Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV08372, Date: 2022-08-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV08372 Hearing Date: August 19, 2022 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: August 19, 2022 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET
CASE: Guadalupe Guzman v. Francisco Flores
CASE NO.: 22STCV08372 ![]()
MOTION
TO SET ASIDE/VACATE DEFAULT
![]()
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Francisco Flores
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff
Guadalupe Guzman
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a breach of contract actions that was filed on March 8, 2022.
Plaintiff hired Defendant to care for and race horses, and alleges that
Defendant failed to do so properly.
Defendant moves to set aside the
default entered against him on May 18, 2022.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside the
default is GRANTED on the condition that Defendant serve and file the answer by
August 26, 2022.
Plaintiff’s request for sanctions
is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendant
moves under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set aside a default entered
on May 18, 2022.
Defendant’s Requests for Judicial Notice
Defendant
requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents in this
case: (1) the Complaint in this case, (2) the Proof of Service of Summons filed
on May 16, 2022, (3) the Court’s order on Defendant’s fee waiver; (4) a May 16,
2022 request for entry of default; (5) a May 17, 2022 request for entry of
default; (6) a May 18, 2022 request for entry of default, and (7) Defendant’s
May 31, 2022 Notice of Change of Address. Defendant’s requests are GRANTED pursuant to
Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records.)
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff
objects to Defendant’s Exhibits A, C, and D attached to the motion as assuming
facts not in evidence, lacking personal knowledge, inadmissible hearsay,
lacking foundation, and, in the case of Exhibit D, lack of relevance.
Plaintiff’s
objection to Exhibit A is SUSTAINED for lack of foundation. As the Court does
not rely on Exhibits C or D in reaching its ruling, the Court declines to rule
on Plaintiff’s objections.
Timing
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 473(b), a motion to set aside/vacate cannot be brought more than six
months after the entry of the order at issue and must be made within a
“reasonable time.” The six-month time limit is
jurisdictional. (Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc. (1985) 173
Cal.App.3d 965, 970.) Six months is defined as half a year, or 182
days, for the purposes of this section. (Davis v. Thayer (1980)
113 Cal.App.3d 892, 901-04.)
Defendant’s
motion to set aside was filed on June 28, 2022. Default was entered against
Defendant on May 18, 2022. There is no question that the motion is within the
six-month time limit proscribed by section 473(b).
Lack of Declaration
Defendant
has not offered any supporting declaration with his moving papers under penalty
of perjury under the laws of the State of California, as is required to constitute
admissible evidence. However, section 473(b) explicitly states that “no
affidavit or declaration of merits shall be required of the moving party.” The
Court therefore will consider the motion on its merits.
Timing
Defendant moves to set aside the
default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) for mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, and excusable neglect.
Code of Civil Procedure section
473(b) provides in pertinent part:
The court may, upon any terms as may be
just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment…taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy
of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the
application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time,
in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment…was taken.
Section 473(b) also authorizes the
Court to grant relief from default using the Court’s equitable powers. (Aldrich
v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co., Inc. (1985) 170 Cal.3d 725, 736.)
In default cases, there is a
three-part test for relief that asks whether there is or was: (1) a meritorious
case; (2) a valid reason for not defending the original case; and (3) diligence
used in requesting to set aside default once discovered. (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975; see also Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 1128, 1144.) The Court also considers possible prejudice that could
result from default being set aside. (Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275
Cal.App.2d 178, 183.) Absent a showing of prejudice to the Plaintiff, only very
slight evidence is required to justify setting aside a default. (Fasuyi v.
Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 696.) Section 473 “should be
liberally applied and the power freely exercised to carry out the policy in
favor of trial on the merits.' (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d 3d. 1971)
Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 165, p. 3735; Taliaferro v. Taliaferro
(1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 216, 220.) There is a strong policy behind
granting relief if the moving party brings the motion for relief within the
statutory time. (In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d
1051, 1071.)
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff
has not made any showing that granting relief will prejudice Plaintiff. Therefore,
Defendant needs only offer very slight evidence to justify relief.
1.
Meritorious Case
Defendant has not included a
proposed answer with his moving papers. However, Defendant contends that the
Complaint filed in this case is identical to the Complaint filed in a previous
case involving the same parties, Guzman v. Flores, LASC Case No.
21STCV35995. (See Complaint; RJN Exh. A.) Defendant states that the answer that
would have been filed in this case would be identical to the answer that was
filed in the previous case. (Defendant’s Motion Exh. A.) Plaintiff objects to
the consideration of this answer. However, the Court will exercise its
discretion to take judicial notice of the corresponding filing in the previous
case, and construe that answer as a proposed answer. The proposed answer raises
multiple affirmative defenses which, if proven, would allow Defendant to
prevail in this action. Plaintiff does not
contend otherwise. Defendant has therefore established that there is a
meritorious case
2.
Valid Reason for Not Defending Original Case
Defendant does not identify which
of the four bases authorized by section 473(b) under which he seeks relief.
Defendant argues that he was operating under the belief that the Complaint in
this matter was actually the Complaint in the previous case, that he was
unaware that a new Complaint had been filed because he had not received it
because he had moved, or, alternatively, that he had requested an extension
from Plaintiff to respond to the Complaint, which was granted.
