Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV31101, Date: 2023-11-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV31101 Hearing Date: November 29, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: November 29, 2023 TRIAL DATE: NOT
SET
CASE: Barton, Klugman & Oetting, LLP
CASE NO.: 22STCV31101 ![]()
MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Yaniv Yasmeh
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Barton,
Klugman & Oetting, LLP
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action for breach of contract that was filed on September 22,
2022. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to make payments pursuant to a
contract between Plaintiff and their predecessor in interest, Bruce Yasmeh.
Defendant Yaniv Yasmeh moves to set
aside a default and default judgment taken against him.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Yasmeh’s Motion to Set
Aside Default and Default Judgment is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendant Yaniv Yasmeh moves to set
aside a default and default judgment taken against him.
Timing of Service
Defendant’s
motion was served by email on October 22, 2023 for a hearing on November 15,
2023. (Proof of Service.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b) requires that
any regularly noticed motion be served 16 court days in advance of the hearing.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).) That time is extended by an additional two court
days if service is made electronically. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6.) Thus, for a
hearing on November 15, 2023, the deadline to serve a notice of motion by
electronic service was Thursday, October 19, 2023. That said, the Court
continued the matter on its own motion to November 29, 2023 due to congestion
of the Court’s calendar. Thus, the issue of service of the motion is moot.
Moreover, as Plaintiff was able to respond to the motion despite insufficient
notice, it appears that the defect in service was not material. The Court will
therefore consider the motion on its merits.
Analysis
Defendant Yaniv Yasmeh moves to set
aside a default and default judgment taken against him based on a purported
mistake by his counsel.
The mandatory relief provision of Code
of Civil Procedure section 473(b)
states:
Notwithstanding any other requirements
of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no
more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is
accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by
the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a
default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered
against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal
was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).)
Defendant, previously a self-represented
litigant, failed to file an answer before a default was taken against him.
Defendant purportedly retained the services of his current counsel on May 5,
2023, but the substitution of attorney was not filed until May 10, 2023. (See
Substitution of Attorney.) Although the declaration of Defendant’s counsel
states in conclusory fashion that the default judgment was obtained as
the result of his mistake, Defendant’s motion is silent as to the underlying
default. (See Declaration of Leslie S. McAfee ISO Mot. ¶ 2.) This is not
surprising as Defendant’s papers state that he was self-represented at the time
the default was taken. (Id. ¶ 2.) The mandatory relief provision of
section 473(b) plainly states that relief is not available if “the default
. . . was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b) [emphasis added].) Defendant has
effectively conceded that this is precisely the case.
Defendant offers numerous arguments
in reply that were not raised in the original motion. First, Defendant argues
that the “attorney fault” that is at issue is a purported representation by Plaintiffs
that they would not pursue a default while the parties took their dispute to a
religious arbiter. A representation by the opposing party is not a basis for
relief under the mandatory relief provision of section 473(b). Such relief is
only available when an attorney’s misconduct prejudices his own client.
Regardless of the nature of this dispute, Defendant is not the client of
Plaintiffs or their counsel with respect to this action. Further, religious
proceedings are irrelevant to this action, and it would likely be
unconstitutional for this Court to consider them at all. (Cal. Const. Art. I §
4; see also U.S. Const. Amend. I.)
Second, Defendant argues that he
was not properly served with the Summons and Complaint. This is an argument
that the default and default judgment are void under section 473(d), or,
alternatively, that the default and default judgment should be set aside under
section 473.5. As neither provision was identified in Defendant’s Notice of
Motion as a claimed basis for relief, these arguments are improper.
Defendant has not demonstrated that
the default was taken against him through the mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or neglect of his counsel. The Court therefore finds that the mandatory relief
provision of section 473(b) does not authorize relief in these circumstances.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendant Yasmeh’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment is DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 29, 2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.