Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 23STCV10121, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV10121, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV10121 Hearing Date: November 27, 2023 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: November 27, 2023 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Gerald Hopkins v. Joy Anderson

CASE NO.: 23STCV10121

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Joy Anderson

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Gerald Hopkins

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action, filed on May 5, 2023, for intentional interference with contractual relations and with prospective economic advantage. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made misrepresentations to Plaintiff’s employer that caused Plaintiff to be terminated.

Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with 30-days leave to amend as to the first cause of action only and otherwise OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file an serve an answer to the Complaint pursuant to code.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

Defendant filed a Declaration of Demurring or Moving Party in Support of Automatic Extension on July 14, 2023 in which she stated that her counsel has repeatedly attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel, but was not successful in doing so. (See July 14, 2023 Declaration.) The Court therefore finds that Defendant has satisfied her statutory meet and confer obligations.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the location of Techachapi Landfill and the Kern County Public Works Department as being within Kern County, California. Neither of these requests is material to the Court’s ruling. Defendant’s requests are DENIED. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 (“[J]udicial notice . . . is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”].)

Timeliness of Demurrer

Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s demurrer as untimely because, according to Plaintiff, the demurrer was filed and served more than 30 days after service of the Summons and Complaint. No proof of service of the Summons and Complaint has ever been filed with the Court, either independently or accompanying Plaintiff’s opposition papers. Plaintiff has thus failed to demonstrate that the demurrer is untimely.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant first asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute because all relevant conduct occurred in Kern County, not Los Angeles County.

Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution explicitly states that superior courts have original jurisdiction in all cases except habeas corpus proceedings and proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. (Cal. Const. Art. VI § 10.) The process of superior courts “shall extend throughout the state.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 71.) “The superior courts of the state of California, while located and functioning in the several counties of the state, are not local or county courts, but constitute a system of state courts.” (Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. V. Superior Court in and for Colusa County (1925) 196 Cal.414, 432.)

Defendant cites no authority standing for the position that a Superior Court of this state does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute arising in this state. A contention that claims pertaining to conduct occurring in Kern County should not be litigated in Los Angeles County is an argument for change of venue under Code of Civil Procedure section 395 et seq, not a basis for a demurrer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

First Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

Defendant demurs to the first cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

To plead and prove a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the elements of this cause of action. Plaintiff alleges:

8. On September, 2021 at the active Tehachapi Landfill, while Joy Anderson was attempting to dispose of excluded items on to the landfill she was met by Gerald Hopkins, and two other bystanders watching the conversation take place.

9. Gerald Hopkin told Joy Anderson in a polite tone that the items that she wanted to disposed were excluded from disposal. After Joy Anderson was told that the items were unacceptable she became very irate and began yelling at Gerald Hopkins.

10. To avoid further conflict Gerald Hopkin walked away from Joy Andersons vehicle.

11. Afterwards, Joy Anderson intentionally embellished, and exaggerated her experience to the Kern County Public Works Department.

12. Joy Anderson intentionally mislead Kern County Public Works Department to cause Gerald Hopkins to be terminated.

(Complaint ¶¶ 8-12.) These allegations comprise the entirety of the factual contentions in the pleadings. As Defendant correctly states, Plaintiff does not allege the existence of a valid contract. Although the Complaint may be easily construed to allege that Plaintiff was employed by the Kern County Public Works Department, Plaintiff offers no basis to infer that there was a valid contract between the parties, and Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion in his opposition that the pleadings are sufficient does not cure this failure. Moreover, the Complaint is entirely silent on the form of the proposed contract. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(g).) The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the first cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Second Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

Defendant also demurs to the second cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

To state a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must plead (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff caused by the acts of the defendant. (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn. 6.)

Defendant asserts that the factual allegations in the Complaint, as recited above, do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Defendant is incorrect. Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as required on demurrer, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was employed by the Kern County Public Works Department (Complaint ¶ 12). Employment is definitionally a relationship with the probability of future economic benefit to the parties. Moreover, the Complaint also alleges that Defendant intentionally mischaracterized her interaction with Plaintiff for the purpose of causing his termination. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Construing the allegations most favorably to Plaintiff, the Complaint, by alleging that Defendant “intentionally mislead Kern County Public Works Department to cause [Plaintiff] to be terminated]” appears to allege that Defendant was successful in disrupting that relationship and harming Plaintiff—i.e., that Plaintiff was terminated. (Id. ¶ 12.) The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is OVERRULED.

Uncertainty

Defendant also demurs to the entire Complaint as uncertain.

"A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures." (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) "A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond--i.e., he or she cannot reasonable determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her." (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 7:85 (emphasis in original).) "The objection of uncertainty does not go to the failure to allege sufficient facts." (Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 459.)

As should be apparent from the Court’s examination of the allegations raised, the Complaint is not so vague that it is impossible for Defendant to identify the claims to which it must respond. The Court therefore finds that the Complaint is not uncertain.

Leave to Amend

When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318). When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to state their claims against a defendant. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) “Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment. [Citation.] Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)

Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the first cause of action might be amended to cure the defects in the pleadings. However, as the failure to state sufficient facts with respect to that cause of action arises from a lack of detailed factual allegations, the Court concludes that the manner of amendment required is self-evident. The Court will therefore exercise its discretion to grant leave to amend.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the first cause of action only and otherwise OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file an serve an answer to the Complaint pursuant to code.

Plaintiff shall have 30 days leave to amend the Complaint from the date of this order.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 27, 2023 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.