Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 22STCV10105, Date: 2024-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV10105, Date: 2024-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10105 Hearing Date: November 21, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: November 21, 2024 TRIAL DATE: February 3, 2025

CASE: JNM, Inc. v. United Valet Parking, Inc.

CASE NO.: 22STCV10105

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant JNM, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant/Cross-Complainant United Valet Parking, Inc.

CASE HISTORY:

· 03/23/22: Complaint filed.

· 10/25/22: Cross-Complaint filed.

· 07/01/24: Request for Dismissal on all causes of action in the Cross-Complaint as to Cross-Defendant IC Parking Systems.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action for breach of a commercial rental lease to recover rental arrears.

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant JNM, Inc. moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the Complaint and Cross-Complaint in this action.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant JNM, Inc. moves for summary judgment of the Complaint and Cross-Complaint in this action.

As Plaintiff is not entitled to summary adjudication of the sole cause of action in each pleading for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Motion for Summary Adjudication

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of the claims for breach of contract in both the Complaint and the Cross-Complaint.

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment satisfies the initial burden to show that there is no defense to a claim by proving each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) Similarly, the cross-defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) In both cases, Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition is not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a movant cannot meet their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1)-(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Complaint for Breach of Contract

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of its sole cause of action for breach of contract on the grounds that Defendant has admitted the facts necessary to establish each element of the cause of action.

To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) a contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) the defendant’s breach; and (4) resultant damage to the plaintiff. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388.)

On January 1, 2018, Plaintiff, as owner, and Defendant, as tenant, entered into a multi-year lease for the parking lot on the ground floor of the commercial real properties located at 1241 and 1245 S. Hope Street, Los Angeles, CA, excluding the office spaces at the property. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact No.1; Separate Statement of Disputed Fact No. 1.) The base rent for the parking lot lease was $18,000 per month, commencing on the first full month after the tenant took possession, and increasing by 3% on January 1, 2019 and every twelve months thereafter. (SSUMF No. 4; SSDF No. 4.)

On April 19, 2018, the parties executed a second lease agreement whereby Defendant leased a two-story office space from Plaintiff at the 1245 S. Hope Street address, commencing May 1, 2018. (SSUMF Nos. 5-6; SSDF Nos. 5-6.) The base rent for the first office lease was $2,500 per month, with a 3% increase every twelve months from commencement of the lease. (SSUMF No. 7; SSDF No. 7.) Both the parking lot lease and the first office lease were scheduled to end on December 31, 2020. (SSUMF Nos. 3, 6; SSDF Nos. 3, 6.)

On July 17, 2018, the parties executed a third lease agreement whereby Defendant leased another two-story office space from Plaintiff at the 1241 S. Hope Street address, commencing August 1, 2018 and ending December 31, 2021. (SSUMF Nos. 8-9; SSDF Nos. 8-9.) The base rent for the second office lease was $4,500 per month, with a 3% increase every twelve months from commencement of the lease. (SSUMF No. 10; SSDF No. 10.) The same day the parties executed the second office lease, the parties also agreed to extend the parking lot lease and the first office lease to December 31, 2021. (SSUMF Nos. 3, 6; SSDF Nos. 3, 6.) Defendant took possession of all three premises, and remained in possession until February 2022. (SSUMF Nos. 11-13; SSDF Nos. 11-13.)

Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to summary adjudication of this cause of action because the existence of a binding contract is undisputed and because Defendant has admitted in requests for admissions that $361,239.79 in rent has gone unpaid. However, to prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a Plaintiff must also plead and prove that it has performed all of its obligations under the contract, or that it has been excused from doing so. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388.) Although Plaintiff asserts that it has established this element by providing the leased premises to Defendant, Plaintiff fails to address whether it has any other obligations under the lease which might bear on this dispute. As the moving party, Plaintiff bears the burden to establish all the elements of its cause of action, and by failing to sufficiently address this element, Plaintiff has not demonstrated entitlement to summary adjudication of this claim. To the contrary, one of the leases at issue, the Standard Industrial/Commercial Multi-Tenant Lease – Modified Net, expressly imposes on Plaintiff the obligation to “keep in good order, condition and repair the foundations, exterior walls, structural condition of the interior bearing walls, exterior roof,” etc. (Exhibit B, p. 3.) Plaintiff has offered no evidence to demonstrate its satisfactory performance of this key duty, so it has failed to establish a right to summary adjudication that would shift the burden to Defendant.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Complaint is DENIED.

Cross-Complaint for Breach of Contract

Plaintiff, as Cross-Defendant, also moves for summary adjudication of Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s counterclaim for breach of contract.

The sole cause of action asserted against the moving Cross-Defendant alleges that Cross-Defendant failed to keep the property in good condition, which resulted in flooding of the office spaces in January 2021 which Cross-Defendant allegedly did not repair. (Cross-Complaint ¶ BC-2.)

Cross-Defendant first contends that Cross-Complainant cannot prevail on this claim because Cross-Defendant “has no evidence” to support the contention that Cross-Complainant breached the contracts by failing to maintain the roof. (Motion p.12:18.) Cross-Defendant offers no evidence to support this contention and does not set forth any material facts in its Separate Statement to that effect. Bare assertions of the absence of evidence do not carry Cross-Defendant’s burden on this motion.

Second, although Cross-Defendant contends that Cross-Complainant admitted to having never communicated with Cross-Defendant, that assertion is belied by the evidence. (SSUMF No. 19.) Close reading of the deposition of Cross-Complainant’s person most knowledgeable, Kenny Sabet, reveals that the deponent only testified that he did not communicate directly with the landlord, and instead communicated regularly with an individual named “Shawn,” whom the deponent identified as the landlord’s agent. (Declaration of Judy M. Lam ISO Mot. Exh. E. pp. 40:13; 42:9-13; 43:7-44:1.) Cross-Defendant does not explain how this contention bears on the breach of contract claim, but, even assuming its relevance, the evidence merely discloses a triable issue of fact on this point. Cross-Defendant is therefore not entitled to summary adjudication on this basis.

Finally, Cross-Defendant contends that paragraph 8.6 of the operative office lease agreement constitutes a waiver of Cross-Complainant’s damage claim. This provision states that “Lessee and Lessor each hereby release and relieve the other, and their entire right to recover damages (whether in contract or in tort) against the other, for loss or damage to their property arising out of or incident to the perils required to be insured against under paragraph 8.” (SSUMF No. 20; Declaration of Joe Song ISO Mot. Exh. B. ¶ 8.6.) However, Cross-Defendant does not cite any provision of the lease which describes the “perils required to be insured against.” In fact, Paragraph 8.3 appears to expressly exclude flooding from the list of perils which must be covered by the Lessor’s insurance, stating “[if] the coverage is available and commercially appropriate, Lessor’s policy or policies shall insure against all risks of direct physical loss or damage (except the perils of flood and/or earthquake unless required by a Lender) [.]” (Id. ¶ 8.3 [emphasis added].) Because Cross-Defendant has failed to demonstrate the applicability of paragraph 8.6 to the harm alleged by Cross-Complainant, Cross-Defendant has failed to show that Cross-Complainant cannot prevail on this basis.

As none of Cross-Defendant’s arguments against the Cross-Complaint carry its burden to show that Cross-Complainant cannot prevail, the burden does not shift to Cross-Complainant to demonstrate a triable issue of fact. Therefore, Cross-Defendant is not entitled to summary adjudication of the Cross-Complaint.

Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Cross-Complaint is DENIED.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.