Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV08810, Date: 2023-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08810 Hearing Date: December 15, 2023 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE:     December 15, 2023                TRIAL DATE: NOT
SET
                                                           
CASE:                         Halen Kadel v. Operational Technical
Services, LLC et al. 
CASE NO.:                 23STCV08810            ![]()
MOTION
TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT
![]()
MOVING PARTY:               Defendants Operational Technical Services, LLC and
Operational Technical Services, Inc. 
RESPONDING PARTY(S): No response on
eCourt as of 12/12/23
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
            
            This is a wage and hour action that was filed on April 20, 2023.
Plaintiff alleges that she was misclassified as an exempt employee and paid a
salary rather than hourly wages, and thus was deprived of overtime, minimum
wages, indemnification for business expenses, wage and hour statements, and
meal and rest periods. Plaintiff also alleges that she was terminated in
retaliation for complaining about this treatment. 
Defendants move to strike portions
of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages. 
            
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Portions of the Complaint is GRANTED. 
DISCUSSION:
Defendants move to strike portions
of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages. 
Legal Standard
The court may, upon a motion, or at
any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ.
Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike
are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been
drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§
437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure,
the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to
strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders.  Code Civ.
Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to
improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it
was filed."  Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (emphasis in original).
Meet and Confer
 Before filing a motion to strike, the moving
party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has
filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration
detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).)
However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or
deny a motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)
The Declaration of Defendants’
counsel states that Defendants’ counsel sent an email to Plaintiff’s counsel on
September 29, 2023, detailing the basis for this motion. (Declaration of
Ibrahim Adwani ISO Mot. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Plaintiff never responded to the
correspondence. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendants have therefore complied with their
statutory meet and confer obligations. 
Punitive Damages
Defendants contend that Plaintiff
has not properly set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages.
Generally, punitive damages
may be awarded only when the trier of fact finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As nonintentional torts support punitive damages when
the defendant's conduct “involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of others,” our focus is on malice and oppression. (Gawara v. United States
Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663].) As
defined in the punitive damages statute, “[m]alice” encompasses “despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights and safety of others,” and “[o]ppression” means
“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1),
(2).) The term “‘despicable,’” though not defined in the statute, is applicable
to “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ ” (College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 [34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
898, 882 P.2d 894], quoting 4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.) 
Under the statute, “malice
does not require actual intent to harm. [Citation.] Conscious disregard for
the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the
probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully
fails to avoid such consequences. [Citation.] Malice may be proved either
expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence
from which the jury draws inferences. [Citation.]” (Angie M. v. Superior
Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197].)
(Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc., (2013) 220
Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299 (bold emphasis added).)
Civil Code § 3294(a)
provides:
In an action for the breach
of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”
Subdivision (b) defines liability for an employer
for the malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct of its employees:
An employer shall not be
liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee
of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of
the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which
the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and
conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud,
or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.
Civil Code § 3294(c) defines malice, oppression
and fraud:
(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable
conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person's rights.
(3) ‘Fraud’ means an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
(Bold emphasis added.)
To withstand a motion to
strike punitive damages allegations, the complaint must set forth facts
supporting a claim for punitive damages:
The mere allegation an
intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of
punitive damages. (Citation omitted.) Not only must there be circumstances of
oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to
support such a claim.
(Grieves v. Superior Court (Fox) (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (emphasis added).)
            Defendants
argue that the Complaint consists entirely of conclusory allegations devoid of
specific facts showing malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, or that
any officer of Defendants ratified that conduct. The Court observes that the
Complaint alleges retaliation under two different legal theories. (Complaint ¶¶
42-56.) Conclusory allegations of malice may be sufficient to support punitive
damages when retaliation is alleged (See Perkins v. Superior Court
(1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.) However, even construed in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that these allegations are not
sufficient because the Complaint is entirely devoid of factual allegations showing
ratification of any malicious conduct. A conclusory assertion that Plaintiff’s
termination was authorized or ratified by an officer, director, or managing
agent of the corporation is not sufficient. 
            The
Court is therefore persuaded that the allegations pertaining to punitive
damages are insufficiently pled and must be stricken. 
CONCLUSION:
            Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint is GRANTED. 
            Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:  December 15,
2023                            ___________________________________
                                                                                    Theresa
M. Traber
                                                                                    Judge
of the Superior Court
            Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
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have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.