Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV10105, Date: 2022-10-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV10105 Hearing Date: October 12, 2022 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: October 12, 2022 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET
CASE: JNM, Inc. v. United Valet Parking, Inc.
CASE NO.: 22STCV10105 ![]()
DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO STRIKE
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant United Valet Parking, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff JNM,
Inc.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action for breach of a commercial rental lease to recover
rental arrears that was filed on March 23, 2022.
Defendant demurs to the Complaint
and moves to strike portions of the allegations therein.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Demurrer to the
Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike is
DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant
requests that the Court take judicial notice of Article 14.6 of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code. Defendant’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code
section 452(c) (official acts).
Demurrer to Complaint
Defendant
demurs to the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty.
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other
extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face
of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing
is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states
a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all
facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall
v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields
v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n
demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are
assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the
reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the
defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1238.)
Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer, the
demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party
who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration
detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).)
However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule
or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)
Defendant
included a declaration from Attorney Nicholas Schouten in the body of the
moving papers stating, under penalty of perjury, that the parties met and
conferred by telephone on April 28, 2022, and did not successfully resolve the
matters disputed in this motion. (Declaration of Nicholas Schouten ISO Mot. ¶
2.) Defendant has therefore satisfied the statutory meet and confer
obligations.
Failure to State Facts Sufficient to Constitute a Cause
of Action
Defendant
demurs to the Complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, on the basis that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract by
failure to pay rental arrears is barred by Los Angeles Municipal Code section
49.99.3.
The current
version of Article 14.6 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, effective since May
12, 2020, establishes a set of temporary protections for tenants, both
residential and commercial, within the City of Los Angeles during the ongoing
COVID-19 Pandemic. Section 49.99.3 of the Code states:
During the Local Emergency Period and
for three months thereafter, no Owner shall endeavor to evict or evict a tenant
of Commercial Real Property for non-payment of rent during the Local Emergency
Period if the tenant is unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. These circumstances include loss of business income due to a
COVID-19 related workplace closure, child care expenditures due to school
closures, health care expenses related to being ill with COVID-19 or caring for
a member of the tenant's household or family who is ill with COVID-19, or
reasonable expenditures that stem from government-ordered emergency measures.
Tenants shall have up to three months following the expiration of the Local
Emergency Period to repay any rent deferred during the Local Emergency
Period. Nothing in this article eliminates any obligation to pay lawfully
charged rent. No Owner shall charge interest or a late fee on rent not paid
under the provisions of this article.
(L.A.M.C. § 49.99.3 [emphasis added].)
The “Local Emergency Period” runs
from March 4, 2020 to the end of the local emergency as declared by the Mayor
of the City of Los Angeles. (L.A.M.C. § 49.99.1.C.) Neither party disputes that
the Mayor of Los Angeles has not yet declared an end to the local emergency.
Defendant contends, however, that the Complaint is barred by this code
provision because the Complaint seeks rent incurred after March 4, 2020, which
is still deferred under section 49.99.3. While this is true, a cursory review of the
Complaint shows that the Complaint also seeks damages for unpaid rent due on
January 1, 2020 and February 1, 2020. (See Complaint ¶ BC-2.) No part of
Article 14.6 states that it applies to rent, fees, eviction notices, or
unlawful detainer actions assessed or filed before the commencement of the
Local Emergency Period, and sections 49.99.3 and 49.99.5 both expressly state
that the article does not eliminate any obligation to pay lawfully charged
rent. (See L.A.M.C. § 49.99.5.) Thus, even assuming that the facts alleged
showed that section 49.99.3 applied to rent owed after March 4, 2020 because
Defendant was unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the pandemic,
Plaintiff would nonetheless be entitled to maintain this action for the unpaid
rent from January and February 2020. Defendant has therefore not shown that
Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Uncertainty
Defendant also demurs to the
Complaint in its entirety as uncertain.
A demurrer
for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a pleading is in some
respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures. (See Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only
where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond--i.e.,
he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied,
or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (See Weil &
Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 7:85 (emphasis in
original).) "The objection of uncertainty does not go to the failure to
allege sufficient facts." (Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3
Cal.App.2d 454, 459.)
Defendant
contends that the Complaint is uncertain because Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant breached multiple leases despite apparently alleging that there is
only one operative lease agreement. Defendant’s argument appears to be based on
the limitations inherent in Plaintiff’s use of Form PLD-C-001(1) in the
Complaint, which presumes the existence of a single agreement at issue. This argument
is not remotely sufficient to sustain a demurrer for uncertainty. The Complaint
alleges that Defendant entered into a set of rental agreements for a set of
properties and has failed to pay rent owed on each of them. (See generally
Complaint.) These allegations are sufficient to permit Defendant to determine
what must be admitted or denied and what counts or claims are directed against
it. Defendant has not shown that the Complaint is uncertain.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety.
Motion to Strike
Defendant
moves to strike several allegations in the Complaint on the basis that they are
false, irrelevant, or improper.
Legal
Standard
The court may, upon a motion, or at
any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ.
Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike
are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been
drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§
437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure,
the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to
strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders. Code Civ.
Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to
improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was
filed." Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
509, 528 (emphasis in original).
Meet
and Confer
Before filing a motion to strike,
the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party
who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a
declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., §
435.5(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to
grant or deny a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)
For the reasons stated above,
Defendant has satisfied its statutory meet and confer obligations.
False Matters
Defendant moves to strike
paragraphs 7 in part, 10a in part, and BC-4 of the Complaint as false.
Defendant
specifically moves to strike paragraph 7b of the Complaint, which states
“[t]his court is the proper court because . . . a defendant lived here when the
contract was entered into.” (Complaint ¶ 7b.)
Defendant contends that this allegation is false because Defendant, as a
corporation, does not “live” anywhere. Plaintiff makes no attempt to defend
this allegation. However, the Complaint also names multiple Doe defendants,
who, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, may be individuals
residing in California. (See Complaint ¶ 4b.) Therefore, the Court cannot
construe this allegation as false in the context of the Complaint.
Defendant
also moves to strike paragraph 10a of the Complaint, which states that
Plaintiff prays for damages of $361,239.79. (Complaint ¶ 10a.) Defendant argues
that this allegation is false, for the reasons stated in the arguments
addressed above in connection with the Demurrer. As the Court has rejected that
argument, the Court does not find that this allegation is false and should be
stricken.
Defendant
also moves to strike paragraph BC-4 of the Complaint for the same reason as
paragraph 10a. Paragraph BC-4 states that Plaintiff suffered damages from
Defendant’s breach of contract in the form of unpaid rent of $361,239.79.
(Complaint ¶ BC-4.) For the same reasons described above, the motion to strike
this allegation must also fail.
Irrelevant or Improper Matters
Defendant
also moves to strike paragraphs BC-1 and BC-2 of the Complaint as irrelevant
and improper based on the same arguments made in connection with Defendant’s
Demurrer for Uncertainty. As the Court has rejected these arguments, the Court
does not find that these allegations should be stricken.
Other Allegations
Defendant
also moves to strike paragraph 10b of the Complaint but offers no justification
for why this paragraph should be stricken. Defendant is therefore not entitled
to an order striking this allegation.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
the Motion to Strike is DENIED.
CONCLUSION:
For the reasons explained above, Defendant’s
Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike is
DENIED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 12, 2022 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.