Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV10404, Date: 2023-01-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10404    Hearing Date: January 23, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     January 23, 2023                   TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Maria Elizabeth Castaneda v. Brandy Norwood

CASE NO.:                 22STCV10404           

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Maria Elizabeth Castaneda

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Brandy Norwood

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This was a wrongful termination, age discrimination, and wage and hour case that was filed on March 25, 2022.

Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees pursuant to a settlement designating her the prevailing party.  

TENTATIVE RULING:

            Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $31,821.40 in attorney’s fees, plus $805.46 in costs.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to a settlement designating her the prevailing party.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Defendant objects to the evidence provided in support of Plaintiff’s motion. Defendant cites no authority, and the Court is aware of none, which requires the Court to rule on evidentiary objections in the context of a Motion for Attorney’s Fees, as opposed to a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c.) The Court therefore declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections directly. To the extent that the evidence to which Defendant objects is relevant to the Court’s determination, the Court will take Defendant’s objections into consideration in evaluating that evidence.

Entitlement to Fees

Plaintiff brought claims under Labor Code sections 218.4, 226, and 1194, as well as Government Code section 12965, each of which entitle a prevailing party to reasonable attorney’s fees regardless of whether the party prevails by settlement or at trial. (See Lab. Code §§ 218.4, 226, 1194; Gov. Code § 12965.) A settlement agreement is generally subject to the law of contract except where otherwise modified by statute. (See, e.g., Nicholson v. Barab (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1673, 1682.)

Here, a notice of settlement was filed on December 2, 2022. Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s section 998 Offer to Compromise for $40,000, plus attorney’s fees. (Declaration of Thomas A. Schelly. Exh. A.) The offer provided for attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,000 or, alternatively, reasonable attorney’s fees by motion. (Id.) Plaintiff has exercised the option to pursue attorney’s fees by motion. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

Reasonableness of Fees

            Reasonable attorney’s fees are allowable costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc § 1033.5(a)(10), (c)(5)(B).) In actions that are based on a contract, “where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract… shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civil Code § 1717(a) [emphasis added].) A recovery of attorney’s fees is authorized even in noncontractual or tort actions if the contractual provision for fee recovery is worded broadly enough. (See Code Civ. Proc § 10211; Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 993 [agreement to award fees based on outcome of “any dispute” encompasses all claims, “whether in contract, tort or otherwise]; Lockton v. O'Rourke (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1076; Lerner v. Ward (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 155, 160.)

Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the Court and shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(5)(B).) Reasonable attorney’s fees are ordinarily determined by the Court pursuant to the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”  (Ibid.) In setting the hourly rate for a fee award, courts are entitled to consider the “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664.)  The burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to prove the reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.) 

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)  The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-275.)  

            Although Plaintiff provided an itemized list of attorney and paralegal time billed in connection with this case, Plaintiff included this list in the body of the moving papers, not in a declaration filed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff has not provided the complete billing records on this case, nor do the entries provided list the date of billing. Further, although the Declaration of Thomas H. Schelly attests to the veracity of his time entries, justifies his hourly rate of $650 as his usual rate, and sets forth his professional experience, the Declaration of Kevin Lipeles does not justify his hourly rate or attest to the accuracy of his time entries. (See Schelly Decl., Declaration of Kevin A. Lipeles ISO Mot.)  Defendant objects to the time entries billed by Attorney Lipeles as inadequately justified. However, Plaintiff provided a supplemental declaration by Attorney Lipeles addressing his hourly rate and the accuracy of his time entries. (See Declaration of Kevin A. Lipeles ISO Reply ¶¶ 2-3.) The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has cured this defect in the moving papers.

            Turning first to the question of reasonably hourly rates, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s regular billing rates are the best measure of the value of the legal services provided by Plaintiff’s counsel. According to the evidence submitted, these rates are $650 for Plaintiff’s two principal attorneys and $214 for paralegal work.  The Court concludes these rates are reasonable based on the experience and status of Plaintiff’s counsel and adopts them for use in calculating the lodestar in this case. 

