Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV07538, Date: 2023-12-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV07538 Hearing Date: December 4, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: December 4, 2023 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET
CASE: Jeremy Brooks v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et
al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV07538
DEMURRER
TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A
RESPONDING PARTY(S): No response on
eCourt as of 11/29/23
CASE
HISTORY:
·
04/07/23: Complaint filed.
·
05/24/23: First Amended Complaint filed.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action for violation of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies
Act. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants reported false and derogatory
information on his consumer credit report. Plaintiff claims that the inaccurate
information resulted from the theft of his identity and that Defendants failed
to investigate or correct their reporting after Plaintiff gave notice of the
theft.
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank
demurs to the First Amended Complaint.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Demurrer to the First
Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend only with respect to the
allegations pertaining to Civil Code section 1785.25(a), and otherwise
OVERRULED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank
demurs to the First Amended Complaint.
//
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other
extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face
of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing
is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all
facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall
v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields
v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n
demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are
assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the
reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the
defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1238.)
Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer, the
demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party
who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration
detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).)
However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds
to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41(a)(4).)
The Declaration of Christopher
Fredrich in support of the motion states that the parties met and conferred by
email on June 9 and 28, 2023, and by telephone on June 19 and 28, 2023, but
were not successful in resolving this dispute. (Declaration of Christopher R.
Fredrich ISO Demurrer ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendant has therefore satisfied its statutory
meet and confer obligation.
Analysis
The First
Amended Complaint asserts a single cause of action against both Defendants for
violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Accountability Act. Although
the pleadings do not specify which portions of the Act are asserted against
each Defendant, closer examination reveals two plausible theories of liability
against Defendant JPMorgan Chase: (1) violation of Civil Code section
1785.25(a), and (2) violation of Civil Code section 1785.20.3. (See FAC ¶¶ 37,
44.)[1]
1.
Violation of Section 1785.25(a)
Defendant first argues that
Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action for
violation of Civil Code section 1785.25(a). This subdivision states that “[a]
person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to
any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the
information is incomplete or inaccurate.” (Civ. Code § 1785.25(a).) According
to Defendant, the First Amended Complaint offers no factual allegations to
support this claim, only conclusory statements that inaccurate information was
furnished to Equifax.
A review of the pleadings confirms
Defendant’s contentions. Plaintiff alleges that he discovered on December 22,
2022 that his consumer credit reports contained incorrect information and that
he had been the victim of identity theft. (FAC ¶¶ 18-19, 21.) Upon discovering
the theft, Plaintiff alleges that he sent dispute letters to both Defendants
informing them of these facts, but that Defendants did nothing. (¶ 13.)
However, the First Amended Complaint is devoid of specifics on what information
was provided, at what time the information was furnished, and the nature of the
inaccuracies. Even under the favorable construction of the pleadings that is
required on demurrer, more detail is required to state a claim under this
statute.
2.
Violation of Section 1785.20.3
Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action for
violation of Civil Code section 1785.20.3. This section provides:
Any person who uses a consumer
credit report in connection with the approval of credit based on an application
for an extension of credit, and who discovers that the consumer's first and
last name, address, or social security number, on the credit application does
not match, within a reasonable degree of certainty, the consumer's first and
last name, address or addresses, or social security number listed, if any, on
the consumer credit report, shall take reasonable steps to verify the accuracy
of the consumer's first and last name, address, or social security number
provided on the application to confirm that the extension of credit is not the
result of identity theft, as defined in Section 1798.92.
(Civ. Code § 1785.20.3(a).)
Defendant
contends that this section is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims because
Plaintiff does not contend that he was ever approved for a line of credit. (See
FAC ¶ 1.) In so arguing, Defendant misconstrues Plaintiff’s contentions. The
plain language of section 1785.20.3 requires a creditor who extends a line of
credit based on a consumer credit report to ensure that the information on the
application matches that credit report, and, if a discrepancy arises, to verify
that the application was not using a stolen identity. Construing the
allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant approved a line of credit to a third party using
Plaintiff’s stolen identity and failed to conduct the verification required by
section 1785.20.3. (See FAC ¶ 17.) That Plaintiff was never approved for a line
of credit because he is not a customer of Chase Bank is irrelevant. Defendant
has therefore failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is
insufficient with respect to this theory of the case.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED only with
respect to the allegations pertaining to Civil Code section 1785.25(a) and
otherwise OVERRULED.
Leave to Amend
When a demurrer is sustained, the
Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can
be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318). When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon
which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his
right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective
for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892,
900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the plaintiffs to
demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to state their
claims against a defendant. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18
Cal.3d 335, 349.) “Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion
unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment.
[Citation.] Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair
opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v.
Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)
Here,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the First Amended Complaint might be revised
to cure the defects described herein. However, as these defects are purely the
result of a lack of detail in the allegations, the manner in which the
pleadings might be cured is self-evident. The Court will therefore exercise its
discretion to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.
CONCLUSION:
Plaintiff
shall have 30 days leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 4,
2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.
[1] Although
the First Amended Complaint also identifies sections 1785.15 and 1785.16 as
bases for the single cause of action, these allegations on their face pertain
only to a credit reporting agency and therefore are not relevant to the moving
Defendant. (See FAC ¶¶ 47-51.)