Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 23STCV06071, Date: 2024-07-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV06071, Date: 2024-07-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV06071 Hearing Date: July 5, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: July 5, 2024 TRIAL DATE: October 8, 2024

CASE: Perla E. Hernandez Cuevas v. FCA US LLC

CASE NO.: 23STCV06071

(1) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET ONE)

(2) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET TWO)

MOVING PARTY: (1)(2) Plaintiff Perla E. Hernandez Cuevas

RESPONDING PARTY(S): (1)(2) Defendant FCA US LLC

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a lemon law action filed on March 20, 2023. Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Jeep Wrangler which allegedly manifested defects in numerous core systems.

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to requests for propounded to Defendant.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to produce verified, code-compliant responses without objections to the requests as propounded within 30 days of this order.

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production (Set One)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to requests for production (set one) No. 19 propounded to Defendant.

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(c).) This burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Timeliness

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must be served “within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Following an Informal Discovery Conference on May 13, 2024, the Court ordered, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, that Plaintiff would have until June 11, 2024 to file motions to compel on any outstanding discovery issues. (May 13, 2024 Minute Order.) The instant motion was served on that date, and is therefore timely, notwithstanding that the motion was filed on June 12, 2024.

Meet and Confer

A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

The Declaration of Nadine Bedwan in support of the motion sets forth the extensive history of Plaintiff’s attempts to informally resolve this dispute, including several meet-and-confer letters and an informal discovery conference. (See Declaration of Nadine Bedwan ISO Mot. ¶¶ 18-27 Exhs. 6-13.) Plaintiff has satisfied the statutory meet-and-confer obligations.

Good Cause

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to request for production (set one) No. 19 propounded to Defendant. This request seeks all documents, including electronically stored information and electronic mail, concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to “electrical defects” in vehicles of the same year, make and model as the subject vehicle, including any databases in Defendant’s possession with information from dealers, service departments, parts departments, or warranty departments, and documents concerning Defendant’s response to each complaint, claim, or reported failure. (Bedwan Decl. Exh. 3. No. 19.) “Electrical Defect” is defined as:

such defects which result in symptoms including, but not limited to: Eco start/stop malfunction; Battery test fail; AUX battery replacement; Vehicle won’t start without jump; Instrument panel cluster no power; Cluster will not light up, gauges inoperative; TSB 08-023-19; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2019 Jeep Wrangler; Vehicle Identification Number 1C4HJXDG6KW557902.

(Bedwan Decl. Exh. 3. p.3:16-20.)

Evidence of similar defects in other vehicles are both relevant and admissible. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 153.) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18.) Documents regarding warranty complaints, service histories, and employee records concerning a defect in all affected vehicles, as well as documents regarding the manufacturer’s responses and instructions to cure that defect are discoverable. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971 [holding that the trial court’s approval of a discovery referee’s report and recommendation of sanctions for failure to produce documents of this nature relating to the subject defect in all affected vehicles was not an abuse of discretion].)

Defendant contends that Donlen and Doppes are both distinguishable from the present case -- Donlen because the issue was whether the plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding defects in and special service bulletins relating to other vehicles was inadmissible, rather than production of documents relating to these issues, (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 138), and Doppes because that case was also an action for fraud, and the manufacturer did not challenge the discovery referee’s findings. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 973-74, 993.) Defendant is correct that these cases are factually distinguishable, but the Court disagrees with Defendant that these cases do not support the position that the documents sought are relevant and admissible. In Doppes, the Court of Appeal expressly stated that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the discovery referee’s report and recommendation. (Doppes, supra, at 971.) Further, expert testimony as in Donlen regarding documentary evidence must necessarily have a foundation in that evidence to be admissible. (Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 577.) Documentary evidence on which an expert is testifying must therefore be discoverable. (Glenfed, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117-18.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks documentary evidence relating to the types of issues directly addressed in both decisions. The Court therefore finds that good cause exists for this request.

Defendant’s Response

Defendant’s initial response consisted of a series of boilerplate objections for vagueness and ambiguity, irrelevance, overbreadth, undue burden and harassment, and invasion of privacy of other owners. (Bedwan Decl. Exh. 4. No. 19.) Defendant’s supplemental response stated that it would comply with the request and produce subject to a protective order, all responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control “relating to other customer concerns, for the same make, year and model as the Subject Vehicle as they relate to Plaintiff’s “INFOTAINMENT SYSTEM DEFECT” definition.” (Bedwan Decl. Exh. 5. No. 19.)