            The Court recognizes that Plaintiff bases her primary request on a lodestar calculation using the billing rates in the Laffey matrix, a standard source for determining comparable hourly rates. (Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702.) While this approach is justified in some cases, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to justify application of these rates here.  Indeed, use of the Laffey matrix would inflate Attorneys Schelly and Lipeles’ already substantial market rate to $786 per hour without sufficient evidentiary support for such a boost. 

            The Court next addresses whether the hours worked are reasonable in light of the work performed.  Defendant attacks the accuracy and detail of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries, stating that they are unreasonably inflated considering the relative simplicity of the case and the stated experience of the attorneys involved.

Plaintiff contends her attorneys spent more than 71.1 hours of attorney and paralegal time in litigating this case before it was settled.  Seeking recovery of 60.7 hours of work, Plaintiff’s counsel explains 10.4 hours were actually billed but are not sought in connection with this motion because they were pared off to account for possible duplication of effort and excessive billing. The Court credits that these hours were excised in the proper exercise of billing judgment.  That said, the Court’s review of the hours spent on various tasks and Defendant’s arguments about the excessive time devoted to certain work leads to a conclusion that additional hours should have been trimmed from Plaintiff’s bills before seeking reimbursement as part of a reasonable fee award.  The Court concludes that an addition 10 hours should be shaved off the award to account for excessive time spent on several tasks, including preparing the 7/26/22 meet and confer letter, work done in response to Defendant’s demurrer, correspondence with Plaintiff, and preparation of the attorneys’ fees motion.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff reasonably spent 48.1 attorney hours at $650/hour and 2.6 paralegal hours at $214/hour to litigate this case.  The lodestar amount, thus, comes to $31,821.40. 

            Plaintiff requests that the lodestar be enhanced by a multiplier of 1.8, which would result in an award of $57,278.52, based on the Court’s computed lodestar.  Plaintiff contends that this multiplier is reasonable considering the contingent nature of this action, Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience and knowledge, the Defendant’s celebrity status, and the favorable result achieved for Plaintiff. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s request for a lodestar enhancement, finding that she has failed to demonstrate entitlement to any increase in fees.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s star status warrants a boost in the fee award.  The Court is not convinced.  Indeed, it may be that an early settlement pegged to the level of Plaintiff’s wage loss was available early in the case because a celebrity like Defendant would want to end an unflattering lawsuit rapidly to keep it out of the public eye. 

Further, the Court does not accept Plaintiff’s counsel contention that they took on substantial risk in representing Plaintiff on a contingency basis.  It is true that multipliers for successful representation on a contingency basis have been awarded. (See, e.g., Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 352.)  In this case, however, Plaintiff has not proven any substantial risks undertaken. Settling within 5 or 6 months of filing does not demonstrate risk.  Instead, prosecuting such a case through discovery battles, motions practice and preparations for trial shows legal representation that embraces risk despite the contingent character of receiving fees.

            While the amount recovered for the client does not place a necessary limit on the amount of fees that should be awarded, this comparison is useful in determining whether the fees sought, including a possible enhancement, are justified by the result obtained.  Here, the result obtained – a payment of $40,000 just a few months after filing – is quite modest.  In contrast, Plaintiff’s top fee request is more than twice the amount received by Plaintiff in settlement of her claims, and the 1.8 enhancement of the Court’s lodestar calculation would result in a fee award that is nearly 50 percent higher than Plaintiff’s settlement recovery.

            Nor do the other factors identified by Plaintiff support a multiplier.  The level of expertise exhibited by Plaintiff’s counsel – even putting aside Defendant’s broadside attacks on their performance – is amply accounted for in the substantial hourly rates they have sought as their market rates.  Further, there were no novel, difficult or complicated issues confronted in this case, and very little actual litigation before the matter was resolved in an early settlement. 

While the kind of sue-and-settle approach pursued here does involve a small measure of risk, taking into account the modest settlement and the other relevant factors, the Court cannot conclude that a multiplier is appropriate here.     

            As Defendant does not contest the amount of costs requested, the Court will award the requested $805.46 in costs.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $31,821.40 in attorney’s fees, plus $805.46 in costs.

            Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2023                                 ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.