Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV25984, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 22STCV25984    Hearing Date: May 11, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     May 11, 2023                                     TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

                                                          

CASE:                         Timothy S. Murakami v. Joyce Yukiko Uyeda et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 22STCV25984           

 

MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Joyce Yukiko Uyeda

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Timothy S. Murakami

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is an action for breach of contract commenced on August 11, 2022.  Iin his First Amended Complaint filed on November 14, 2022, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Uyeda breached an implied-in-fact agreement to place Plaintiff on the title for the property in which they resided in exchange for Plaintiff’s coverage of mortgage payments.

 

            Defendant Uyeda moves to expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action recorded by Plaintiff on the subject property.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

            Defendant’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens is DENIED.

 

            Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in the amount of $2,400. Payment is to be made within 30 days of this order.

 

DISCUSSION:

 

            Defendant Uyeda moves to expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action recorded by Plaintiff on the subject property.

 

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Legal Standard

 

A lis pendens is a recorded document that gives constructive notice that an action affecting title or right to possession of real property has been filed, and may be filed by any party that asserts a real property claim to that real property. (Kirkeby v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 647.) A person with an interest in the affected real property can petition the court to expunge the lis pendens. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.30.) The court must order the lis pendens expunged if it finds that (a) there is no real property claim, (b) the claimant did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim, or (c) adequate relief can be secured by giving an undertaking. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 405.31- 405.33.) A real property claim is a cause of action that, if successful, would affect title to or the right of possession of specific real property or the use of an easement identified in a pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.4.) 

 

Failure to Plead Real Property Claim

 

Defendant brings this motion on the basis that the First Amended Complaint does not allege a real property claim.

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 405.31 requires expungement of a lis pendens “if the court finds that the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.31.) As our Supreme Court has stated:

 

In making this determination, the court must engage in a demurrer-like analysis. Rather than analyzing whether the pleading states any claim at all, as on a general demurrer, the court must undertake the more limited analysis of whether the pleading states a real property claim. Review involves only a review of the adequacy of the pleading and normally should not involve evidence from either side, other than possibly that which may be judicially noticed as on a demurrer.

 

(Kirkeby v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 647-48 [internal citations and quotations omitted].) Unlike most other motions, the burden of proof in a motion to expunge lis pendens is on the party opposing the motion, who must show the existence of the real property claim. (Id. at 647.)

 

1.      Validity of Claim

 

Defendant contends that the First Amended Complaint does not allege a valid real property claim, and that the only agreement alleged related to the payment of Defendant’s salary for services rendered at Plaintiff’s firm. A cursory review of the allegations as pled disproves this contention. According to the allegations, Plaintiff began paying Defendant money to make the mortgage payments on the property to keep the property as a home for both of them. (FAC ¶ 14.) Plaintiff ultimately chose to pay Defendant a “salary” from his law practice, for which Defendant was not required to perform services at Plaintiff’s law practice. (¶¶ 16-17.) What services Defendant did perform were allegedly of very limited value and done sporadically. (18.) Plaintiff’s payments were made on the expectation that he would be entitled to an ownership interest in the property. (¶ 24.) Between 2017 and 2021, Defendant repeatedly told Plaintiff that the property belonged to them equally. (¶¶ 27-32.) Further, Defendant specifically promised Plaintiff in 2017 that he would be added to the title as an equal owner within a reasonable time after the extinguishment of Plaintiff’s tax lien which was expected to occur in 2020 (¶ 30), and reiterated that promise in March 2021 when the lien was actually extinguished. (¶ 32.)

 

In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that money paid to Defendant was intended to purchase an interest in the property. Defendant relies on a misreading of Evidence Code § 662, which requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the owner of legal title to property is the owner of full beneficial title. (Evid. Code § 662.) Plaintiff is not alleging, however, that he has an ownership interest in the property, but rather that he is entitled to such an interest that has not been conveyed by Defendant’s breach of their agreement. Further, extrinsic evidence is outside the scope of the inquiry raised on this motion, pursuant to Kirkeby. (Ibid, 33 Cal.4th at 647-48.) Defendant’s conclusory argument that the payments made are “more reasonably interpreted” as wage payments is similarly unpersuasive, and without support from any authority for such a presumption.

 

2.      Statute of Frauds

 

            Defendant next argues that any implied-in-fact agreement alleged by Plaintiff is barred by the statute of frauds.

