the party
of superior bargaining strength” and “relegates to the subscribing party only
the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (Citations omitted.) “[A]bsent unusual
circumstances, use of a contract of adhesion establishes a minimal degree of
procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the availability of market
alternatives.” (Citation omitted.)
(Walnut Producers of California,
supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at 645-46 (bold emphasis added).) Ordinarily, attorney-client
retainer agreements are not considered contracts of adhesion. (Powers v.
Dickson, Carlson & Campillo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110.)
Plaintiff
contends that the agreement was an adhesion contract because the letter
accompanying the agreement, which offered additional explanation of certain key
provisions of the engagement agreement, including the arbitration clause,
required Plaintiff to check either that she had discussed the agreement with
independent counsel and was advised to her satisfaction, or that she was
advised to seek independent counsel and decided not to do so. (Meyer Decl. Exh.
B. p. 2.) Plaintiff contends that this requirement in the explanation letter
somehow renders the agreement so oppressive as to be unconscionable. As
Defendants state in their reply brief, Plaintiff identifies no provision of the
agreement itself that Plaintiff contends is procedurally unconscionable.
Further, although Plaintiff states in argument that Defendants were in a
superior bargaining position because of a pressing need and desire to hire
legal counsel, Plaintiff cites no evidence showing that Defendants, in fact,
held superior bargaining position over Plaintiff due to her financial means,
the time available, the availability of other counsel, or any other factor that
might have affected the relative bargaining strength of the parties.
Based on the evidence presented, the Court cannot conclude that
the agreement was procedurally unconscionable.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
As Plaintiff has not shown any procedural
unconscionability, the Court need not address whether there is any substantive
unconscionability in the agreement. Nevertheless, the Court will address this
prong of the unconscionability test on its merits.
“A provision
is substantively unconscionable if it ‘involves contract terms that are so
one-sided as to “shock the conscience,” or that impose harsh or oppressive
terms.’ [Citation.] The phrases ‘harsh,’ ‘oppressive,’ and ‘shock the
conscience’ are not synonymous with ‘unreasonable.’ Basing an unconscionability
determination on the reasonableness of a contract provision would inject an
inappropriate level of judicial subjectivity into the analysis. ¿‘With a
concept as nebulous as “unconscionability” it is important that courts not be
thrust in the paternalistic role of intervening to change contractual terms
that the parties have agreed to merely because the court believes the terms are
unreasonable. The terms must shock the conscience.’ [Citations.]”
(Walnut
Producers of California. supra, 187
Cal.App.4th at 647-48.)
Plaintiff
contends that the agreement is substantively unconscionable for the same
reasons that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable. Even if the
agreement were procedurally unconscionable, and it is not, arguments of
procedural unconscionability do not address the question of substantive
unconscionability. Plaintiff points to no terms in the agreement that are so
one-sided as to shock the conscience, or that impose harsh or oppressive terms.
Plaintiff has failed to establish any substantive unconscionability in the
arbitration agreement. Therefore, the arbitration clause is not unenforceable
on the basis of unconscionability.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED, along with the request to stay the
case pending arbitration.
Moving
Parties to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 1, 2022 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
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should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.