Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV00075, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV00075    Hearing Date: November 15, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     November 15, 2023               TRIAL DATE: October 29, 2024

                                                          

CASE:                         Melissa Hansen, et al., v. Jodie Votava-Smith, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 23STCV00075           

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (x4)

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants Vaughn A. Starnes, M.D., Jennifer Shepard, Shilpa Shah, M.D., and Children’s Hospital Los Angeles.

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Melissa and Collier Hansen, individually and as successors in interest to Maia Hansen.

 

CASE HISTORY:

·         01/03/23: Complaint filed.

·         03/20/23: First Amended Complaint filed.

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is a wrongful death and medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acted below the standard of care in treating their newborn child’s cardiovascular syndromes.

 

Defendants Vaughn Starnes, Shilpa Shah, Jennifer Shepard, and Children’s Hospital, Los Angeles move for judgment on the pleadings.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings are DENIED.

 

DISCUSSION:

 

Defendants Vaughn Starnes, Shilpa Shah, Jennifer Shepard, and Children’s Hospital, Los Angeles move for judgment on the pleadings. Each Defendant filed a separate motion seeking the same relief. However, as the parties raise identical arguments concerning each of the four motions, the Court will address the motions and their arguments together in the interest of brevity.

Legal Standard

 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer.  (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198).  Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994). Any defects must either appear on the face of the pleading, or else be taken by judicial notice.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-22).  The parties’ ability to prove their respective claims is of no concern.  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 99.)  Though the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint and answer as true (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), it will not do so for “conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or [judicially noticed] facts…” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-20).

 

Meet and Confer

 

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439(a)(4).)

 

The Declaration of each Defendant’s counsel in support of their respective motions states that the parties met and conferred in writing before the motions were filed, but were not able to reach an agreement on the issues raised here. (See, e.g., Declaration of Melissa Timoschick ISO Mot. ¶ 7.) The Court therefore finds that Defendants have satisfied their statutory meet and confer obligations.

 

Timing

 

           A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought by a defendant at any time after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(f)). Unless a court orders otherwise, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may not be made after entry of a pre-trial conference order, (Cal. Rules of Court 3.720-3.730) or 30 days before the initial trial date, whichever is later. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(e). No pre-trial conference order was entered in this case, and the motions were filed more than 30 days before the initial trial date.

 

Analysis

 

            Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 

            Claims for wrongful death against a healthcare provider are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, which states, in relevant part:

 

In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5.) For the purposes of this statute as it applies to wrongful death claims, “injury” means both “the death of [the] decedent and its negligent cause.” (Larcher v. Wanless (1976) 18 Cal.3d 656, 657-58 [emphasis added].)

 

            Each of the Defendants moving for judgment on the pleadings were substituted for Doe defendants as additional attending physicians or, in the case of CHLA, the employer of the physicians. Defendants assert that the discovery provision of section 340.5 required Plaintiffs to assert their claims against these Defendants within one year of the death of the decedent on October 25, 2021. Defendants, in so arguing, misconstrue the holding of Larcher as stating that both portions of the statute of limitations begin to run upon the death of the decedent. Not so. The reality is that Larcher clarified section 340.5’s references to “injury” in the one-year discovery clause as encompassing wrongful death claims rather than excluding them. (Larcher, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 658-69.) In so holding, the California Supreme Court stated that, as applied to wrongful death actions, the word “injury” “must be read to refer to the wrongfully caused death of the plaintiff’s decedent.” (Id at 659 [emphasis added].) Put differently, a plaintiff in a wrongful death action against a healthcare provider has one year to file suit “measured from the date on which they discovered or should have discovered their ‘injury’ in the form of the death of their decedent and its negligent cause,” (Id. at 657-58 [emphasis added]), so long as the suit is filed within three years of the death of the decedent.

 

            Defendants assert that Plaintiffs were aware of their claims against each of these four Defendants at the time the original Complaint was filed, and, therefore, that the Doe Amendments were barred by the statute of limitations because they were not made within one year of Maia’s death. Here, the First Amended Complaint alleges that Maia passed away on October 25, 2021, as did the original Complaint. (FAC ¶ 25, Complaint ¶ 20.) Both the original and amended pleadings allege that Plaintiffs did not discover the injury—i.e., the alleged wrongful failure to diagnose and treat Maia properly—until on or about October 12, 2022. (Complaint ¶ 15; FAC ¶ 19.) However, as Defendants observe, Plaintiffs allege that they served their first notices of intention to sue on October 3, 2022. (See Complaint ¶ 18; FAC ¶ 22.) Thus, as Defendants argue, Plaintiffs must have at least had notice of their injury by that date. However, these allegations only establish, at best, that Plaintiffs were on actual notice of their injury by October 3, 2022. Even assuming that Plaintiffs were on notice of their claims against these Defendants at that time, Defendants have only demonstrated that the deadline to assert the claims against them was October 3, 2023, one year after the notices of intention to sue. The original Complaint was filed on January 3, 2023. (See Complaint.) Defendants Shepard and Shah were substituted for Doe defendants on March 13, 2023. (March 13, 2023 Amendments to Complaint). Defendant CHLA was substituted for a Doe Defendant on March 15, 2023. (March 15 2023 Amendment to Complaint.) The First Amended Complaint was filed on March 20, 2023. (See FAC.) Defendant Starnes was substituted for a Doe defendant on March 22, 2023. (March 22, 2023 Amendment to Complaint). All of these filings are well within the one-year statute of limitations based on the date of accrual evidenced from the pleadings of October 3, 2022. Defendants are therefore not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this basis. 

 

CONCLUSION:

 

            Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings are DENIED.

 

            Moving Parties to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:  November 15, 2023                            ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.