Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV36101, Date: 2023-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV36101    Hearing Date: October 25, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     October 25, 2023                   TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

                                                          

CASE:                         Mayra Lemus, et al. v. General Motors, LLC

 

CASE NO.:                 22STCV36101           

 

DEMMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT COMPLAINT; MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant General Motors, LLC

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Mayra Lemus and Martin Sanchez Hernandez

 

CASE HISTORY:

·         11/15/22: Complaint filed.

·         07/14/23: First Amended Complaint filed.

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is a lemon law action filed on November 15, 2022. Plaintiffs purchased a 2021 Chevrolet Colorado which they subsequently discovered was equipped with a transmission system that is known to Defendant be incurably defective in design.

 

Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment and moves to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

            Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

            Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

 

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DISCUSSION:

 

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

 

            Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment in the First Amended Complaint.

 

Legal Standard

 

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

 

Meet and Confer

 

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) That said, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

 

The Declaration of Jesse Valencia in support of the demurrer states that the parties met and conferred on July 31, 2023 via telephone regarding this demurrer and the simultaneous motion to strike, but were not able to reach an agreement. (Declaration of Jesse Valencia ISO Demurrer ¶ 3.) The Court therefore finds that Defendant has satisfied the statutory meet and confer process.

 

Analysis

 

            Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)  

 

The elements of fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) intent to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of fact. (Hambridge v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.)  

 

1.      Representations

 

            Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action fails because they do not allege any misrepresentations by Defendant or its agents. This contention neglects that Plaintiffs allege a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, not ordinary fraudulent misrepresentation. Defendants have therefore failed to demonstrate that the fifth cause of action is defective on this basis.

 

2.      Duty to Disclose

 

Defendant next argues that it had no duty to disclose any defect because it had no transactional relationship with Plaintiffs.

 

There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material fact.” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) A duty to disclose may also arise when a defendant possesses or exerts control over material facts not readily available to the plaintiff. (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1199.)  

 

“Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1384.)  

 

            Defendant argues that this cause of action fails because, although the First Amended Complaint contends that Defendant had exclusive knowledge of and actively concealed material facts from Plaintiffs, the First Amended Complaint does not allege a transactional relationship between the parties. Ordinarily, a duty to disclose absent a fiduciary relationship “presupposes the existence of [a] relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311.) Defendant contends that because Defendant is the manufacturer of Plaintiff’s vehicle, there was not a “direct dealing” between the parties that gives rise to a duty to disclose. (See Bigler-Engler, supra, at 311.) Defendant is mistaken.

 

            Although a manufacturer does not have a transactional relationship with the “public at large” (Bigler-Engler, supra, at 311), a vendor does have a duty to disclose material facts “not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.” (OCM Principle Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-60.) Here, the essential allegation is that Plaintiffs are not members of the public at large, but a subsequent purchaser of a product manufactured by Defendant. Existing precedent does not require Plaintiffs to allege any further relationship with the manufacturer of the vehicle exhibiting the defects giving rise to this action.

 

Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

 

            Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the basis that the fourth cause of action for fraud is without merit, and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of malice or oppression. As the Court has overruled Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for fraud, this argument necessarily fails.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

            Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

 

            Moving Party to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:  October 25, 2023                                ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.