Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV13087, Date: 2023-12-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV13087 Hearing Date: December 20, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: December 20, 2023 TRIAL DATE: March
12, 2024
CASE: Albert Santa v. Sky Asset Management
Group, et al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV13087
MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE COMPULSORY CROSS-COMPLAINT
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Sky Asset Management Group and Sky
Remodeling, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Albert
Santa
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment
discrimination action that was filed on April 19, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that
his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his religion and
retaliated against him for complaining about being assaulted by a co-worker.
Defendants move for leave to file a
compulsory cross-complaint.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to
File Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.
The
Proposed Cross-Complaint filed on October 26, 2023, is deemed filed this date.
DISCUSSION:
Defendants
Sky Asset Management Group and Sky Remodeling, Inc. move for leave to file a
cross-complaint against Plaintiff and proposed Cross-Defendant Janeth Ortega.
Compulsory Cross-Complaint
Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the
party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the
complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(a).) Parties seeking to file untimely
compulsory cross-complaints may seek leave from the Court to do so, even though
the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake,
neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.) In such a case, after
notice to the adverse party, the Court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint
if the party acted in good faith. This section is liberally construed to avoid
forfeiture of causes of action. (Id.)
The purpose of the compulsory cross-complaint statute is to
prevent piecemeal litigation. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) Compulsory cross-complaints consist of those causes of
action existing at the time of service of the answer that the defendant must
bring against the plaintiff, or else forfeit the right to bring them in any
other action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30(a).) Specifically, compulsory
cross-complaints consist of the causes of action that “arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action
which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).)
To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term
“transaction”—it is “‘not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . .
. but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated.’” (Align
Technology, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 960.)
A motion
to file a compulsory cross-complaint at any time during the course of the
action must be granted where forfeiture would otherwise result, unless the
moving party engaged in bad faith conduct. (Silver Organizations Ltd. v.
Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.) The determination that the moving
party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.;
Foot’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d
897, 902 [“We conclude that this principle of liberality requires that a strong
showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file
a cross-complaint under this section”].) “Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect,
mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless
accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver Organizations Ltd, supra,
217 Cal.App.3d at 99)
Rather, bad faith is “defined as ‘[t]he opposite of “good faith,” generally
implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or
deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some
contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . . , but by some
interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence,
but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or ill will.’” (Id. at 100.)
Here, Defendants seek leave to file a
Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff alleging claims for breach of the employment
contract and the rental agreement, account stated and open book account, and
intentional misrepresentation. Defendants concede that their answer was filed
on July 14, 2022. (Declaration of Ashkan Ashour ¶ 2.) Defendants state that
they were not able to obtain necessary information to file the proposed
Cross-Complaint until September 8, 2023, when Plaintiff divulged information
which allegedly establishes that Plaintiff breached his employment contract.
(Ashour Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendants do not state what information was already known
or what those admissions were. However, the proposed Cross-Complaint alleges
that Plaintiff worked excess hours without authorization, did not report
necessary information to management, harassed a tenant who reported his
misconduct, and remained in the manager’s unit after termination. (Ashour Decl.
Exh. A. ¶ 19.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues
that the proposed Cross-Complaint is not a compulsory cross-complaint because
Defendants filed a separate unlawful detainer action purportedly seeking the
same relief. (See Declaration of Kristina Unanyan ISO Opp. Exh. 2.) Plaintiff
relies on Flynn v. Page for this argument, in which the Court of Appeal
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
file a compulsory cross-complaint where the causes of action had been pled and
dismissed in a separate action. (Flynn v. Page (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d
342, 347.) Plaintiff argues that the unlawful detainer action seeks the same
remedies and should therefore be construed as alleging the same causes of
action. (Compare Unanyan Decl. Exh. 2, Ashour Decl. Exh. A.)
Nothing in Flynn supports the position
that “cause of action” should be conflated with “remedy sought.” In applying
statutory law, the Court is obligated to interpret the actual words of the
statute by “assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing
them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the
Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs.” (Even
Zohar Constr. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61
Cal. 4th 830, 837-838.) The plain meaning of a “cause of action” does not mean
merely the remedy sought but the nature of the primary right which has been
injured and the legal theory entitling a party to that remedy. (See, e.g.,
CAUSE OF ACTION, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).) It is well-settled
that in an unlawful detainer action, “only the right to possession is in
issue.” (Fish Construction Co. v. Moselle Coach Works, Inc. (1983) 148
Cal.App.4th 654, 658.) The proposed Cross-Complaint does not seek possession of
the property that is the subject of the unlawful detainer claim. (See Ashour
Decl. Exh. A.) Moreover, the proposed Cross-Complaint also alleges separate
violations of Plaintiff’s employment agreement that were not at issue in the
unlawful detainer action, which only alleges a failure to pay rent. (Compare
Ashour Decl. Exh. A. ¶ 19, Unanyan Decl. Exh. 2. 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Quit.) Thus, the unlawful detainer action cannot be construed as having pled
the same causes of action asserted in the proposed Cross-Complaint.
Plaintiff
also asserts that Defendants did not act in good faith, but offers no evidence
for this claim beyond an assertion by Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendants have
long possessed all the information alleged in the Cross-Complaint. (Unanyan
Decl. ¶ 10.) Unsupported assertions by counsel are not evidence of bad faith
conduct by Defendants, and Plaintiff offers nothing that would tend to
establish any improper motive. The Court therefore finds that leave to file the
compulsory cross-complaint against Plaintiff should be granted.
Joinder of Janneth Ortega
Defendants’
proposed cross-complaint seeks to add Janneth Ortega as a cross-defendant in
this action. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 428.20:
[w]hen a person files a cross-complaint
as authorized by Section 428.10, he may join any person as a cross-complainant
or cross-defendant, whether or not such person is already a party to the
action, if, had the cross-complaint been filed as an independent action, the
joinder of that party would have been permitted by the statutes governing
joinder of parties.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 428.20.) A compulsory cross-complaint is
necessarily a cross-complaint authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section
428.10. (Compare Code Civ. Proc. §§ 426.10, 426.30, 428.10.)
Joinder of defendants
is governed by section 379, which states that:
(a)
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them:
(1) Any right to relief jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law
or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or
(2) A claim, right, or interest in the
property or controversy which is the subject of the action.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 379(a).)
Defendants do not directly address
this issue in their papers. However, the Court observes that the proposed
Cross-Complaint alleges that the both Plaintiff and the proposed
Cross-Defendant were hired as property managers for the subject property.
(Ashour Decl. Exh. 2 ¶¶ 7-8.) The Court also observes that most of the
allegations in the Cross-Complaint treat the Cross-Defendants as a unit, and,
further, that the allegations all revolve around the Cross-Defendants’ conduct
in that role. (Ashour Decl. Exh. 2. ¶¶ 12-5.) The Court therefore finds that the
proposed Cross-Complaint asserts rights to relief arising out of the same series
of occurrences as the individuals who are already a party to this case.
Defendants may therefore join Janneth Ortega as a Cross-Defendant.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.
The
Proposed Cross-Complaint filed on October 26, 2023 is deemed filed this date.
Moving
Parties to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 20,
2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
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should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
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have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.