Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 23STCV11801, Date: 2023-09-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV11801, Date: 2023-09-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV11801 Hearing Date: September 26, 2023 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: September 26, 2023 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Andrea Campos v. Lucky Taro, Inc.

CASE NO.: 23STCV11801

MOTION FOR STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF ARBITRATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Lucky Taro, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Andre Campos

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action under the Private Attorneys General Act, filed on May 24, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant systematically denied its employees their full wages, timely paid wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, and accurate wage statements.

Defendant moves to stay this matter pending resolution of a separate arbitration.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion for Stay Pending Resolution of the Arbitration is GRANTED.

The Court orders this matter stayed pending resolution of the arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims under the Labor Code and the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

The Court sets a Status Conference Re: Resolution of Arbitration for March 20, 2023 at 8:30 AM.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant requests that the Court stay this matter pending resolution of a pending arbitration of related issues.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Defendant raises evidentiary objections to portions of Plaintiff’s Opposition and the Declaration of Christian J. Petronelli in support of the opposition. Defendant cites no authority requiring the Court to rule on evidentiary objections in the context of a motion for stay, as opposed to a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).) Regardless, as the materials to which Defendant objects are not relevant to this ruling, the Court declines to rule on these objections.

Factual History

Most of the factual history relevant to this motion is undisputed. Plaintiff signed a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims in the course of his employment by Defendant. (Declaration of Cari A. Cohorn ISO Mot. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) That agreement provides for arbitration of disputes arising out of or related to Plaintiff’s employment by Defendants. (Id. Exh. A. §§ 1-5; see also Exh. B. §§ 1-5.) Plaintiff submitted a demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association on May 8, 2023, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. (Cohorn Decl. ¶ 3.)

In the Arbitration, Plaintiff asserts claims for employment discrimination, failure to engage in the interactive process, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. (Declaration of Christian J. Petronnelli ISO Opp. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also asserts claims under the California Labor Code including meal and rest period violations, failure to provide accurate wage and time statements under Labor Code section 226, and waiting time penalties. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed the Complaint in this action on May 24, 2023 seeking civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act on behalf of himself and other employees for numerous violations of the Labor Code by Defendant, including, inter alia, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to timely pay wages on termination. (See Complaint ¶¶ 24-37.)

Analysis

Defendant argues that this case should be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration by operation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4, or, in the alternative, that the Court should exercise its inherent authority to stay this action.

1. Mandatory Stay Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.4

Defendant first argues that this action is subject to a mandatory stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. This section provides, in relevant part:

If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4 [emphasis added].) Defendant concedes that the Court has not ordered arbitration of any controversy in this action, but contends that a stay is nonetheless appropriate under this provision because Plaintiff voluntarily chose to arbitrate his FEHA and Labor Code claims. Defendant cites no authority in support of this position, which contradicts the express language of the statute that provides for a stay of the action only when the Court has ordered arbitration. The Court having made no such order, Section 1281.4 does not authorize the relief sought by Defendant in these circumstances.

2. Discretionary Stay Under Inherent Authority

Defendant moves in the alternative to stay this proceeding pending resolution of the arbitration under the Court’s inherent authority.

Code of Civil Procedure section 128 subdivision (a)(8) states that the Court has the inherent authority “[t]o amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128(a)(8).) As a consequence of this authority, trial courts “generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.)

Defendant argues that staying this action will conserve the time and effort of the parties, counsel, and the Court, because arbitration of Plaintiff’s FEHA and Labor Code claims will necessarily require resolution of issues which overlap with issues raised in Plaintiff’s PAGA claims. Defendant contends that staying this matter pending arbitration will avoid the risk of duplicative proceedings resulting in conflicting rulings.

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that there would not be a risk of conflicting rulings because Plaintiff’s PAGA claims are not at issue in the arbitration. Thus, Plaintiff argues, none of the findings by the arbitrator could have any effect on Plaintiff’s PAGA claims, and specifically asserts that the arbitrator will not be addressing Plaintiff’s standing to bring PAGA claims. While that may be true, this does not mean that the arbitrator will confront no issues that impact on Plaintiff’s standing to assert PAGA claims in this action. As the California Supreme Court held in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal. 5^th 1104, 1120, PAGA’s statutory language in “section 2699, subdivision (c) defines ‘aggrieved employee,’ and we have explained that ‘[t]he plain language of section 2699(c) has only two requirements for PAGA standing.’ [Citation] The plaintiff must allege that he or she is (1) ‘someone ‘who was employed by the alleged violator”’” and (2) someone “‘”against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”’” [Citation].” Because of the overlapping Labor Code violations asserted in this PAGA action and in the arbitration, the arbitrator will be compelled to resolve – one way or another – whether Plaintiff was subjected to violations of his statutory rights. It is true that Plaintiff need only prove that he was subject to one type of Labor Code violation to have standing to challenge all violations on behalf of all aggrieved parties, but Plaintiff has brought all his Labor Code violations in the arbitration, thus leaving open the possibility that the arbitrator could find he suffered no violation. If this were so, the arbitrator’s decisions on whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated would form the predicate for a finding that he lacked standing to assert the PAGA claims. (Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal. App. 5th 65, 77-79 [arbitrator’s decision that no violation has occurred has preclusive effect in PAGA action].) Allowing the PAGA case to proceed to trial would risk conflicting rulings in the two proceedings. The Court is therefore persuaded that a stay pending resolution of the arbitration is in the interests of justice and judicial efficiency.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a stay of this action pending resolution of the arbitration is warranted under the Court’s inherent authority to control its own proceedings.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Stay Pending Resolution of the Arbitration is GRANTED.

The Court orders this matter stayed pending resolution of the arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims under the Labor Code and the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

The Court sets a Status Conference Re: Resolution of Arbitration for March 20, 2023 at 8:30 AM.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2023 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.