Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case 22STCV25984 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV25984, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV25984 Hearing Date: March 8, 2023 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: March 8, 2023 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Timothy S. Murakami v. Joyce Yukiko Uyeda et al.

CASE NO.: 22STCV25984

DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Joyce Yukiko Uyeda

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Timothy S. Murakami

CASE HISTORY:

· 08/11/22: Complaint filed.

· 11/14/22: First Amended Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action for breach of contract that was filed on August 11, 2022. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Uyeda breached an implied-in-fact agreement to place Plaintiff on the title for the property in which they resided in exchange for Plaintiff’s coverage of mortgage payments.

Defendant Uyeda demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant Uyeda demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

The Declaration of James A. Kim states that he sent Plaintiff’s counsel written correspondence on December 13, 2022 raising the issues identified in the demurrer, and that he received a reply the next day that disputed the arguments raised. (Declaration of James A. Kim ISO Demurrer ¶ 3.) Defendant does not provide copies of this correspondence, nor any further detail regarding the discussion between the parties. Further, a single exchange of emails or letters is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory obligation to engage in a good-faith effort to informally resolve the disputes presented in this demurrer. The Court therefore finds that Defendant has not satisfied her statutory obligations. That said, the Court will nevertheless address the motion on its merits.

Uncertainty

Defendant demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety as uncertain.

A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a pleading is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (See Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond--i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (See Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 7:85 (emphasis in original).) "The objection of uncertainty does not go to the failure to allege sufficient facts." (Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 459.)

Defendant appears to base this contention on purportedly contradictory factual allegations and a failure to allege certain facts concerning the nature of the agreement at issue. Defendant therefore appears to be arguing that the First Amended Complaint is uncertain because it is devoid of necessary facts—an argument which is expressly invalid with respect to a demurrer for uncertainty. (Brea, supra, 3 Cal.App.2d at 459.) Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is uncertain.

Labor Code Section 221

Defendant also demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it improperly seeks to recover wages as money damages. Defendant bases this contention entirely on Labor Code section 221, which states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or receive from an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer to said employee.” (Lab. Code § 221.) However, it is well-settled that the purpose of this section is ”to prevent employers from secret deductions or kickbacks to pay employees less than their stated wages.” (Koehl v. Verio, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1337.) Even if the Court were to accept Defendant’s contention that the funds at the center of this dispute are wages—a presumption to which Defendant is not entitled on a demurrer -- nothing in this section nor in the case law applying the statute provide any basis for Defendant’s position. Defendant cites no precedent demonstrating that section 221 prohibits an action to recover money damages because the money sought was paid to the defendant as wages. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is defective on this basis.

Promissory Estoppel

Defendant argues that the First Amended Complaint is insufficient as to a claim of promissory estoppel. As Plaintiff does not allege a cause of action for promissory estoppel, this argument is entirely without merit.

Statute of Frauds

Defendant also demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it is barred by the statute of frauds. Defendant contends that this action is barred because it is based on an oral contract for a transfer of an interest in real property.

Under the statute of frauds, codified in section 1624 of the Civil Code, certain transactions, including, as relevant here, an agreement for the leasing or sale of an interest in real property, must be reduced to writing and subscribed by the party to be charged to be enforceable. (Civ. Code § 1624(a)(3).) However, equitable estoppel permits enforcement of an oral agreement to prevent fraud when one party has detrimentally relied on an oral promise or another party has been unjustly enriched. (Juran v. Epstien (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 892). Equitable estoppel may preclude a statute of frauds defense. (Byrne v. Laura (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068). Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in a given case is a question of fact. (Id.)

Defendant contends that the statute of frauds bars this action and that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged part performance as a defense to the statute of frauds. However, Defendant ignores that Plaintiff specifically pleads of equitable estoppel as a defense to enforcement of the statute of frauds. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 47.) As Defendant makes no effort to address this defense in her moving papers, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is defective on this basis.

Cohabitant Agreement

Defendant also demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it fails to adequately allege an agreement between unmarried cohabitants. Defendant’s sole authority in support of this argument is a non-specific citation to Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660. Defendant does not identify the manner in which the First Amended Complaint is in conflict with this precedent. Further, Defendant’s reply brief offers no further legal authority in support of her contentions. As the moving party, Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the defects in the pleading. Defendant has not done so. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is defective on this basis.

Statute of Limitations

Defendant also demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it is barred by the statute of limitations. Claims for breach of an oral contract have a two-year statute of limitations. (Civ. Code § 339(1).) The statute of limitations begins to run at the time of breach. (Cochran v. Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1124.)

Here, Defendant contends that the statute of limitations has lapsed because the First Amended Complaint alleges that, despite having allegedly paid Defendant since 2011 to cover the mortgage and living expenses, Defendant never, in that time, added Plaintiff to the title of the subject property. According to Defendant, the statute of limitations began to run in 2011. However, in opposition, Plaintiff argues that the breach only occurred in 2021 once the parties ended their romantic relationship, transforming Defendant’s incomplete performance into non-performance. (See FAC ¶¶ 34-38.) As the Complaint was filed in August 2022, the statute of limitations would therefore not bar this action. Construing all allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as required on demurrer, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately set forth a plausible theory under which the statute of limitations does not bar recovery. The Court therefore finds that the First Amended Complaint does not fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action on this basis.

Unclean Hands

Defendant also demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety as failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because the doctrine of unclean hands bars Plaintiff’s recovery.

The doctrine of unclean hands prohibits a party from recovering against another when that party has themselves engaged in some wrongful or unfair act. (See, e.g. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 CCal.App.4th 970, 978.) Whether the defense of unclean hands applies “depends on the analogous case law, the nature of the misconduct, and the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 56.) The misconduct in question “must prejudicially affect the rights of the person against whom relief is sought so that it would be inequitable to grant such relief.” (Wiley v. Wiley (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 840, 842.) Application of the doctrine of unclean hands is generally a question of fact. (Crosstalk Productions, Inc. v. Jacobson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 631, 639.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff concedes in the First Amended Complaint that he was engaged in wrongful conduct because he arranged with Defendant not to record his name on the title for the subject property because a tax lien had been imposed on him. According to Defendant, Plaintiff admits that he was attempting to avoid enforcement of that lien against him. However, as Plaintiff states in opposition, even if Defendant’s contention is true, Defendant does not state, either in her moving papers or her reply brief, how she was prejudiced by Plaintiff’s purported misconduct such that equity should bar his recovery. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is defective on this basis.

As Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the First Amended Complaint is uncertain or fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2023 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.