Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 22STCV38043, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV38043, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV38043 Hearing Date: September 6, 2023 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: September 6, 2023 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Javier Rojas v. California Commerce Club, Inc.

CASE NO.: 22STCV38043

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant California Commerce Club, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Javier Rojas

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an employment discrimination action that was filed on December 6, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated him while on disability leave for surgery, and did so on the basis of that disabisurgery anddant moves to compel this matter to binding arbitration.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

This matter is hereby stayed pending resolution of the arbitration. The Court sets a hearing for an Order to Show Cause Re: Status of Arbitration for March 6, 2024 at 8:30 AM. All other hearings in this matter are advanced to this date and vacated.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant moves to compel this matter to binding arbitration and stay these proceedings pending resolution of the arbitration.

Existence of an Arbitration Agreement

Under California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 741 (overruled on other grounds by Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094).) A party petitioning to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.)

Defendant has provided a three-page document, in English, signed by Jose Garcia and bearing what appears to be Plaintiff’s signature and initials, and is dated December 11, 2018. (Declaration of Jose Garcia ISO Mot. Exh. A.) The document is titled, in block capitals, bolded and underlined, “Arbitration Agreement and Mandatory Dispute Resolution Process.” Paragraph 2 of the Agreement states, as relevant here:

In the event of any dispute, prior to commencing any legal action, Employee or the Company, whichever is the complaining party, shall give prompt written notice to the other (as to the Company, this person shall be the Executive Director of Human Resources) of the nature of the dispute, claim or controversy. Upon the receipt of such written notice, the Parties agree to meet within 30 days in person to discuss in good faith the dispute, claim or controversy to attempt to resolve the dispute, claim or controversy informally.

If the Parties cannot resolve their differences in that informal dispute resolution process, then all claims relating to Employee’s recruitment, employment with, or termination of employment from the Company shall be deemed waived unless submitted to final and binding arbitration by JAMS. . .

(Id. ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff challenges the existence of a binding arbitration agreement. Plaintiff first argues in opposition that he did not sign the agreement, and thus there is no operative arbitration agreement for lack of mutual assent. Consent of the parties is an essential element of a contract. (See Civ. Code § 1565.) In argument, Plaintiff claims that his signature on that Declaration does not match the signature on the agreement, and that the initials and dates on the first and second page differ from the third page. Plaintiff has offered a sworn declaration, with accompanying verification by a translator, stating that he does not believe that the initials and dates on pages 1 and 2 of the agreement are in his handwriting. (Declaration of Javier Rojas ISO Opp. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also states that he does not read English well and has difficulty understanding complex documents in English. (Id. ¶ 3.) However, Plaintiff does not, in his declaration, categorically deny initialing the first two pages of the agreement. The Court, as trier of fact, is empowered to compare the signature, initials, and dates on the Arbitration Agreement with Plaintiff’s signature on his declaration. (See Evid. Code § 1417.) In that capacity, the Court observes that, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the date notations are similar on all three pages of the Arbitration Agreement. (Garcia Decl. Exh. A.) Further, Plaintiff’s contention that the initials on the first two pages do not match the signature on the third page is not persuasive, as a signature and initials, by definition, need not be identical.

Plaintiff next contends that, even if he did sign the arbitration agreement, it is void because he did not know what he was signing at the time. A contract is void when a party does not intend to enter the contract for lack of knowledge of what the party is signing. (See Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 415.) Plaintiff argues that the agreement was only provided to him in English, but offers no sworn testimony to that effect, relying only on the absence of any reference to a Spanish version of the agreement in the moving papers and his contention that he does not speak or read English well and has difficulty understanding complex documents in English. (Rojas Decl. ¶ 3.) In reply, Defendant provided a copy of its verified responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, in which Defendant stated categorically that the Arbitration Agreement was available to all employees via company intranet with Spanish and Mandarin Chinese interpretation. (Declaration of Theodore E. Bacon ISO Reply Exh. 5. No.1.)

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s contentions. Although Plaintiff makes assertions concerning the validity of his initials and the provision of a Spanish version of the Agreement, the minimal factual statements in his sworn declaration are not sufficient to defeat Defendant’s showing that Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement.

Applicability of Federal Arbitration Act

Neither party contends that the agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and the plain language of the Agreement offers no guidance. The Court therefore finds that this agreement is governed by the California Arbitration Act.

Scope of the Agreement

Defendant contends that the scope of the Arbitration Agreement covers Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff does not dispute this contention.

“The scope of arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties.” (See, e.g., Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323.) “A party can be compelled to arbitrate only those issues it has agreed to arbitrate.” (Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408, 419.)

The Agreement states that it covers “all grievances, disputes, claims, or causes of action (collectively, "claims") in a federal, state or local court or agency under applicable federal, state or local laws, arising out of Employee's employment with the Company and the termination thereof, including claims Employee may have against the Company or against its officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees, or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise, or that the Company may have against Employee.” (Garcia Decl. Exh. A. ¶ 3.) As this is an action for employment discrimination and wrongful termination, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2023 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.