Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV36600, Date: 2024-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV36600    Hearing Date: January 17, 2024    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     January 17, 2024                   TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

                                                          

CASE:                         Walid Muhammad v. Elizabeth Yang, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 22STCV36600           

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants Tommy SF Wang and Wang IP Law Group, P.C.

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Walid Muhammad

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is a professional negligence action that was filed on November 18, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed numerous errors in filing a trademark application on Plaintiff’s behalf, including, inter alia, filing the mark under the wrong class. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to settle a trademark infringement action against Nike, Inc. for less than would have otherwise been possible.

 

            Defendants Tommy SF Wang and Wang IP Law Group, P.C. demur to the Complaint in its entirety as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendants Tommy SF Wang and Wang IP Law Group, P.C.’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

DISCUSSION:

 

Defendants Tommy SF Wang and Wang IP Law Group, P.C. demur to the Complaint in its entirety as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 

Legal Standard

 

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

 

Meet and Confer

 

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

 

The Declaration of Marta Alcumbrac attached to the motion states that counsel for the parties met and conferred telephonically on July 7, 2023 and on July 21, 2023, as well as via email on July 17, 2023 and July 20, 2023. (Declaration of Marta Alcumbrac ISO Demurrer ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants have therefore satisfied their statutory meet and confer obligations.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

            Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Complaint filed in the action IFIMAKEIT Clothing Co. v. Nike Inc. in U.S. District Court D. NJ Case No. 2:20-cv-17893-JMV-JBC; (2) the Motion to Dismiss in that action filed on April 19, 2021; (3) the Petition for Cancellation of the Mark in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office filed by Nike on July 16, 2021, Docket No. 247958-277; (4) a Request for Extension of Time to Respond to the Petition, filed August 26, 2021; and (5) the Docket for the U.S. PTO matter involving Nike and Plaintiff, case No. 92077618.

 

Plaintiff objects to the documents as not relevant, improperly offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein, and not authenticated. The Court concurs with Plaintiff that the documents are not properly authenticated, nor are they certified copies of court or administrative records. (See Ross v. Creel Printing &Publishing Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 743.) Moreover, the documents are not relevant to the matter before the Court because they cannot establish that Plaintiff suffered an actual injury so as to lift the tolling period for Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, as described infra. Accordingly, Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice are DENIED. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 (“[J]udicial notice . . . is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”].) 

 

Analysis

 

Defendants Tommy SF Wang and Wang IP Law Group, P.C. demur to the Complaint in its entirety on the grounds that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 

            Legal malpractice actions are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which provides in relevant part:

 

(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first. [. . . ] Except for a claim for which the plaintiff is required to establish the plaintiff's factual innocence, the time for commencement of legal action shall not exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled during the time that any of the following exist:

 

(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury.

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a)(1).) These provisions, taken together, effectively state that a claim for professional negligence does not accrue until the plaintiff sustains actual injury. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 751.) The test for “actual injury” is “whether the plaintiff has sustained any damages compensable in an action, other than one for actual fraud, against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission arising in the performance of professional services.” (Id.)

 

            Defendants argue that this action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations because Plaintiff admitted to having discovered the alleged wrongful act more than one year before this action was filed. The Complaint alleges that Defendants committed several errors in filing a trademark application on Plaintiff’s behalf, including, inter alia, by filing the mark under the wrong class. (Complaint ¶¶ 11-13, 15.) According to the pleadings, Plaintiff subsequently sued Nike Inc. for infringing on Plaintiff’s trademark by using the mark on shoes. (Id. ¶ 12.) Nike argued that the Mark was not enforceable because it was filed under a class that did not cover footwear and was based on an inaccurate Statement of Use and therefore void ab initio. (¶ 13.)

 

            According to Defendants, Nike filed a Petition for Cancellation of the Mark on July 16, 2021. (RJN Exh. C.) Defendants argue that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the Petition for Cancellation was filed because the Petition placed Plaintiff on actual or constructive notice of the deficiencies in the Trademark Application. Thus, Defendants contend, since Plaintiff did not file this action until November 2022, the statute of limitations expired before the Complaint was filed. Even if the Court were to take judicial notice of these filings, they would not be relevant to this line of argument. The one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions does not run until the plaintiff suffers actual injury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a)(1); Jordache, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 751.) It is not sufficient to argue that Plaintiff had actual notice of the deficiencies more than one year before filing the Complaint; Defendants must establish that Plaintiff was injured more than one year before filing the Complaint.

 

            Defendants contend that Plaintiff was injured with the filing of the Petition for Cancellation on July 16, 2021, notwithstanding the allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff’s injury was sustained when the infringement action settled in November 2022. (Complaint ¶ 14.) Defendants cite no authority—and the Court is aware of none—standing for the proposition that the filing of a claim constitutes a legal injury. It is true that “actual injury” does not necessarily require some form of final adjudication such as judgment or settlement. (Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 591.) Were the Court to adopt Defendants’ position, any petition or claim for relief filed by anyone, regardless of its validity, would constitute an impairment of the rights of the party against whom the claim is brought. The Court rejects such a far-reaching construction of the term “actual injury.” Moreover, the question of when an “actual injury” occurs is predominantly a factual injury. (Adams, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 588; Jordache, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 751.) The Complaint alleges that the injury was sustained when the settlement occurred in November 2022, the same month as this action was filed. (Complaint ¶ 14.) Defendants offer no valid basis to dispute that allegation. Defendants have thus failed to establish that the Complaint is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence actions.

           

CONCLUSION:

 

            Accordingly, Defendants Tommy SF Wang and Wang IP Law Group, P.C.’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

            Moving Parties to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:  January 17, 2024                                ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.