In opposition, Defendant first contends that Plaintiff did not address the sufficiency of Defendant’s supplemental response—a response which unilaterally narrows the scope of the request, does not identify responsive documents as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280(a), and does not respond to the same defect identified in the request, and is therefore insufficient on its face. Defendant’s contention that its production is compliant with other court orders in other cases is entirely irrelevant.

Defendant asserts that the definition of “Electrical Defect” employed for Plaintiff’s requests is overly broad and ambiguous. The Court disagrees with Defendant. These terms are not overly broad for the purpose of discovery nor are they so vague that Defendant is unable to intelligibly respond. The remainder of Defendant’s objections claim overbreadth or irrelevance on the basis that discovery not pertaining directly to the subject vehicle is improper. Defendant is incorrect, as the Court has discussed with respect to the good cause shown for the request.

Further, although Defendant asserts that the request as written is unduly burdensome, Defendant offers no evidence of that contention. Defendant also entirely fails to justify its privacy objections. The Court therefore finds these objections are meritless. Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling full and complete responses without any unilateral narrowing of scope to this request.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production (Set One) No. 19 is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant responses without objections to the request as propounded within 30 days of this order.

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production (Set Two)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to requests for production (set two) Nos. 58-63 propounded to Defendant.

Legal Standard

Timeliness

Following an Informal Discovery Conference on May 13, 2024, the Court ordered pursuant to a stipulation by the parties that Plaintiff would have until June 11, 2024 to file motions to compel on any outstanding discovery issues. (May 13, 2024 Minute Order.) The instant motion was served on that date, and is therefore timely, notwithstanding that the motion was filed on June 12, 2024.

Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Nadine Bedwan in support of the motion sets forth the extensive history of Plaintiff’s attempts to informally resolve this dispute, including several meet-and-confer letters and an informal discovery conference. (See Declaration of Nadine Bedwan ISO Mot. ¶¶ 16-22 Exhs. 4-8.) Plaintiff has satisfied the statutory meet-and-confer obligations.

Good Cause

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production Nos. 58-63. These requests seek all documents relating to internal analysis or investigation into the “engine defect” (Bedwan Decl. Exh. 2. No. 58), communications regarding the “engine defect” (No. 59); decisions to issue notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, technical service bulletins, and recalls concerning the “engine defect” (No. 60); customer complaints, reported failures, and warranty claims; (No. 61); failure rates because of the “engine defect” (No. 62); and fixes for the “engine defect.” (No. 63.) All requests pertain not only to the subject vehicle but to vehicles of the same year, make, and model. The requests define “engine defect” to mean:

such defects which result in symptoms including, but not limited to: Vehicle shakes at highway speeds; Vehicle won’t start; Vehicle requires jumpstart; Check engine light on; Leak from front of engine; Rear shock leaking; Valve cover gasket replacement; Engine oil cooler leaking; Engine oil cooler seal warped; Leaking shock absorber replacement; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2019 Jeep Wrangler; Vehicle Identification Number 1C4HJXDG6KW557902.

(Bedwan Decl. Exh. 2. p.3:15:20.)

Defendant’s Responses

In response to each request, Defendant asserted substantially identical boilerplate objections that the requests were not reasonably particularized, were overbroad and argumentative, that the definition of “engine defect” was not sufficiently specific, that the definition of “your” in reference to Defendant was overbroad, that the requests seek confidential or privileged information and seek information regarding other customers which is irrelevant and violates their privacy rights,, that the request for electronically stored information is overbroad and unduly burdensome, and that the vehicle was purchased used and therefore not subject to the remedies of the Song-Beverly Act. (See, e.g., Bedwan Decl. Exh. 3. No. 58.)

In opposition, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff did not address the sufficiency of Defendant’s supplemental production served on June 18, 2023. (Declaration of Michael J. Gregg ISO Opp. Ex. D.) However, those supplemental responses are unaccompanied by a verification, and unverified responses to discovery are tantamount to no responses at all. (See Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 fn 4.) Even if it were verified, Defendant’s supplemental response unilaterally narrows the scope of the request to “customer concerns,” and does not identify the responsive documents which are or will be provided, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280(a). Moreover, Defendant entirely fails to justify any of its objections beyond baldly asserting that the responses are overbroad and irrelevant, or, alternatively, that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the objections are invalid. However, the burden is on Defendant to justify any failure to fully respond to these requests. (See Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221.) Defendant has failed to do so. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an order compelling further responses.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production (Set Two) is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant responses without objections to the request as propounded within 30 days of this order.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production (Set One) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production (Set Two) is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to produce verified, code-compliant responses without objections to the requests as propounded within 30 days of this order.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 5, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.