Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 23PSCV00016, Date: 2025-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23PSCV00016, Date: 2025-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00016 Hearing Date: February 27, 2025 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: February 27, 2025 TRIAL DATE: May 20, 2025

CASE: 3BTech, Inc. v. Pro-Com Products Inc., et al.

CASE NO.: 23PSCV00016

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Pro-Com Products, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff 3BTech, Inc.

CASE HISTORY:

· 01/04/23: Complaint filed.

· 09/15/23: Cross-Complaint filed by AJ Global Group.

· 11/06/24: Dismissal entered on Complaint as to AJ Global Group.

· 11/07/24: Dismissal entered on Cross-Complaint.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is one of several related actions arising from a warehouse fire that destroyed some $13 million worth of Plaintiff’s stock. Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence in their provision of security, fire suppression, and safe storage of Plaintiff’s materials.

Defendant Pro-Com Products, Inc. moves for summary judgment.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Pro-Com Products, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant Pro-Com Products, Inc. moves for summary judgment.

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Plaintiff’s Improper Objections

Pursuant to the California Rules of Court, all objections to evidence pertaining to a Motion for Summary Judgment must be served and filed separately from other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1354(b).) Rather than comply with this requirement, Plaintiff has elected to assert its objections in its Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. While objections must be referenced in the Separate Statement, that reference does not substitute for the formal statement of objections required by the Rules of Court. (See Id.) Plaintiff has therefore failed to properly assert objections to Defendant’s evidence.

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Opposition

Plaintiff submitted a “Supplemental Opposition” to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on February 20, 2025, in addition to the opposition filed and served on February 13, 2025. No such filing is authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure, and Plaintiff offers no explanation for the failure to raise the arguments offered in that supplemental briefing. The Court therefore refuses to consider this improper filing.

Analysis

Defendant Pro-Com Products, Inc. moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against it.

To prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) a duty of the defendant to use due care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) that the breach was the cause of the resulting injury. (See, e.g., Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917-18.)

Here, Plaintiff asserted a claim against this Defendant for general negligence to recover for property damage, loss of use, and loss of earning capacity stemming from the destruction of Plaintiff’s property in a fire at a warehouse located at 1250 Bixby, City of Industry, CA on December 4, 2020. (See Complaint.) Defendant AJ Global owned the warehouse and leased it to Defendant Pro-Com Products on July 18, 2018 pursuant to a 5-year lease. (SSUMF No. 1.) Plaintiff executed a Consignment Agreement with Pro-Com on September 9, 2018 and a Memorandum of Understanding on January 13, 2020 (amended June 28, 2020) under which Defendant agreed to sell Plaintiff’s products on consignment and Plaintiff was permitted to store its product at the warehouse during Pro-Com’s lease. (SSUMF Nos. 2.) On December 4, 2020, a fire broke out at the warehouse at approximately 8:44 p.m., causing damage to the warehouse and the loss of Plaintiff’s stock. (SSUMF Nos. 3-11, see also Complaint.) Investigators for the Los Angeles County Fire Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department independently determined that the fire was caused by arson perpetrated by an unknown third party. (SSUMF Nos. 13-14.)

Defendant first contends that under established case law, it owed no duty to Plaintiff to protect Plaintiff’s property from the criminal acts of an unknown third party. Defendant relies on well-established precedent regarding the liability of landowners for criminal conduct of third parties taking place on the landowner’s premises. (E.g. Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1146.) However, Defendant has failed to explain the application of these authorities to the instant case, where the moving party is not a landowner, but a tenant who has contracted with the Plaintiff for product storage, and Plaintiff is not a tenant but rather a party who stores product on Defendant’s premises as part of their business agreement. Defendant offers neither authority nor evidence tending to establish that this relationship is equivalent to the relationship between a landlord or master tenant and a tenant or subtenant. Thus, Defendant has not demonstrated that the authorities upon which it relies are applicable to the instant case, and, therefore, has failed to establish that it did not owe Plaintiff an affirmative duty to safeguard Plaintiff’s products. Further, although Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal nexus between Defendant’s conduct and the fire as a matter of law, Defendant’s authorities in support of its attack on causation suffer from the same deficiency. (E.g. Nola M. v. University of Southern California (1993) 16 Cal.App.4^th 421, 435 [landowner’s failure to act not legal cause of injury inflicted by criminal act of third party]; see also Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 912, 917-18 [same].) As Defendant has not demonstrated the application of these authorities to the relationship between itself and the Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendant has not carried its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot establish either an affirmative duty or a causal nexus between the alleged conduct and the injury.

Although not addressed by the parties in their briefing, it appears to the Court that the agreement between the parties with regard to the storage of Plaintiff’s merchandise amounts to a bailment. “A deposit of personal property to be cared for until the owner demands redelivery has been held to constitute bailment in a variety of factual contexts.” (Greenberg Bros. v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. (1966) 246 Cal. App. 2d 529, 531[Citations omitted].) Where the deposit of the property is done to benefit both the owner and the receiver of the property, that is, the bailee, the bailment is considered one for hire. (Civil Code §§ 1844, 1851.) A bailment for hire imposes an ordinary duty of care on the bailee. (Civil Code § 1852; Gebert v. Yank (1985) 172 Cal. App. 3d 544, 551.) While a bailee is not an insurer of the transferred property, he is obligated to perform the terms of the parties’ agreement with due care and can be held liable for any damage or loss where he is guilty of negligence. (Greenberg Bros., supra, at p. 533.) “This is true even where a third person stole the subject of the bailment and thus made redelivery impossible.” (Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 713, 715 [Citations omitted].) Although the basis for the Court’s ruling is Defendant’s failure to demonstrate the absence of any duty based on the party’s actual relationship, this authority confirms that a criminal interloper’s interference with a bailor’s property does not negate the bailee’s negligence in caring for the property.

Defendant’s contention that it cannot be held liable because its conduct did not cause damage to Plaintiff’s property is undermined by its failure to acknowledge or brief its duty as a bailee to maintain Plaintiff’s property in good condition. Having skipped the mandatory step of analyzing the nature and scope of its duty in the context of its agreement with Plaintiff, the Court cannot evaluate either whether any actions or failures to act should be considered negligence or whether such negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s loss. Plainly, Defendant has offered no evidence about whether fire protection equipment on-site could have prevented or minimized the loss.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant Pro-Com Products, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2025 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.