 

            Under the statute of frauds, codified in section 1624 of the Civil Code, certain transactions, including, as relevant here, an agreement for the leasing or sale of an interest in real property, must be reduced to writing and subscribed by the party to be charged to be enforceable. (Civ. Code § 1624(a)(3).)  However, equitable estoppel permits enforcement of an oral agreement to prevent fraud when one party has detrimentally relied on an oral promise or another party has been unjustly enriched. (Juran v. Epstien (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 892). Equitable estoppel may preclude a statute of frauds defense when the party asserting the defense induced the other to change their position in reliance on the contract. (Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068). Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in a given case is a question of fact. (Id.)

 

            Here, the First Amended Complaint specifically pleads equitable estoppel as a defense to the statute of frauds. (FAC ¶ 47.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant promised Plaintiff an equal ownership interest numerous times (¶¶ 27-32, 47), and that Plaintiff relied on these promises in numerous payments to Defendant to pay off the mortgage. (¶ 47.) Despite Defendant’s assertions to the contrary, these allegations constitute definite promises made by Defendant to Plaintiff, not merely “Plaintiff’s unilateral understandings.” (Opp. p. 10:14.)

 

            The Court notes that the pleadings and moving papers also reference part performance as an alternative defense to the statute of frauds. (See Byrne, supra,52 Cal.App.4th at 1071-72.) As equitable estoppel is an independent defense to the statute of frauds, and Plaintiff has adequately pled that defense, the Court does not address the adequacy of the part performance defense. (Id. at 1072.)

 

3.      Unclean Hands

 

            Defendant’s final argument is that the doctrine of unclean hands bars this action, repeating an argument previously raised on demurrer.

 

            The doctrine of unclean hands prohibits a party from recovering against another when that party has themselves engaged in some wrongful or unfair act. (See, e.g. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 CCal.App.4th 970, 978.) Whether the defense of unclean hands applies “depends on the analogous case law, the nature of the misconduct, and the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 56.) The misconduct in question “must prejudicially affect the rights of the person against whom relief is sought so that it would be inequitable to grant such relief.” (Wiley v. Wiley (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 840, 842.) Application of the doctrine of unclean hands is generally a question of fact. (Crosstalk Productions, Inc. v. Jacobson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 631, 639.)

 

            Defendant contends that Plaintiff concedes in the First Amended Complaint that he was engaged in wrongful conduct because he arranged with Defendant not to record his name on the title for the subject property because a tax lien had been imposed on him. According to Defendant, Plaintiff admits that he was attempting to avoid enforcement of that lien against him. Defendant also contends that she would be prejudiced because she paid taxes on the money she received because they were recorded as wages, and asserts, without supporting authority, that she would owe no taxes if the money was not for wages.

 

            The Court does not find this argument compelling. As the doctrine of unclean hands is generally a question of fact, the Court does not think it appropriate for resolution under the demurrer-like examination of section 405.31. (Kirkeby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 647-48; Crosstalk Productions, Inc., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at 639.) Further, Defendant’s claimed injury by Plaintiff’s conduct does not, in the Court’s view, rise to the level of prejudicially affecting her rights such that it would be inequitable to grant Plaintiff the relief sought.

 

            For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a valid real property claim.

 

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Invalidity of Lis Pendens

 

            Defendant also purports to bring this motion on the basis that the lis pendens does not comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure § 405.23. However, Defendant does not elaborate on this argument either in her moving papers or her reply brief. The Court therefore declines to address this argument.

 

Attorney’s Fees

 

            Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in connection with this motion as the prevailing party in the amount of $6,800.00.

 

            Code of Civil Procedure § 405.38 states:

 

The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 405.38.)

 

            Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $6,800 based on 6 hours of attorney time at $400.00 per hour, plus two anticipated hours at the same rate, plus an additional $3,600 in fees incurred in connection with the previous motion to expunge in this case, which was mooted by the filing of the First Amended Complaint. (Declaration of Carol L. Newman ISO Opp. ¶¶ 2-3, 5.) Plaintiff are not entitled to attorney’s fees on a motion for which they were not the prevailing party. Further, the Court is not inclined to award fees and costs not actually incurred. The Court therefore reduces the fee award to $2,400, reflecting the fees actually incurred.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens is DENIED.

 

            Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in the amount of $2,400. Payment is to be made within 30 days of this order.

 

            Moving Party to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:  May 11, 2023                         ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.