Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV00075, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV00075 Hearing Date: November 15, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: November 15, 2023 TRIAL DATE: October
29, 2024
CASE: Melissa Hansen, et al., v. Jodie
Votava-Smith, et al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV00075 ![]()
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (x4)
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants Vaughn A. Starnes, M.D., Jennifer Shepard,
Shilpa Shah, M.D., and Children’s Hospital Los Angeles.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Melissa
and Collier Hansen, individually and as successors in interest to Maia Hansen.
CASE
HISTORY:
·
01/03/23: Complaint filed.
·
03/20/23: First Amended Complaint filed.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a wrongful death and medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants acted below the standard of care in treating their
newborn child’s cardiovascular syndromes.
Defendants Vaughn Starnes, Shilpa
Shah, Jennifer Shepard, and Children’s Hospital, Los Angeles move for judgment
on the pleadings.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants’ Motions for Judgment
on the Pleadings are DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendants Vaughn Starnes, Shilpa
Shah, Jennifer Shepard, and Children’s Hospital, Los Angeles move for judgment
on the pleadings. Each Defendant filed a separate motion seeking the same
relief. However, as the parties raise identical arguments concerning each of
the four motions, the Court will address the motions and their arguments together
in the interest of brevity.
Legal Standard
A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer. (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic
Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198). Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the
pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their
veracity. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994). Any defects must either appear on the
face of the pleading, or else be taken by judicial notice. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
316, 321-22). The parties’ ability to
prove their respective claims is of no concern.
(Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995,
99.) Though the Court must accept the
allegations of the complaint and answer as true (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v.
Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), it will not do so for “conclusions of
law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or
[judicially noticed] facts…” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB
Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215,
1219-20).
Meet and Confer
Before filing a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by
telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion for
judgment on the pleadings and file a declaration detailing their meet and
confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a).) However, an insufficient
meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a)(4).)
The Declaration of each Defendant’s
counsel in support of their respective motions states that the parties met and
conferred in writing before the motions were filed, but were not able to reach
an agreement on the issues raised here. (See, e.g., Declaration of Melissa
Timoschick ISO Mot. ¶ 7.) The Court therefore finds that Defendants have
satisfied their statutory meet and confer obligations.
Timing
A
motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought by a defendant at any time
after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 438(f)). Unless a court orders otherwise, a motion for judgment on the
pleadings may not be made after entry of a pre-trial conference order, (Cal.
Rules of Court 3.720-3.730) or 30 days before the initial trial date, whichever
is later. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(e). No pre-trial conference order was entered
in this case, and the motions were filed more than 30 days before the initial
trial date.
Analysis
Defendants
move for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims against
them are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Claims for
wrongful death against a healthcare provider are governed by Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.5, which states, in relevant part:
In an action for injury or death
against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional
negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after
the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever
occurs first.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5.) For the purposes of this statute
as it applies to wrongful death claims, “injury” means both “the death of [the]
decedent and its negligent cause.” (Larcher v. Wanless (1976) 18
Cal.3d 656, 657-58 [emphasis added].)
Each of the
Defendants moving for judgment on the pleadings were substituted for Doe
defendants as additional attending physicians or, in the case of CHLA, the
employer of the physicians. Defendants assert that the discovery provision of
section 340.5 required Plaintiffs to assert their claims against these
Defendants within one year of the death of the decedent on October 25, 2021.
Defendants, in so arguing, misconstrue the holding of Larcher as stating
that both portions of the statute of limitations begin to run upon the death of
the decedent. Not so. The reality is that Larcher clarified section
340.5’s references to “injury” in the one-year discovery clause as encompassing
wrongful death claims rather than excluding them. (Larcher, supra,
18 Cal.3d at 658-69.) In so holding, the California Supreme Court stated that,
as applied to wrongful death actions, the word “injury” “must be read to refer
to the wrongfully caused death of the plaintiff’s decedent.” (Id at
659 [emphasis added].) Put differently, a plaintiff in a wrongful death action
against a healthcare provider has one year to file suit “measured from the date
on which they discovered or should have discovered their ‘injury’ in the form
of the death of their decedent and its negligent cause,” (Id. at
657-58 [emphasis added]), so long as the suit is filed within three years of
the death of the decedent.
Defendants
assert that Plaintiffs were aware of their claims against each of these four
Defendants at the time the original Complaint was filed, and, therefore, that
the Doe Amendments were barred by the statute of limitations because they were
not made within one year of Maia’s death. Here, the First Amended Complaint
alleges that Maia passed away on October 25, 2021, as did the original
Complaint. (FAC ¶ 25, Complaint ¶ 20.) Both the original and amended pleadings
allege that Plaintiffs did not discover the injury—i.e., the alleged wrongful
failure to diagnose and treat Maia properly—until on or about October 12, 2022.
(Complaint ¶ 15; FAC ¶ 19.) However, as Defendants observe, Plaintiffs allege
that they served their first notices of intention to sue on October 3, 2022.
(See Complaint ¶ 18; FAC ¶ 22.) Thus, as Defendants argue, Plaintiffs must have
at least had notice of their injury by that date. However, these allegations
only establish, at best, that Plaintiffs were on actual notice of their injury
by October 3, 2022. Even assuming that Plaintiffs were on notice of their
claims against these Defendants at that time, Defendants have only demonstrated
that the deadline to assert the claims against them was October 3, 2023, one
year after the notices of intention to sue. The original Complaint was filed on
January 3, 2023. (See Complaint.) Defendants Shepard and Shah were substituted
for Doe defendants on March 13, 2023. (March 13, 2023 Amendments to Complaint).
Defendant CHLA was substituted for a Doe Defendant on March 15, 2023. (March 15
2023 Amendment to Complaint.) The First Amended Complaint was filed on March
20, 2023. (See FAC.) Defendant Starnes was substituted for a Doe defendant on
March 22, 2023. (March 22, 2023 Amendment to Complaint). All of these filings
are well within the one-year statute of limitations based on the date of
accrual evidenced from the pleadings of October 3, 2022. Defendants are
therefore not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this basis.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings are DENIED.
Moving
Parties to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 15,
2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.