Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 22STCV39723, Date: 2023-10-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV39723 Hearing Date: October 9, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: October 9, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET
CASE: Juddy Saenz v. Eurostar Inc.
CASE NO.: 22STCV39723 ![]()
MOTION
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Eurostar Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Juddy
Saenz
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) filed on
December 21, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant systematically failed to
pay its employees minimum and overtime wages, wages upon termination, and meal
and rest periods, and maintain accurate wage statements.
Defendant moves to compel
Plaintiff’s individual claim to arbitration and stay or dismiss the
representative claims.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendant moves to compel
Plaintiff’s individual claim to arbitration and stay or dismiss the
representative claims.
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of
Marie Lopez Mackay
Plaintiff
asserts several evidentiary objections to the declaration of Marie Lopez Mackay
filed in support of the motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows:
Objection No. 1: OVERRULED. This
testimony is relevant as background information.
Objection No. 2: OVERRULED.
This testimony is relevant as background information and to establish
deponent’s personal knowledge, if any, of matters to which she attests.
Objection No. 3: OVERRULED.
Does not lack foundation. Remaining objections are inapplicable as this
testimony is offered as the basis for the declarant’s knowledge.
Objection No. 4: OVERRULED.
Does not lack foundation or personal knowledge. Remaining objections are
inapplicable.
Objection No. 5: SUSTAINED as
to conclusion that Plaintiff was presented with and executed the Arbitration
Agreement for lack of personal knowledge. The declarant’s position, duties, and
familiarity with Defendant’s policy and practice do not allow her to opine on the
specifics of Plaintiff’s review of the Arbitration Agreement or her alleged
execution of it.
Objection No. 6: OVERRULED.
Objections go to weight, not admissibility.
Objection No. 7: SUSTAINED
only as to the conclusion that the Agreement was executed by Plaintiff for lack
of personal knowledge.
Objection No. 8: SUSTAINED
only as to the conclusion that the Agreement was executed by Plaintiff for lack
of personal knowledge.
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of
Ryan Patterson
Plaintiff
also objects to portions of the Declaration of Ryan Patterson in support of the
motion. The Court rules on Plaintiff’s objections as follows:
Objection No. 1: OVERRULED IN
PART AND SUSTAINED IN PART. Does not lack foundation or personal knowledge,
except as to whether the Arbitration Agreement was executed by Plaintiff, as to
which the Objection is sustained. Remaining objections are inapplicable.
Analysis
Under California law, arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
728, 741 (overruled on other grounds by
Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094).) A party petitioning to compel
arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement
to arbitrate, and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.)
Defendant seeks to compel
arbitration based on a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims purportedly
executed by Plaintiff on February 2, 2022. Plaintiff was hired as an Assistant
Store Manager on January 14, 2022, and was terminated on August 26, 2022, some
eight months later. (Declaration of Marie Lopez Mackay ISO Mot. ¶ 3.) Defendant
contends that Plaintiff signed the agreement on or about February 2, 2022. (Id.
¶ 4, Exh. A.) The testimony of Defendant’s Senior Director of Human
Resources, on which Defendant’s moving papers rely, bases this conclusion
purely on the witness’s knowledge of Defendant’s policy and practice, not her
personal knowledge of whether Plaintiff signed the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Ms. Mackay describes the responsibilities of her position in sufficient detail
to lay a foundation for her description of Defendant’s business records.
(Mackay Decl. ¶ 2; see Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 324.)
However, her familiarity with Defendant’s business records and its policy and practices
does not empower her to authenticate Plaintiff’s electronic signature.
It is undisputed that the agreement
was signed using an electronic signature. (Id. ¶ 4, Exh. A. p.3.) An
electronic record or signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of
the person. (Civ. Code § 1633.9(a).) The act of the person may be shown in any
manner. (Id.) As described by the Court of Appeal, “the burden of
authenticating an electronic signature is not great.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros.
Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844.) Here, the Mackay
declaration offers no basis whatsoever for the conclusion that Plaintiff’s
purported signature is authentic. Further, Plaintiff, in her opposition,
categorically denies ever signing the Arbitration Agreement or even having been
presented with the paperwork for review. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s
Store Manager filled out all of her employment documents on the Manager’s own
computer which Plaintiff could not access, and that she was never informed of
any arbitration agreement. (Declaration of Juddy Saenz ISO Opp. ¶ 2.)
Defendant attempts to remedy the
failure to authenticate Plaintiff’s electronic signature in its reply briefing,
offering declarations from Defendant’s Human Resources Information Systems
Manager and from the Store Manager responsible for onboarding Plaintiff.
However, as evidence submitted in reply, the Court has the discretion whether
or not to consider this evidence. (Alliant Ins. Services, Inc. v. Gaddy (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1308.) The Court does not think it appropriate to do so
here. Defendant’s motion did not place Plaintiff on adequate notice of the
factual basis for the motion because it relied entirely on the insufficient
statements of a single witness who lacked any personal knowledge about the key
fact – whether Plaintiff executed the Arbitration Agreement -- and has thus
deprived Plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to respond to the factual claims
asserted in reply which should have initially been provided.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.