Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCP03188, Date: 2024-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP03188    Hearing Date: August 5, 2024    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     August 5, 2024                       TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Learning Enrichment After-School Program Inc. v. California Department of Education

CASE NO.:                 23STCP03188           

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MOVING PARTY:               Respondent California Department of Education

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Petitioner Learning Enrichment After School Program (LEAP) Inc.

CASE HISTORY:

·         07/24/23: Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate and Complaint filed.

·         01/16/24: Demurrer sustained as to first cause of action for petition for mandamus and third cause of action for declaratory relief.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a petition for writ of administrative mandate and complaint for breach of contract. Petitioner alleges that it contracted with Respondent to provide meals through programs administered by Respondent. Petitioner contends that Respondent improperly disallowed Petitioner to serve meals at certain locations and demanded payment for reimbursements previously distributed for those meals.

Respondent moves for judgment on the pleadings on the sole remaining cause of action for breach of contract.

TENTATIVE RULING:

            Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

            Respondent moves for judgment on the pleadings on the second cause of action for breach of contract.

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent to a general demurrer.  (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198).  Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994). Any defects must either appear on the face of the pleading, or else be revealed by judicial notice.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-22).  The parties’ ability to prove their respective claims is of no concern.  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 99.) Though the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint and answer as true (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), it will not do so for “conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or [judicially noticed] facts…” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-20).

Meet and Confer

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a)(4).)

            The Declaration of Attorney Lilly Ko accompanying the motion states that the parties met and conferred electronically on January 30, 2024 and via telephone on February 5, 2024, but were unable to reach an agreement regarding the issues raised here. (Declaration of Lilly Ko. ISO Mot. ¶¶ 2-3.) Respondent has therefore satisfied its meet-and-confer obligations.

Requests for Judicial Notice

            Respondent requests that the Court take judicial notice of what it purports to be the California Department of Education’s Appeals Process for Child Nutrition Programs as set forth on a webpage. No date of access or publication is given for this document, and the document contains no citations to any statute or regulation which would support a finding that it is an accurate statement of the regulatory scheme. Respondent’s request for judicial notice is therefore DENIED.

            Petitioner requests that the Court take judicial notice of the tentative ruling on Respondent’s Demurrer to the Petition and Complaint. As the final ruling of the Court is in the record, the tentative ruling is immaterial. Petitioner’s request for judicial notice is therefore DENIED.

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Analysis

            Respondent moves for judgment on the pleadings on the second cause of action for breach of contract on the basis that Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction as to the breach of contract claim.

            This action was originally pled as a petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 under the first cause of action and as a common-law claim for breach of contract under the second cause of action, alongside a third cause of action for declaratory relief. (See generally Petition.) On October 18, 2023, Respondent demurred to the Petition in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute any of the three causes of action alleged. (Demurrer filed October 18, 2023.) On January 16, 2024, the Court sustained the demurrer as to the first cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and as to the third cause of action as subsumed within the first cause of action. (January 16 2024 Ruling.) The Court overruled the demurrer as to the second cause of action on the grounds that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a breach of contract claim and because Petitioner’s substantial compliance with the contract is a question of fact not suitable for demurrer. (Id. at pp. 12-13.)

            Respondent contends that Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies “regarding the allegations of substantial performance” deprives the Court of jurisdiction. Although Respondent cites Hill RHF Housing Partners L.P. v. City of Los Angeles and Campbell v. Regents of University of California, neither of those authorities support the contention that a party must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing a common-law claim for breach of contract. In Hill RHF Housing Partners, our Supreme Court acknowledged that in select circumstances, an exhaustion requirement may be inferred “in statutory and regulatory schemes that do not contain any express command that available administrative procedures be engaged before relief may be sought in court.” (Hill RHF Housing Partners L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 478.) However, that statement was made in the context of statutory claims, not common law claims such as those at issue here. As Petitioner notes in opposition, Hill concerned petitions for writ of mandate and declaratory relief contending that the City of Los Angeles violated Proposition 218 in establishing a business improvement district. (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 469-72.) Nothing in that opinion references common-law contractual claims. Moreover, Campbell only sets forth the general rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required to establish jurisdiction when an administrative remedy is provided by statute. (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.)

            As the Court previously found, and as argued by Petitioner in opposition, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally not required for bringing an action for breach of contract. (Shaw v. Regents of Univ. of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 44, 52.) Critically, as stated by the Court of Appeal in 300 DeHaro Street Investors v. Department of Housing & Community Development, the fact that a contract “incorporated various statutes verbatim does not prevent the parties from exercising remedies for breach of contract.” (300 DeHaro Street Investors v. Department of Housing & Community Development (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1256.) Petitioner analogizes this case to McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co., in which the Court of Appeal found that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required on a breach of contract claim for failure to pay for produce delivered because the administrative remedies set out in the Food and Agricultural Code were cumulative to a common-law claim for breach of contract. (McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1230, 1246.) As Respondent contends in reply, McKee’s holding turns in significant part on an express provision of the relevant statutory scheme that the rights and remedies described are in addition to any other rights, remedies, or penalties provided by law. (McKee, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at 1240, Food & Agri. Code § 55437.) According to Respondent, no similar provision is described in the regulatory framework established in Title 7 Part 225 of the Code of Federal Regulations. However, Respondent neglects that these federal regulatory provisions set forth only minimum requirements for State agencies to receive federal grants to conduct food service programs and are not the actual enacting provisions. (See Code Fed. Regs. tit. 7 §225.1.) While Respondent has requested judicial notice of a webpage purportedly describing the appeal process, it does not provide the Court with the enacting statutes or regulations governing this program. Moreover, Respondent entirely fails to reckon with the 300 DeHaro Street Investors opinion, cited by both Petitioner in its opposition and by the Court in its previous ruling, which directly states that claims for breach of contractual obligations against a public entity stand separate from claims for mandamus even where the contractual claim necessarily challenges an administrative decision. (300 DeHaro Street Investors, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 1256.)

            In sum, Respondent has not demonstrated that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required for Petitioner to maintain its claim for breach of contract against Respondent.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

            Moving Party to give notice.

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 


Dated:  August 5, 2024                          ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.