Defendant’s first argument may be
properly construed as an argument for relief for mistake or excusable neglect
“Excusable neglect is that neglect which might have been the act of a
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.” (Alderman v. Jacobs (1954)
128 Cal.App.2d 273, 276.) Defendant argues that he was mistaken as to the
existence of a new Complaint because the Complaint in this matter is identical
to the Complaint in the previous matter. A review of the Complaint in the 2021
filing shows that, aside from the case number, that Complaint is identical to
the Complaint in this case, right down to the typographical errors. It is
therefore extremely plausible that a self-represented and reasonably prudent
litigant might be confused by the two nearly-identical complaints. However, as
Plaintiff observes in opposition, Defendant has undercut his own argument, as,
on May 9, 2022, Defendant filed a request to waive court fees in this case.
Defendant offers no explanation for why he filed a request to waive court fees
in a matter that he purportedly did not believe existed. The Court therefore
finds that Defendant has failed to show mistake or excusable neglect on this
basis.
Defendant’s second argument is that the
failure to answer the Complaint was because he was unaware of the Complaint due
to having relocated and changed his address. To the extent that this is an
argument that Defendant was not properly served with the Complaint, this argument
is properly brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d) under the
Court’s power to set aside a void judgment. However, Defendant makes no
reference to section 473(d) in his moving papers and does not elaborate on this
argument further. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff did not object to this argument in
opposition, the Court will examine it on the merits.
The court may,
on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void
judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d).) The Court has the inherent power
to set aside a void judgment whether or not it is void on its face. (Rogers
v. Silverman (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1122.) When an application to
vacate and set aside a judgment that is not void on its face, but void in fact,
is made within a reasonable time after its rendition and is based on a
sufficient showing, it is within the power of the court, and its duty, to set
it aside (Smith v. Bratman (1917) 174 Cal. 518, 520.) A judgment or
order is void on its face when its invalidity appears from an examination of
the judgment roll. (People v. Davis (1904) 143 Cal. 673, 676; Carrasco
v. Craft (1985) 164 Cal. App. 3d 796, 808.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b) allows a summons
to be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s . .
. usual place of business . . . in the presence of . . . a person apparently in
charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address . . .
at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by
thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class
mail . . .” This form of service is permitted only when a copy of the summons
cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 451.20(b).)
On May 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a
Proof of Service by substituted service stating that Defendant was served by
substituted service with the Summons and Complaint on April 5, 2022. However, the
Declaration of Diligence included in the Proof of Service states that, on March
29, 2022, the Plaintiff’s process server spoke with an occupant at 736 E.
Sacramento Street in Altadena, who told the process server that Defendant had
recently moved out and his location was unknown. (Proof of Service p. 2.) The
Proof of Service then states that substituted service was effected at the same
address. (Id. p.1.) Plaintiff offered no additional evidence that any
further effort was expended to confirm Defendant’s address. In addition, on May
31, 2022, Defendant filed a Notice of Change of Address dated May 17, 2022 with
a proof of service by mail dated May 18, 2022, stating that Plaintiff no longer
resided at the 736 E. Sacramento Street address. The Court finds that service
was not properly made on Defendant of the Complaint in this action, and the
default entered on May 18, 2022 was therefore void in fact and must be set
aside.
As the Court has found that an
independent basis for relief exists, the Court need not examine Defendant’s
final argument. Nevertheless, the Court notes that Defendant’s argument that an
extension was requested and granted on May 17, 2022 is not supported by
any evidence. Although Defendant states that he requested an extension of time
to respond to the answer on May 17, 2022, Defendant offers no evidence that
this request was ever granted. Even if the Court were to consider Exhibit C, to
which Plaintiff has objected, no evidence is offered showing that any
communication from Plaintiff’s counsel was ever received. Defendant therefore
has not shown that this would be a proper basis to set aside the default.
3.
Diligence in Requesting to Set Aside Default
Defendant does not initially
address the issue of diligence in requesting to set aside a default. However, Plaintiff
also does not argue that Defendant did not exercise adequate diligence in bringing
this motion.
There is an unofficial standard
that, to bring a motion to set aside a default, a motion should be filed within
three months of the party’s discovery of the default. (Benjamin v. Dalmo
Mfg. Co. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 529; Huh v. Wang (2007), 158
Cal.App.4th 1406, 1421-22.) Here, the
default was entered on May 18, 2022, and the motion was filed on June 28, 2022.
The Court finds that Defendant has therefore exercised reasonable diligence in
requesting to set aside the default.
The Court
finds that Defendant, having offered a meritorious case in his defense, having
shown evidence of a valid reason for not defending the case originally, and
having shown evidence of diligence upon discovery of the default, is entitled
to relief from default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.
//
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Sanctions
Plaintiff requests that the Court
impose sanctions on Defendant in the amount of $1,000, pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 473(c)(1)(A). As the Court has granted relief due to
Plaintiff’s improper service of the Complaint, the Court finds that such
sanction would be inappropriate. The Court therefore declines to award the
requested sanctions.
CONCLUSION:
For the reasons explained above, Defendant’s
Motion to Set Aside the default is GRANTED on the condition that Defendant
serve and file the answer by August 26, 2022.
Plaintiff’s request for sanctions
is DENIED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 19, 2022 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.