Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23PSCV02623, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23PSCV02623 Hearing Date: November 12, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: November 12, 2024 TRIAL DATE: February
11, 2025
CASE: Happy Harbor Restaurant, Inc. v.
California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration
CASE NO.: 23PSCV02623 ![]()
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant California Department of Tax and Fee
Administration
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Happy
Harbor Restaurant, Inc.
CASE
HISTORY:
·
08/25/23: Complaint filed.
·
05/09/24: Request for Dismissal as to Second Cause
of Action filed.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a tax refund action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant collected
excessive taxes on the sale of a restaurant.
Defendant moves for summary
judgment.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendant moves for summary
judgment.
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an
opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if
not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment
if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from
the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge
v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is
not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet
their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)
Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Factual History
This is an
action demanding the repayment of excessive taxes allegedly collected by
Defendant on the sale of a restaurant owned by Plaintiff. As evidenced by the
undisputed record, Defendant commenced a sales tax audit of Plaintiff in 2016,
ultimately covering the period between January 11, 2011, and September 30,
2019. (Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 1-2;
Plaintiff’s Response to Separate Statement Nos. 1-2.) In 2019, Plaintiff
executed an agreement to sell a restaurant which it owned, initiating an escrow
process managed by Central Escrow Group, Inc. (SSUMF No. 4; RSS No. 4.) On or
about January 24, 2020, Central Escrow sent Defendant a Request for Certificate
of Payment, seeking a certificate of release for the sale of the restaurant,
and listing the sale price of the restaurant as $1,190,000. (SSUMF Nos. 5-7;
RSS Nos. 5-7.) Defendant advised Plaintiff that the request had been made on
January 31, 2020. (Id. No. 8.) On September 3, 2020, Defendant sent
Central Escrow a Notice of Amounts Due and Conditional Release, stating that
the full purchase price was due and informing Central Escrow that the full
purchase price was to be held in deposit with Defendant “until all pending
issues have been resolved.” (Id. Nos. 9-10.) At that time, Defendant’s
audit of Plaintiff remained ongoing, and no formal deficiency determination had
been issued. (Id. No. 11.) On September 28, 2020, Central Escrow sent
Defendant a check in the amount of $1,030,827.48, which has been held in
deposit since that time. (Id. Nos. 13-14.)
On February
14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a refund claim with Defendant demanding the return of
the funds conveyed by Central Escrow. (SSUMF Nos. 15-17; RSS Nos. 15-17.) Plaintiff
subsequently filed this action on August 25, 2023, seeking damages in the same
amount. (See Complaint ¶ 20.) In May of 2024, Defendant sent a letter to
Plaintiff stating that Defendant had completed the audit and, based on its
examination, proposed the issuance of a formal notice of deficiency
determination in the amount of $1,058,393.26, consisting of $678,481 in taxes;
$201,727.26 in interest through May 31, 2024, and $178,185 in penalties. (SSUMF
Nos. 21-23; RSS Nos. 21-23.) Defendant’s letter was accompanied with supporting
documentation, including calculations and recommendations regarding penalties.
(Id. Nos. 24-28.) These papers were enclosed in a May 8, 2024 letter
from Defendant’s Supervising Tax Auditor, Eileen Smith, which stated that
Plaintiff had ten days from the date of the letter to contact Defendant
regarding any questions or challenges to Defendant’s findings. (Id. Nos.
29-30.) Plaintiff requested a meeting with Defendant to review the analysis on
May 20, 2024. (Id. Nos. 31-32.) At the time this action was filed,
Defendant had not made a final determination regarding Plaintiff’s tax
liability, and no notice of deficiency determination had been issued. (Id.
No. 34.)
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendant
moves for summary judgment on the sole remaining cause of action for overpaid
taxes on the grounds that Plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies
before pursuing this tax refund action.
The
California Sales and Use Tax Law authorizes the Department of Tax and Fee
Administration to assess, collect, and refund taxes. (Rev. & Tax Code §
6001 et seq.; see also §§ 20, 20.5; Gov. Code § 15770.22.) Sections 6811
through 6815 require purchasers to withhold from the purchase price of a
business, or its goods or stock, any amount which the seller owes under the
Sales and Use Tax Law until the seller produces a receipt from the
administering entity showing that all taxes have been paid or no amount is due.
(Rev. & Tax Code § 6811.) If the purchaser does not withhold that amount
from the purchase price, the purchaser is itself liable. (Id. §
6812(a).) The Department may require withholding of funds before the final tax
liability is determined. (Rev. & Tax Code § 6183; Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 18 §
1702(b).) Such withheld funds are treated as security and are deemed payments
only if they are in fact applied to the taxpayer’s liability. (Rev. & Tax
Code § 6815.)
Article
XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution vests the Legislature with
plenary control over the method to recover taxes paid. (Cal. Const. art. XIII §
32.) Consequently, a taxpayer must strictly comply with any
administrative procedures established by the Legislature for the recovery of a
tax before bringing an action in Court. (IBM Personal Pension Plan v. City
and County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1299.) Moreover,
the disputed tax liability must be fully paid before the taxpayer may seek to
recover any amount of that tax. (State Bd. Of Equalization v. Superior Court
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 633, 636, 642-43.)
In the context of the Sales and Use
Tax Law, a deficiency determination does not become final until either the 30-day
period to seek redetermination has run (Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 6561, 6565), 30
days have passed from the Department’s order on any petition for
redetermination (Rev & Tax. Code § 6561), or the appellate process with the
Office of Tax Appeals has concluded. (Gov. Code §§ 15670(a); 15671(a)91);
15672-15675.) Based on these provisions, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
action is premature because no final determination had been made at the time
the action was filed. (SSUMF No. 34). Consequently, Defendant contends, the
withheld funds were not yet considered a “paid tax” because the amount owed had
not yet been conclusively determined, and the funds remained held in security,
rather than paid, as a matter of law. (SSUMF Nos. 13-14; Rev. & Tax. Code §
6185.)
Plaintiff, in opposition, dismisses
Defendant’s position as “silly,” and asserts that payment of the assessed taxes
was made by Central Escrow. Plaintiff appears to be operating under a
misconception. Under the plain language of sections 6701 and 6185 of the
Revenue and Tax Code, the funds received by Defendant from Central Escrow are
security, not payment, as they have not yet been applied to Plaintiff’s tax
liability precisely because that liability has not yet been finally
determined. (Rev. & Tax Code § 6701, 6185.) Plaintiff’s associated argument
that the three-year statute of limitations under section 6902.3 would have run if
this action had not been filed is similarly unfounded. As payment under the
Sales and Use Tax Law is not made until the funds are actually applied
to Plaintiff’s liability, the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run,
nor will it start running until such time as those funds are applied to the
account. (See Rev. & Tax Code § 6902.3.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s bald
assertions that the administrative process has concluded is both unsupported by
law and belied by the undisputed facts, which establish that discussions
between the parties are ongoing, and no formal determination has been made.
(Plaintiff’s RSS Nos. 31-34.)
Based on the undisputed factual
record, the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated that Plaintiff cannot
prevail on the sole remaining cause of action for overpaid taxes because
Plaintiff’s tax liability has not yet been finally determined, no taxes have
been paid as a matter of law, and, thus, Plaintiff has not exhausted its
administrative remedies. Plaintiff, in contrast, has failed to demonstrate a
triable issue of fact in this respect. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff
has not exhausted its administrative remedies and Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 12,
2024 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
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have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.